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Abstract
A fundamental aspect of society is the exchange and discussion of opinions bet-
ween individuals, occurring in mediums and situations as varied as company bo-
ardrooms, elementary school classrooms and online social media. This thesis stu-
dies several mathematical models of how an individual’s opinion(s) evolves via in-
teraction with others in a social network, developed to reflect and capture different
socio-psychological processes that occur during the interactions.
In the first part, and inspired by Solomon E. Asch’s seminal experiments on con-
formity, a novel discrete-time model of opinion dynamics is proposed, with each indi-
vidual having both an expressed and a private opinion on the same topic. Crucially,
an individual’s expressed opinion is altered from the individual’s private opinion
due to pressures to conform to the majority opinion of the social network. Expo-
nential convergence of the opinion dynamical system to a unique configuration is
established for general networks. Several conclusions are established, including how
differences between an individual’s expressed and private opinions arise, and how
to estimate disagreement among the private opinions at equilibrium. Asch’s expe-
riments are revisited and re-examined, and then it is shown that a few extremists
can create “pluralistic ignorance”, where people believe there is majority support for a
position but in fact the position is privately rejected by the majority of individuals!
The second part builds on the recently proposed discrete-time DeGroot–Friedkin
model, which describes the evolution of an individual’s self-confidence (termed social
power) in his/her opinion over the discussion of a sequence of issues. Using nonlinear
contraction analysis, exponential convergence to a unique equilibrium is established
for networks with constant topology. Networks with issue-varying topology (which
remain constant for any given issue) are then studied; exponential convergence to
a unique limiting trajectory is established. In a social context, this means that each
individual forgets his/her initial social power exponentially fast; in the limit, his/her
social power for a given issue depends only on the previously occurring sequence of
dynamic topology. Two further related works are considered; a network modification
problem, and a different convergence proof based on Lefschetz Fixed Point Theory.
In the final part, a continuous-time model is proposed to capture simultaneous
discussion of logically interdependent topics; the interdependence is captured by a “lo-
gic matrix”. When no individual remains attached to his/her initial opinion, a ne-
cessary and sufficient condition for the network to reach a consensus of opinions is
provided. This condition depends on the interplay between the network interactions
and the logic matrix; if the network interactions are too strong when compared to
the logical couplings, instability can result. Last, when some individuals remain atta-
ched to their initial opinions, sufficient conditions are given for opinions to converge
to a state of persistent disagreement.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Social Network Analysis
The works of this thesis fall into the broad field of research on social networks which
has been studied, in different communities at various times, for many decades. A
general definition of a social network is a system which contains a set of social actors
(the actor may be an individual or an organisation) that interact according to a set
of social relationships or interconnections. Social network analysis is the study of
variables of interest in the network, e.g. the actors’ opinions on a given topic, and
how these variables may be determined or may be changed due to the interactions. In
many, but not all of the works, a focus is placed on investigating the role of network
itself in shaping the behaviour that arises.
From one perspective, social network analysis falls into the rich and vast field of
complex network analysis; by nature, humans react in complex and often surprising
ways to stimulus when in a social setting. The spreading of rumours or ideas over
a social network can be captured by a diffusion model [Kempe et al., 2003], or by
epidemic models which first arose in the study of virus spreading [Mei et al., 2017;
Brockmann and Helbing, 2013]. Investigations have been made regarding the diffe-
rences in how Facebook users consume scientific and conspiracy articles [Del Vicario
et al., 2016]. The work of [Ramazi et al., 2016] studied networks of binary decision
making individuals, classifying individuals as either conforming (the individual ta-
kes decision A when enough neighbours are also taking A) or anti-conforming (the
individual takes decision B when too many neighbours take A). Surprisingly, it was
shown that networks of either conforming or anti-conforming individuals tend to
reach decisions they are satisfied with. Systematic changing of the network structure
to undermine or strengthen the network with respect to an objective function, e.g. re-
ducing the expected number of attacks arising from a terrorist network, was studied
in [Mellon et al., 2016]. A comprehensive review of literature on social network ana-
lysis is well beyond the scope of this thesis; the above is just a selective representation
that helps to highlight the wide range of interesting problems considered.
One of the most popular approaches to social network analysis is agent-based
modelling. In an agent-based model, each actor is represented by an agent, with
some mathematical model (typically a vector difference or differential equation) des-
cribing the agent’s dynamics, e.g. how an individual may process new sources of
1
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information but with a confirmation bias towards the individual’s established views.
Agents interact according to mathematical models which describe rules or processes
that occur during the interaction. Beyond building a model, a key task is to establish
what types of network-level phenomena (macro-level dynamics) arise from processes
at the agent level (micro-level dynamics); some resulting network-level phenomena
can be counter to what is expected when considering what occurs at the agent-level
dynamics. This thesis will study agent-based models of opinion dynamics.
1.2 Opinion Dynamics and Influence Networks
Opinion dynamics is an area of research that has been investigated by communities
in sociology, physics, computer science, systems and control engineering, and more,
over decades. Thus, no attempt is made to give a detailed account of all available
works other than to introduce some of the most relevant results. At the beginning
of each main chapter, a more detailed review may be provided to give relevance and
context to each work. The interested reader is referred to [Proskurnikov and Tempo,
2017] for an overview survey from a systems and control perspective, [Flache et al.,
2017] for a survey from the computational sociology community while the survey
[Friedkin, 2015] forms a bridge between the two communities. In the remainder
of this section, the fundamental French–Harary–DeGroot model is highlighted and
some interesting extensions, which aim to capture a variety of social phenomena, are
discussed. Models and social phenomena of direct interest to this thesis are explored,
then motivations and key philosophies of opinion dynamics research are elucidated,
and last, a connection is drawn to multi-agent systems research.
1.2.1 The Fundamental French–Harary–DeGroot Model
In 1956, John French Jr. introduced an agent-based model of opinion dynamics
[French Jr, 1956] to study how individuals exerted social power on each other during
interactions in a network. French Jr. assumed that each individual has an opinion
on a given topic, and each individual interacts to learn of the opinions of that indi-
vidual’s neighbours. In doing so, the opinions evolve over time as each individual
integrates learned opinion values of his/her neighbours with the individual’s own
opinion until a consensus is reached on the opinion value, i.e. there is agreement
across the opinions of all individuals. Frank Harary [Harary, 1959; Harary et al.,
1965] and Morris DeGroot [DeGroot, 1974] provided major theoretical contributions
to generalise the model and establish conditions on the network which guarantee a
consensus of opinions is achieved. The French–Harary–DeGroot model has become
the fundamental agent-based model of opinion dynamics which many subsequent
works, including the works in this thesis, build upon. For convenience, the author
will refer to the model simply as the DeGroot model (as it is widely known), but the
contributions by French and Harary are not overlooked. To better understand the li-
terature review and place context on results, the model will be informally introduced
here, with a formal account given in Chapter 2.
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For a given population of n individuals, individual i has an opinion yi(t) at time
t = 0, 1, . . ., which is a real-valued number1. Individual i’s opinion evolves according
to the difference equation
yi(t + 1) =
n
∑
j=1
wijyj(t) (1.1)
and this process occurs simultaneously for all n individuals in the network. Here,
yj(t) is the opinion value of individual j, who is a neighbour of individual i. The
nonnegative coefficient wij is assumed to satisfy ∑nj=1 wij = 1. One can consider the
quantity wij as representing the amount of relative influence individual j exerts on
individual i in determining i’s new opinion value yi(t + 1). Thus, wij is termed an
“influence weight” while the collection of individuals is sometimes termed an “influ-
ence network”. It is clear that the influence weights represent a social power exerted
by one individual onto another (French had been driven to develop a mathematical
representation of social power). As proved in [Harary, 1959; Harary et al., 1965; De-
Groot, 1974], the opinions asymptotically reach a consensus if the graph representing
the network is strongly connected2 and aperiodic. That is, limt→∞ yi(t) = yj(t) for all
individuals i and j in the network; interpersonal social influence acts to bring opini-
ons closer together in value. Notice that because it was assumed that ∑nj=1 wij = 1,
then yi(t + 1) is a convex combination (or weighted average) of opinions yj(t). Thus,
some works refer to such models as weighted averaging models.
The DeGroot model has received extensive treatment since the seminal works
discussed above. A number of experimental validations have been conducted, e.g.
[Becker et al., 2017; Chandrasekhar et al., 2012]. Attention has also been placed on
establishing conditions on the network topology which guarantees a consensus is
reached even when topology is changing over time, i.e. the influence weights wij(t)
are time-varying. Some results are given in e.g. [Cao et al., 2008; Ren and Beard, 2005;
Nedić and Liu, 2017; Shi and Johansson, 2013]. A major assumption of the DeGroot
model is that all individuals simultaneously update their opinions at each time instant
t. Gossip-based models relax this assumption. Gossip models, in which only one
individual’s opinion changes at each time instant (or a subset of individuals in some
variations), have been studied in e.g. [Ravazzi et al., 2015; Liu et al., 2011; Boyd et al.,
2006; Yu et al., 2017]. A continuous-time variant was proposed in [Abelson, 1964].
1.2.2 Beyond Consensus and Towards Complex Social Phenomena
Beyond consensus, variations of the DeGroot model have been proposed to inves-
tigate how different social phenomena may arise. The Hegselmann–Krause model
[Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Lorenz, 2007; Blondel et al., 2009; Mirtabatabaei
and Bullo, 2012; Su et al., 2017; Etesami and Başar, 2015] introduced the concept
of bounded-confidence to describe homophily, where an individual interacts only
1Other works may assume the opinion is a discrete variable. An interpretation of an opinion as a
real number is provided in Chapter 2.
2This condition implies that for any two individuals i and j, i can directly or indirectly (via a path
on the graph) influence j’s opinion. The reader is referred to Chapter 2 for details.
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with those others who have similar opinions. From a modelling perspective, this
means that the influence weight wij is dependent on the difference |yi(t)− yj(t)|, i.e.
wij is state-dependent. In the limit, individuals can become separated into clusters,
where the final opinions are the same within each cluster, and different between the
clusters. The Altafini model introduced the concept of negative influence weights
wij < 0 to capture antagonistic interactions among individuals who may, for any
number of reasons, dislike or mistrust each other [Altafini, 2013; Proskurnikov et al.,
2016; Liu et al., 2017a]. If the strongly connected network is “structurally balanced”,
the opinions can become polarised into two opposing clusters, otherwise all opinions
converge to yi(t) = 0. The paper [Dandekar et al., 2013] extended the DeGroot mo-
del to capture an individual’s tendency for bias assimilation, i.e. an individual will
place more weight on opinions whose values are closer to the individual’s current
opinion. Under certain conditions on the network structure and intensity of bias as-
similation, the social network can become polarised. Social influence, as described by
the DeGroot model, was used to explain how the “wisdom of the crowd“ effect can
be strengthened due to interactions between individuals [Becker et al., 2017], with
experimental validation provided. Models which consider an individual’s desire to
be unique are studied in [Mäs et al., 2014; Smaldino and Epstein, 2015].
Many of the above listed works contain models (e.g. Hegselmann–Krause and
Altafini) which have limiting behaviour that is said to show weak diversity [Duggins,
2017; Mäs et al., 2014]. That is, the limiting opinions are diverse (in the sense that the
opinions are not at a complete consensus) but form clusters in which every indivi-
dual in the cluster has the same opinion. In the context of the Hegselmann–Krause
model, the network forms disconnected subgraphs where each subgraph represents
a cluster, and there is no interaction between individuals in different clusters. In
the Altafini model, “structural balance” may be destroyed by changing the sign of
a single influence weight from wij > 0 to wij < 0 (or vice versa), with the result
being opinions then converge to the neutral value of yi(t) = 0 instead of forming
two polarised clusters. In other words, the polarisation phenomenon is not robust
to network changes. The reality is that in most social settings,strong diversity is ob-
served, where there is a distribution of opinions over a continuous spectrum that is
not concentrated into sharp clusters. There may be several subgroups, including per-
haps extremists (termed subcultures in the sociology community [Mäs et al., 2014])
where opinions within a subgroup are approximately, but not exactly equal. This
has motivated several models which attempt to give different explanations for strong
diversity. Works such as [Duggins, 2017; Mäs et al., 2014] show strong diversity
can result from a state-dependent intolerance of differing opinions. In their models,
wij(t) is a smooth function which obeys wij(t) < 0 if |yi(t) − yj(t)| is greater than
some threshold, and wij(t) > 0 if |yi(t)− yj(t)| is smaller than that threshold. This
contrasts with the Altafini model, which assumes that wij has a sign that is indepen-
dent of the state yi (but may be time-varying).
The Friedkin–Johnsen model [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990] is a generalisation of
the DeGroot model which explains that strong diversity arises due to an individual’s
stubbornness, manifested in their remaining to some degree attached to their initial
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opinion (dependent on just how stubborn they are). That is, individual i continues to
be influenced by yi(0) over the course of the opinion discussion. From another per-
spective, this implies that individual i is not maximally susceptible to interpersonal
influence as described by the DeGroot model. In the limit, the opinions may converge
to an equilibrium of persistent disagreement. A formal introduction to the Friedkin–
Johnsen model, which will be used as a basis for some of the results in this thesis,
will be given in Chapter 2. The model has been experimentally verified in small-
to medium-size groups [Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011; Friedkin and Bullo, 2017], and
a continuous-time version of the model appeared earlier [Taylor, 1968]. An interes-
ting extension was presented in [Parsegov et al., 2017], which considers the scenario
where individuals simultaneously discuss multiple logically interdependent topics.
The final opinion distribution can be heavily affected by the logical interdependence;
the paper [Friedkin et al., 2016b] showed that such interdependence could be used
to explain why the US public supported the invasion of Iraq in 2003 at the time it
occurred, but by 2005 (and as a direct consequence of many individuals changing
their opinions concerning the possession or otherwise by Iraq of weapons of mass
destruction) the majority of the US public believed the invasion was unjustified.
1.2.3 Social Phenomena of Relevance
The above results give a general overview of results that help to build a picture of
the direction this thesis aims to take. Now, a brief introduction is given to the spe-
cific social phenomena that are investigated in this thesis; where needed, additional
literature is provided in the introduction of the relevant chapter for further in-depth
exploration.
In Part I, the causes of discrepancies between an individual’s privately held and
publicly expressed opinions are studied using a novel model proposed by the author.
There is a rich literature on such discrepancies. In [Waters and Hans, 2009], the
authors recorded that over one third of jurors in criminal trials would have priva-
tely voted against the final decision of the jury panel they were on. The economist
and political scientist Timur Kuran popularised the concept of preference falsification,
where an individual presents a falsified view due to social pressure (be it imaginary
or real) [Kuran, 1997]. Interestingly, there is often a disconnect between the true
opinions of the general majority and what is perceived to be the true opinion of the
general majority. This relates to the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance; in the 1960s,
the majority of white Americans were in fact privately against segregation but most
individuals assumed there was a majority in support of segregation [O’Gorman, 1975].
One reason such discrepancies arise is due to a pressure to conform to a social norm,
as illustrated by Solomon E. Asch’s seminal experiments on conformity [Asch, 1951].
The interested reader is referred to the introduction of Chapter 3, where these ideas
are given a full treatment. The proposed model is used to revisit Asch’s experiments,
and identify a situation where pluralistic ignorance arises in a network.
In the above literature, much focus was placed on modelling how the influence
weights wij change as individuals interact. Beyond the simple assumption that wij(t)
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changes as an explicit function of time t, the changes are often driven by a social
process, e.g. homophily in the Hegselmann–Krause model or bias assimilation in
[Dandekar et al., 2013]. Part II investigates how the wij change as captured by the
DeGroot–Friedkin model [Jia et al., 2015]. The DeGroot–Friedkin model considers a
social network which discusses opinions on a sequence of topics. At the end of each
topic, individual i updates his/her self-weight wii (termed self-confidence or indivi-
dual social power in [Jia et al., 2015]) via the social process of reflected self-appraisal.
In particular, wii increases (respectively decreases) if individual i had a significant
(respectively negligible) impact during the discussion of the previous topic. Owing
to the assumption ∑nj=1 wij = 1, as wii increases or decreases, necessarily wij for j 6= i
also changes. Using a variety of tools, investigations are conducted in Part II to iden-
tify the role of the network structure in determining how individual social power
wii changes over the sequence of issues, and to draw conclusions on the limiting
behaviour of wii. A modified variant of the DeGroot–Friedkin model was used to
experimentally identify how social groups, over time, tend to become dominated by
a single individual with high social power [Friedkin et al., 2016a].
Part III investigates a continuous-time model that describes how a network of
individuals simultaneously discuss opinions on a set of logically interdependent to-
pics. A key aspect of this work is that significant, as opposed to merely technical,
differences in the conditions which guarantee that the opinion system remains sta-
ble are identified between the discrete-time model in [Parsegov et al., 2017; Friedkin
et al., 2016b] (as noted earlier) and the continuous-time model proposed in this the-
sis. These differences are related to the network topology and matrix describing the
logical interdependence.
1.2.4 Motivations and Key Concepts
Having introduced and discussed a number of different results, one question that
requires answering is: why is there a need to develop agent-based opinion dynamics
models? It is unlikely that such models will be able to capture human interactions in
a social network to the same degree of accuracy as an Euler–Lagrange equation might
capture the dynamics of a robotic manipulator arm [Spong et al., 2006], even though
there are experimental validations of the DeGroot and Friedkin–Johnsen models as
detailed earlier. In the author’s opinion, several reasons motivate the work.
First, a key objective is to be able to obtain high level observations about the con-
ditions (both on the agent- and network-level) required to generate specific network-
level phenomena, e.g. reaching a consensus. One may then use the model to explain
how agent-level dynamics might, via networked interactions, create the observed so-
cial phenomena. This can be used to enrich the existing sociological and social psy-
chological literature which typically study the same phenomena from the perspective
of experiments or more qualitative methods. As an example, the goal of Part I of this
thesis is precisely to re-examine interesting and established social phenomena not
yet considered in agent-based models. At times, the agent-level dynamics can lead
to surprising and unexpected results, such as when each individual’s desire to be
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unique leads to overall conformity in the network [Smaldino and Epstein, 2015].
Second, well-posed and validated agent-based models can allow for a systematic
determination of the key factors or parameters that govern the phenomena, and also
allow for observations on how the phenomena may change as a function of the fac-
tors or parameters. This may not be straightforward for experimental or qualitative
based methods at the beginning. As an example, and as will be explicitly detailed
in Chapter 2, the DeGroot model reaches a consensus if the network satisfies cer-
tain connectivity requirements, while the final consensus value is in part determined
by the individuals’ “eigenvector centralities”, which is a quantity dependent on the
network structure and the strength of the interpersonal influence weights wij. This
knowledge may prove crucial in identifying methods for reducing unwanted social
phenomenon (reducing one type of unwanted social behaviour will be a major focus
of Chapter 4). As a result, such models (provided they are experimentally validated
later) will allow for predictions to be made on how changes to the network or to indi-
viduals’ parameters may affect the observed social phenomena; this may also guide
the design of future experimental and theoretical studies.
For the systems and control community to provide lasting contributions to this
field, some key concepts should be kept in mind. The model must be sufficiently
simple so that the full array of techniques developed in systems and control can
be utilised. Some of the above works, e.g. [Mäs et al., 2014; Duggins, 2017] are
able to capture a rich variety of phenomena but are so complex in the nonlineari-
ties of the agent equations that there is little hope of obtaining analytical results or
drawing qualitative or even general conclusions about the relation between behavi-
our and model parameters. (A parameter search might be employed to characterise
the model’s behaviour, but such models often have dozens of parameters, and so a
curse of dimensionality exists). On the other hand, simple models may not be able
to capture, as accurately, observed real-world social phenomena, which are often
complex and unexpected. Thus, a difficult balance must be struck whereby the mo-
dels must be sufficiently simple for analysis (including the drawing of qualitative or
semi-quantitative conclusions) but with enough parameters and complexities to cap-
ture the phenomena of interest. Such a view is not unique to the author; an eloquent
discussion is given in [Proskurnikov and Tempo, 2017]. Last, and to maximise the
chances that the works are accepted beyond the systems and control community, one
must ensure that the models proposed or studied are grounded in literature from so-
ciology and social psychology, whether it is in the agent equations or the phenomena
to be studied. This is a key difference from perhaps more conventional research on
the closely related discipline of multi-agent systems, where control algorithms are
designed to achieve a specific control objective. More is said in the next subsection.
1.2.5 Relation to Coordination of Multi-Agent Systems
The curious reader may be wondering why the systems and control community has
displayed a recent and vigorous interest in problems on opinion dynamics. From one
point of view, it is natural for systems and control researchers to seek to study com-
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plex networked systems in a more inter-disciplinary setting. While this is true, the
author’s view is that opinion dynamics has been of particular interest due to its close
relation to the problem of coordinating multi-agent systems, which has received sus-
tained and high levels of interest over the past 2 decades. Specifically, the DeGroot
and Abelson models are closely related to discrete-time and continuous-time algo-
rithms, respectively, for coordinating groups of autonomous vehicles [Jadbabaie et al.,
2003; Ren and Beard, 2005; Cao et al., 2008]. Also, the Taylor model was investigated
as an algorithm for containment-control of a multi-agent system [Cao et al., 2012].
In more detail, opinion dynamics models have agent-level dynamics which lead to
network-level social phenomena via interactions, while distributed algorithms are
used to establish how autonomous agents interact with its neighbours in order to,
e.g. reach a consensus [Ren and Beard, 2005; Olfati-Saber et al., 2007; Cai and Ishii,
2012], synchronise its states [Chopra, 2012; Wu et al., 2016; Qin and Yu, 2013] or form
a geometric formation shape [Krick et al., 2009; Anderson et al., 2008] .
The works reported in this thesis are therefore closely aligned with the author’s
other works conducted during his PhD studies on topics involving coordination of
multi-agent systems. This includes a body of work on (i) consensus and synchronisa-
tions of networked Euler–Lagrange agents (listed as papers [6], [7], [8], [19], [20], [22],
[23] on page vii), (ii) cooperative control of Global Positioning System (GPS)-denied
Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) using bearing measurements (listed as papers [3],
[9], [18], [21], on page vii), and (iii) various other topics in multi-agent coordination
(listed as papers [4], [12], [15], [17], [25], on page vii). One key difference is that in
cooperative control of multi-agent systems, distributed control laws are developed
for each agent to ensure the multi-agent system achieves some predefined objective,
e.g. forming a geometric formation shape. Thus, the algorithms are limited only by
the agents’ capabilities (e.g. actuator saturation, or communication range). In opi-
nion dynamics, the focus is on accurately modelling how an individual obtains and
processes information, and establishing what type of behaviour may arise.
1.3 Thesis Outline and Statements of Collaborations
This thesis consists of ten chapters, including the current chapter. The next chapter
introduces the fundamental DeGroot and Friedkin–Johnsen models in detail, and the
concept of using a graph to capture a dynamic social network. Seven main chapters
follow, each presenting main technical results. Chapter 10 provides conclusions and
discusses future work. A short appendix gives a list of results on linear algebra,
graph theory, and nonlinear contraction analysis used in the thesis. A brief outline
of the thesis structure and the contents of each chapter is now presented. According
to the different emphases of research topics and proposed research problems, the
seven main chapters (Chapters 3-9) are divided into three parts as shown in the list.
Figure 1.1 gives an overview of the thesis structure and the relation between the
chapters and the established models discussed earlier.
After the summary of each main chapter (Chapters 3-9) given below, a brief sum-
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French-Harary-DeGroot Model
Expressed-Private-Opinion Model Chapter 9DeGroot-Friedkin Model
Chapter 3
Chapter 4
Chapter 5
Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8
Figure 1.1: The structure of the thesis chapters and the models studied.
mary of the nature of the collaboration is reported when appropriate. The author is
primarily responsible for the contribution of research outcomes in each main chapter.
1. Chapter 1 presents a general introduction to the research background, and co-
vers some relevant models and results, as well as providing motivation for this
thesis.
2. Chapter 2 introduces the DeGroot model of opinion dynamics, which is the
fundamental model that this thesis builds upon. Standard convergence results
and an interpretation of the social network as a graph are presented. The
Friedkin–Johnsen model is also presented.
Part I: How Differences in Private and Expressed Opinions Arise
This part consists of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
3. Chapter 3 introduces a novel opinion dynamics model, termed the Expressed–
Private–Opinion (EPO) model, which aims to show that a pressure to conform
with the group norm can lead to an individual having different private and
expressed opinions. Convergence results are obtained, and detailed analysis
is conducted on the steady-state opinion configuration to draw conclusions
within the social networks context.
This is joint work with Y. Qin, A. Govaert, and M. Cao (University of Groningen, Net-
herlands), and B. D. O. Anderson. Part of the research in this chapter was performed
during a research visit to University of Groningen, Netherlands.
4. Chapter 4 uses the EPO model to examine and explain results from the seminal
conformity experiments by Solomon E. Asch, which also provides a level of
validation of the model. In addition, it is shown that the dangerous social
phenomenon of “pluralistic ignorance” (explained in detail in this chapter) can
occur due to the presence of stubborn extremists.
This is joint work with Y. Qin, A. Govaert, and M. Cao (University of Groningen, Net-
herlands), and B. D. O. Anderson. Part of the research in this chapter was performed
during a research visit to University of Groningen, Netherlands.
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Part II: Evolution of Individual Social Power
This part consists of Chapter 5, Chapter 6, Chapter 7 and Chapter 8.
5. Chapter 5 revisits the recently proposed DeGroot–Friedkin model of social po-
wer evolution over a sequence of issues. Nonlinear contraction analysis is em-
ployed to obtain an exponential convergence result, and other techniques are
employed to gain insight into convergence rate and provide an upper bound
on the social power of an individual at equilibrium.
This is joint work with J. Liu (SUNY at Stony Brook, USA), Tamer Başar (University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA), C. Yu and B. D. O. Anderson.
6. The main contribution of Chapter 6 is to extend the original DeGroot–Friedkin
model to include dynamic (issue-varying) network topology. Nonlinear con-
traction analysis is again employed to draw the conclusion that individuals
exponentially forget their initial social power; social power as the sequence of
issues tends to infinity depends only on the network topology.
This is joint work with J. Liu (SUNY at Stony Brook, USA), Tamer Başar (University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA), C. Yu and B. D. O. Anderson.
7. Chapter 7 studies star graphs, which give rise to autocratic social power confi-
gurations. A number of network modification strategies are investigated, invol-
ving the introduction of new individuals and new interpersonal relationships
in order to change the ordering of individual social power.
This is joint work with J. Liu (SUNY at Stony Brook, USA), Tamer Başar (University
of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA), C. Yu and B. D. O. Anderson.
8. Chapter 8 explores the original DeGroot-Friedkin model from the perspective
of Lefschetz fixed-point theory. In particular, a simple result is obtained to
conclude a local exponential convergence property, without the detailed calcu-
lations that arise when using nonlinear contraction analysis.
This is joint work with B. D. O. Anderson.
Part III: Opinion Dynamics with Interdependent Topics
This part consists of Chapter 9.
9. Chapter 9 considers a continuous-time model where individuals simultane-
ously discuss opinions on multiple logically interdependent topics. Necessary
and sufficient conditions are established on the logical interdependency and
network topology for ensuring a consensus of opinions is reached; it turns out
that these conditions differ significantly from the discrete-time model. Stub-
born individuals are also investigated.
The results in this chapter are from joint work with M. H. Trinh, and H.-S. Ahn (GIST,
South Korea) and Y.-H. Lim (GNTECH, South Korea) and B. D. O. Anderson. Part of
the research in this chapter was performed during a research visit to Gwangju Institute
of Science and Technology, South Korea.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
This chapter introduces the notation to be used in the thesis, and an overview of
graph theory. In addition, the DeGroot and Friedkin–Johnsen models are revisited.
2.1 Notations and Definitions
The notation used in this thesis is largely standard in systems and control literature.
The set of real, integer, and natural numbers are denoted by R, Z, and N, respecti-
vely. Unless stated otherwise, scalars and vectors are denoted by non-bold and bold
lower case, respectively. That is, x is a scalar while x is a vector. A matrix is deno-
ted by a bold upper case variable, e.g. M. Moreover, vectors are viewed as column
vectors unless otherwise stated. The transpose of a vector x or matrix M is denoted
by x> or M>, respectively. The ith entry of x and (i, j)th entry of M are denoted by
xi and mij, respectively. The matrix diag(xi) denotes a diagonal matrix with the ith
entry being xi.
For any real number x and complex number z, |x| and |z| denote the absolute
value of x and modulus of z, respectively. The imaginary unit is denoted by
√
−1 = 
and for a complex number z = a + b, denote Re(z) = a and Im(z) = b. The 1-norm,
2-norm, and ∞-norm of a vector x, and the associated induced matrix norm, are
denoted by ‖ · ‖1, ‖ · ‖2 and ‖ · ‖∞, respectively. The n-column vector of all ones and
zeros is given by 1n and 0n, respectively. The n × n identity matrix is given by In.
The ith canonical base unit vector of Rn is denoted as ei, i.e. ei ∈ Rn has one in its ith
entry and zeros elsewhere. The Kronecker product is denoted by ⊗.
A matrix A is said to be nonnegative (respectively positive) if all of its entries aij
are nonnegative (respectively positive). The matrix A is denoted as being nonnega-
tive and positive by A ≥ 0 and A > 0 respectively. Similarly, for a vector x ∈ Rn,
0 ≤ x and 0 < x indicate component-wise inequalities, i.e., for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
0 ≤ xi and 0 < xi, respectively. The n-simplex is ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ x, 1>n x = 1}.
Define ∆̃n = ∆n\{e1, . . . , en} and int(∆n) = {x ∈ Rn : 0 < x, 1>n x = 1} as the simplex
excluding the corner points and the interior of the simplex, respectively.
A nonnegative matrix A ∈ Rn×m is said to be row-substochastic (row-stochastic)
if, for all i, there holds ∑nj=1 aij ≤ 1 (∑nj=1 aij = 1). A matrix A is said to be doubly
stochastic if ∑nj=1 aij = 1 and ∑
n
j=1 aji = 1. For two nonnegative matrices A, B ≥ 0,
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A ∈ Rn×m and B ∈ Rn×m are said to be of the same type, denoted by A ∼ B, if A
and B have strictly positive elements at the same positions. The spectral radius of a
square matrix A ∈ Rn×n is the largest modulus value of the eigenvalues of A, and
is denoted by ρ(A). For a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, λi(A) denotes an eigenvalue of A. If
A = A>, the eigenvalues are assumed to be ordered from smallest to largest, so that
λmin(A) , λ1(A) ≤ . . . ≤ λn(A) , λmax(A). A matrix is irreducible if there does not
exist a permutation matrix P such that Ā = P>AP has the lower triangular form
Ā =
[
Ā11 0
Ā21 Ā22
]
, (2.1)
where Āij have size greater than 0. A useful definition for a certain matrix property
is now given.
Definition 2.1 (Primitivity, [Bullo et al., 2009, Definition 1.12]). A nonnegative square
matrix A is primitive if there exists k ∈N such that Ak > 0.
2.2 Graph Theory
As will become evident in the following section, a graph is a mathematical object
that is a convenient and powerful method for representing the interactions between
a group of individuals. The terms “network” and “graph” will be used interchange-
ably when there is no risk of confusion.
Given any square nonnegative matrix A ∈ Rn×n, one can associate with it a graph
G[A] = (V , E [A], A). Here, V = {v1, . . . , vn} is the set of nodes of the graph G[A],
with index set I = {1, . . . , n}. An edge eij = (vi, vj) is in the set of ordered edges
E [A] ⊆ V × V if and only if aji > 0. Unless specified, self-loops may exist, i.e. eii is
allowed to be in E , and thus aii > 0 is allowed. The edge eij is said to be incoming
with respect to vj and outgoing with respect to vi, i.e. the arrow points1 from vi to
vj, and the weight aji is said to be the weight associated with edge eij. Fig. 2.1 gives
an example network. The interpretation of the edges is dependent on the context
and model, but typically connotes a form of directed interaction from individual i
to individual j. In the opinion models considered in this thesis, an edge eij connotes
that individual j learns of, and is in some way influenced by individual i’s opinion.
Another interpretation is that the edge eij implies that individual i exerts an influence
on individual j. The works considered in this thesis will only consider graphs with
positive edge weights, i.e. aij ≥ 0. Other works may consider negative edge weights
to represent antagonistic or competitive interpersonal influence.
Since the graph is directed, in general, existence of eij does not imply existence of
eji (and vice versa) and thus A is not assumed to be symmetric. The neighbour set
of vi is denoted by Ni = {vj ∈ V : (vj, vi) ∈ E}, and records the nodes j with edges
1In some literature, and perhaps due to problem context, edge weights are defined so that eij > 0⇔
aij > 0. For a given aij > 0, the direction of the associated edge is therefore reversed from what is
detailed in this thesis. The result is that the matrix A is unchanged, while all edges are drawn in the
opposite direction. No issues arise in terms of analysis, other than use of different terminology.
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incoming to i. Because self-loops are allowed, vi may be in Ni. A directed path is a
sequence of edges of the form (vp1 , vp2), (vp2 , vp3), ..., where vpi ∈ V and epi pi+1 ∈ E .
Node i is reachable from node j if there exists a directed path from vj to vi. Moreover,
a graph G[A] is strongly connected if and only if there is a path from every node to
every other node [Godsil and Royle, 2001]. A graph G[A] is strongly connected if and
only if A is irreducible [Godsil and Royle, 2001], or equivalently, there does not exist
a reordering of the nodes V such that A can be expressed in the form in Eq. (2.1). A
directed cycle is a directed path that starts and ends at the same vertex, and contains
no repeated vertex except the initial (which is also the final) vertex. The length of a
cycle is the number of edges in the cyclic path. The perodicity of a directed graph is
the smallest integer k that divides the length of every cycle of the graph. A graph is
aperiodic if k = 1 [Bullo et al., 2009]. Note that any graph with a self-loop is aperiodic.
From results on nonnegative matrices and, further, the Perron-Frobenius Theo-
rem (see Appendix A.1), one concludes that A has left and right eigenvectors with
nonnegative entries, u> and v, associated with the eigenvalue λ1 = ρ(A). If G[A] is
strongly connected, then λ1 = ρ(A) is a simple eigenvalue, u> and v can be taken
to have strictly positive entries. All other eigenvalues λi, i 6= 1 satisfying |λi| = ρ(A)
are simple. There are precisely k eigenvalues of A (including λ1(A)) with modulus
equal to ρ(A), where k is the periodicity of the graph G[A]. If A is row-stochastic
then λ1 = 1, and the following definition is employed
Definition 2.2 (Dominant Eigenvectors). For a strongly connected graph G[A], with row-
stochastic A, let the strictly positive vector u> and 1n be left and right eigenvectors of A asso-
ciated with the simple eigenvalue λ1 = ρ(A) = 1. With normalisation satisfying u>1n = 1,
u> and 1n are termed the dominant left and right eigenvectors of A, respectively.
Some literature refer to ui as the eigenvector centrality of node i in the network
[Newman, 2010] (other literature may not require A to be row-stochastic). In fact,
eigenvector centrality will be a critical part of the DeGroot–Friedkin model studied
in Part II. A result linking G[A] to the primitivity of A is now given.
Lemma 2.1 (Strongly connected, aperiodic graphs and primitive matrices, [Bullo
et al., 2009, Proposition 1.35]). The graph G[A] is strongly connected and aperiodic if
and only if A is primitive, i.e. ∃k ∈N such that Ak is a positive matrix.
2.3 Basic Models of Opinion Dynamics
Two fundamental models of interpersonal influence networks are now reviewed, and
basic convergence results stated. For clarity, the models are presented formally first
in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, with comments and discussions on the model parameters
and social context given in Section 2.3.3.
2.3.1 The DeGroot Model
Consider a population of n individuals, represented by G[W ] = (V , E [W ], W); the
nodes are the individuals while the edges represent interpersonal influences. At time
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Figure 2.1: An example social network of 5 individuals modelled as the directed graph
G[W ]. The direction of the edges can be considered to represent influence flow. For example,
individual 1 exerts a direct influence onto individual 2 to change 2’s opinion via the directed
edge e12, with influence weight w21. Individual 1 indirectly influences individual 3 via the
directed path formed by the sequence of edges e15, e54, e43, with weights w51, w45, w34.
steps 0, 1, . . . ,, individual i’s opinion2 yi(t) ∈ R evolves according to following:
yi(t + 1) =
n
∑
j=1
wijyj(t). (2.2)
With wij ≥ 0, it is assumed that for all i ∈ I , there holds ∑nj=1 wij = 1, which
implies that W is row-stochastic. In some literature, the notation ∑j∈Ni wijyj(t) is
used; this is equivalent to the right hand side of Eq. (2.2) because for any j /∈ Ni,
wij = 0. It should be noted that all individuals update their opinions synchronously;
asynchronous models are available but will not be considered further in this thesis.
For convenience, the vector of opinions y(t) = [y1(t), . . . , yn(t)]> is used to represent
the opinions of all individuals in the network. The compact form of the opinion
dynamical system for the influence network G[W ] with each individual’s opinion
evolving according to Eq. (2.2), is given by
y(t + 1) = Wy(t). (2.3)
The matrix W is sometimes referred to as the influence matrix. The following is a
standard definition for the final opinion distribution.
Definition 2.3. Let y(t) = [y1(t), . . . , yn(t)]> be the vector of the opinions of individuals
1, . . . , n in a social network. The opinions are said to have reached a consensus if and only if
y∗ , limt→∞ y(t) satisfies y∗ = α1n, for some finite α ∈ R.
A standard result on the convergence of the DeGroot model to consensus is now
given, see e.g. [Ren and Beard, 2007; Proskurnikov and Tempo, 2017; Bullo et al.,
2009; Nedić and Liu, 2017].
2See Section 2.3.3 for a discussion how an opinion can be represented as a real number.
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Theorem 2.1. Suppose that the opinion yi(t) of each individual i in the network G[W ]
evolves according to Eq. (2.2). Suppose further that G[W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic,
and W is row-stochastic. Then, limt→∞ y(t) =
(
ζ>y(0)
)
1n exponentially fast, where ζ> is
the dominant left eigenvector of W .
The author would like to point out that, owing to the problem context, most
strongly connected social networks are also aperiodic. This is because it is rare to
have a network where there does not exist at least one individual i with a nonzero
self-weight wii, which for strongly connected networks immediately implies aperio-
dicity. Interestingly, while Theorem 2.1 gives a result for exponential convergence to
a consensus, it is in fact possible for Eq. (2.3) to achieve finite-time consensus for cer-
tain types of network topologies [Hendrickx et al., 2015]. That is, y(t) =
(
ζ>y(0)
)
1n
for all t ≥ T1, with T1 < ∞. In fact, the set of topologies which achieves finite-time
consensus appears to not be a thin set. This is in stark contrast to the continuous-time
Abelson model, which may also reach a consensus exponentially fast but never in fi-
nite time. Convergence results do exist for G[W ] which are not strongly connected,
e.g. which contain a directed spanning tree (see Appendix A.2 for a definition), but
these will not be examined, since Parts I and II deal with strongly connected graphs.
Part III does consider graphs that are not strongly connected, but the model is in
continuous-time, and relevant results are deferred to that part. A semi-contraction
result is now given (the proof is straightforward, see e.g. [Proskurnikov and Tempo,
2017]).
Corollary 2.1. Suppose that the opinion yi(t) of each individual i in the network G[W ]
evolves according to Eq. (2.2), where W is row-stochastic. Define ȳ(t) = maxi∈I yi(t) and
y(t) = mini∈I yi(t). Then, there holds
ȳ(t) ≥ ȳ(t + 1) (2.4a)
y(t) ≤ y(t + 1) (2.4b)
for all t ≥ 0.
From this result, it is said that the system Eq. (2.3) is semi-contracting because
V(t) = ȳ(t)− y(t) is nonincreasing over t. In the problem context, this means that the
opinions grow closer together in value or stay the same distance, but never become
further apart in value.
The introduction to the DeGroot model is completed by noting, as discussed
in Chapter 1, that generalisations exist which consider the influence weights as a
function of time or of opinions y(t), or of both, i.e. wij(t, y(t)). For clarity, in this
thesis time-varying refers exclusively to influence weights that are dependent ex-
plicitly on time t, i.e. wij(t), whereas the notation wij(y(t)) is used to refer to a
state-dependent influence weight. The focus of this thesis is to study new complex
phenomena, as opposed to detailing convergence analysis with time-varying or state-
dependent influence weights, and unless specifically stated otherwise, it is assumed
that the wij are time-invariant and state-independent.
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2.3.2 The Friedkin–Johnsen Model
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is interest in investigating how strong diversity ari-
ses in social networks (see Chapter 1 for a definition of strong diversity). In particular,
Theorem 2.1 indicates that in strongly connected and aperiodic influence networks,
social influence acts until opinions reach a consensus. Since many social networks
are strongly connected, or contain a strongly connected component, one must ask “if
social influence acts to bring opinions to a consensus what other process generates
strong diversity?” To explain this, Noah Friedkin and Eugene Johnsen proposed a
new model, known now as the Friedkin–Johnsen model, where the opinion yi(t) of
individual i, in G[W ], evolves as
yi(t + 1) = λi
n
∑
j=1
wijyj(t) + (1− λi)yi(0). (2.5)
Similar to the DeGroot model, it is assumed that wij ≥ 0 and ∑nj=1 wij = 1 for all
i. Here, λi ∈ [0, 1] represents individual i’s susceptibility or openness to interpersonal
influence, as captured by the term ∑nj=1 wijyj(t). The term 1− λi is sometimes re-
ferred to as individual i’s stubbornness, as it represents attachment to his/her initial
opinion yi(0). Thus, λi = 1 represents maximal openness to interpersonal influence
as in the DeGroot model, while λi = 0 represents maximal closure to interpersonal
influence. Some literature refer to individuals with λi < 1 as prejudiced individu-
als. It is clear that yi(t + 1) is a convex combination of individual i’s interpersonal
influence ∑nj=1 wijyj(t) and his/her initial opinion yi(0). (A natural and frequently
assumed choice is λi = 1−wii [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990; Friedkin and Bullo, 2017;
Friedkin et al., 2016b]). For arbitrary λi, one obtains the compact form of the opinion
dynamical system as
y(t + 1) = ΛWy(t) + (In −Λ)y(0), (2.6)
where Λ = diag(λi), i = 1, . . . , n. Notice that if all λi = 1, then Eq. (2.6) reduces
to Eq. (2.3). I.e., the DeGroot model is a special case of the Friedkin–Johnsen model
where all individuals are maximally open to interpersonal influence. The following
is a recent result from [Parsegov et al., 2017], rephrased for clarity in the context of
this thesis.
Theorem 2.2 (Stability of the Friedkin–Johnsen Model). Suppose that the opinion yi(t)
of each individual i in G[W ] evolves according to Eq. (2.5). Suppose further that G[W ] is
strongly connected, W is row-stochastic, and there exists an i ∈ I such that λi < 1. Then,
y∗ , lim
t→∞
y(t) = (In −ΛW)−1(In −Λ)y(0), (2.7)
with ρ(ΛW) < 1.
Again, it is noted that [Parsegov et al., 2017] does consider graphs which are not
strongly connected, but the results are omitted here. Interestingly, while the DeGroot
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model has extensive results on time-varying networks G[W ], results on time-varying
networks under the Friedkin–Johnsen model have only appeared recently [Proskur-
nikov et al., 2017].
Note that for strongly connected G[W ] where every individual has some stub-
bornness, i.e. λi < 1 for all i ∈ I , there holds y∗i 6= y∗j , ∀i, j, generically. That is, no
individuals have equal opinion values at equilibrium, which implies strong diver-
sity among the final opinion values. To the author’s knowledge, this last result is not
available in the literature, but can be derived following a method similar to what will
be presented in Section 3.3. Also of note is that the property set out in Corollary 2.1
does not hold in general for the Friedkin–Johnsen model. However, one can show
that for all i ∈ I and t ≥ 0, yi(t) ∈ [a, b] where a = mini∈I yi(0) and b = maxi∈I yi(0).
Again, these results can be proved using methods detailed in Section 3.3.
2.3.3 Comments on the Models
Having presented the models formally as dynamical systems, some brief commen-
tary is now given on the models in light of their context in influence network mo-
delling. These comments should be considered throughout the thesis, as they will be
relevant to all works presented.
Representation of an Opinion: First, the representation of an opinion yi(t) as a
real number is elucidated. Several applications exist in which the definition of yi
as a real number is useful. For example, the social network may be discussing a
topic which is defined by a question with a necessarily subjective answer, e.g. “is
pasta tasty?” Then, negative and positive values of yi represent disagreement and
agreement, respectively, while yi = 0 represents a neutral stance. The magnitude
of yi(t) represents the intensity of the agreement or disagreement. Alternatively,
one could consider the topic as a statement on an idea, e.g. “same-sex marriage
should be legalised”, with yi representing individual i’s attitude towards the idea.
Then, negative and positive values represent i opposing and supporting the idea,
respectively. Depending on the model and problem context, it may be useful to
scale the opinions so that yi(0) ∈ [−1, 1], with yi = −1 and yi = 1 representing the
extreme opinions on the spectrum; a well-defined model (such as the DeGroot and
Friedkin–Johnsen models) would then have the property that yi(t) ∈ [−1, 1] for all
t ≥ 0 . Yet other works consider yi(t) ∈ [0, 1]. Some works, e.g. [Yildiz et al., 2013;
Nowak et al., 1990], consider yi(t) as a discrete variable (with one typical choice being
binary 0, 1). These may be suitable for opinions that lead to actions being taken, e.g.
yi may represent the voting choice for individual i in a political election, or a choice
on whether to buy the latest smart phone. This thesis elects to consider yi ∈ R as it
better captures differences in opinions, such as the differences that can arise between
an individual’s private and expressed opinion, as studied in Chapter 3 and 4.
Terminology: The terms “opinion”, “attitude”, “belief” are just a few of many that
appear in the social science literature. There are some subtle differences, with dis-
tinctions made difficult due to a lack of consistent and agreed upon definitions across
different scientific communities. In this thesis, the author takes the view that an indi-
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vidual’s belief is his/her position on a statement which is provable to be true or false,
e.g. “the Earth orbits around the Sun.” An individual’s opinion is his/her position
on a subjective statement which cannot be proved to be true or false, e.g. “vanilla ice
cream tastes better than chocolate ice cream.” This distinction is simply one choice of
the definitions from the many possible versions in the literature. No further attempt
is made to distinguish the terms, and unless stated otherwise, this thesis will exclu-
sively use the term “opinion” when referring to yi(t). This is because the models
considered in this thesis are general enough to cover many scenario applications.
Multiple Topics: If the individuals are discussing m independent topics, then one
can define yi(t) = [y1i (t), . . . , y
m
i (t)]
> as individual i’s vector of opinions, with yki
denoting i’s opinion on topic k ∈ {1, . . . , m}. The Kronecker product is used to
trivially extend existing results, e.g. Theorem 2.1 and 2.2. For example, the DeGroot
compact form becomes
y = (W ⊗ Im) y(t), (2.8)
where y(t) = [y>1 , . . . , y
>
n ]
>. When the m topics become dependent on each other,
new analysis is required, and Chapter 9 investigates one model’s method of captu-
ring interdependence among the topics.
Interpretation of Parameters: For parameters wij, λi and the other parameters that
will be introduced in later models, it is clear that their values depend on many
factors, such as individual i’s personality, culture, upbringing and experience, or
whether i is an expert on the topic of discussion. The magnitudes of wij can de-
pend on level of friendship, status and rank (formal or informal) of the individuals
in the network, etc. This thesis does not aim to identify these values for a given
social network, or explain how or why the parameters may be different for different
individuals. The works in thesis only postulate that the parameters exist, and that
the individuals’ opinions evolve according to the models that will be later presented.
It is not even assumed that individuals necessarily know the exact value themselves,
or are aware that their opinions evolve as captured in the models. The key focus of
this thesis is to consider how the opinions evolve for a given set of parameters, and
draw quantitative or semi-quantitative conclusions on the effects of the parameters on
the opinion evolution, which may be used to gain high-level insight into interperso-
nal influence networks.
Time-Scales: Last, it should be noted that the above models are typically suited for
application on problems with short time-scales, e.g. a boardroom discussion lasting
several hours or perhaps at a workshop over a week. Such models may not accurately
reflect discussion over months or years, because almost certainly wij, λi, etc., would
change over time (the precise nature of the time-variation depends on many factors).
Chapters 5 through 8 do consider a model where the network discusses a sequence
of issues, which may be appropriate for longer time-scales. However, that model
assumes that each individual’s self-weight wii changes after discussion on a issue,
following a social process called reflected self-appraisal. Thus, the interest is in the
evolution of wii over the issue sequence, and yi is not the primary variable of interest.
Part I
How Differences in Private and
Expressed Opinions Arise
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Chapter 3
A Novel Model for Opinion
Dynamics Under Pressure to
Conform
Part Summary
Part I studies a novel opinion dynamics model proposed by the author, termed the
Expressed–Private–Opinion (EPO) model. The model draws inspiration from some
of the most classical results, and aims to develop a mathematical framework for
describing social phenomena involving individuals who have different expressed and
private opinions. In the EPO model, each individual is assumed to have a private
and expressed opinion, and each individual’s expressed opinion is altered from the
individual’s private opinion by a pressure to conform to the social norm. Chapter 3
introduces the EPO model and presents theoretical results on stability, and analyses
the private and expressed opinions at equilibrium. Chapter 4 uses the model to
revisit the seminal conformity experiments by Solomon Asch and investigate how
pluralistic ignorance can arise due to the presence of stubborn extremists.
Chapter Summary
This chapter introduces the Expressed–Private–Opinion (EPO) model. A number
of phenomena involving individuals with different private and expressed opinions
have been recorded and studied in the social sciences via qualitative and experimen-
tal methods, and these are discussed in the introduction immediately below. After
introducing and explaining the motivation of the model, conditions on parameters of
the influence network are obtained which guarantee that the opinions convergence
to a steady state. Then, investigations are conducted to draw several interesting con-
clusions on the effects of individual stubbornness, and resilience to the pressure to
conform to a group majority, in generating differences in an individual’s expressed
and private opinion.
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3.1 Introduction
In much of the existing literature on agent-based opinion dynamics modelling, it is
assumed that each individual has an opinion yi(t) which is communicated to others
in the network. Few models consider the possibility that an individual expresses
an opinion different to his/her private opinion, even though the reader will almost
certainly have been in a situation where this has occurred to them.
On the other hand, these situations are well studied in the social and political
sciences. In [Waters and Hans, 2009], the authors found that over one third of jurors
in criminal trials would have privately voted against the decision of the jury panel
they were on. Large differences between the private and expressed opinions of the
civilian population can generate discontent and tension, which might result in violent
and unforeseen actions such as the Arab Spring movement [Goodwin, 2011] and the
fall of the Soviet Union [Kuran, 1989]. During the rise of Islamic State in 2014,
a US led coalition readily expressed agreement to attack Raqqa, then the de-facto
capital of Islamic State. Later, when deciding which troops were to lead the ground
assault, the opposing private opinions of the Turkish and Kurdish representatives in the
coalition emerged and created a deadlock for almost two years [Mintz and Wayne,
2016]. Access to the public actions of individuals, without being able to observe their
thought processes that led to the actions, can spark an informational cascade where
all successive individuals choose the wrong action [Bikhchandani et al., 1992]. This was
used to help explain why farmers in Iowa refused to adopt hybrid seed corn for
years, despite its benefits [Ryan and Gross, 1943]. Due to fears of social isolation
and exposure, some individuals enforce social norms despite privately disliking the
norms [Centola et al., 2005; Willer et al., 2009].
Naturally, there is interest in identifying what creates such differences or dis-
crepancies between expressed and private opinions/actions. One commonly hypot-
hesised reason is that such differences arise due to a pressure to conform to a group
standard or norm. Formal study of such pressure goes back many decades. In 1951,
Solomon E. Asch’s seminal paper [Asch, 1951] showed that individuals could re-
act differently when their judgment about an indisputable fact was challenged by a
unanimous majority. Some individuals could withstand the pressure, whereas the
actions and judgments of other individuals were heavily affected. A variety of other
studies have been reported, and they generally establish that such pressures not only
generate different expressed and private opinions/actions, but can also have other
consequences. In some instances, high productivity factory workers were pressured
to lower their production rate to match factory averages [Coch and French Jr, 1948].
Peer punishment is often dealt to individuals who deviate from group norms, such
as in gangs [Thrasher, 1963]. This occurs even if the norm is destructive or unhealthy
for the group itself [Abbink et al., 2017]. The pressure exerted on an individual to
conform may change over time, or depend on his/her opinions and/or the opinion-
s/actions of others in the group [Waters and Hans, 2009; Asch, 1951; Schachter, 1951;
Gorden, 1952].
Significant advances have been achieved, separately, in the model complexity and
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analysis of the key factors in each model that determine specific dynamical proper-
ties (see Chapter 1). Despite this, existing agent-based models have failed to provide
a thorough account of phenomena involving (i) differences in private and expressed
opinions, and (ii) the effects of a pressure to conform to the group norm (both of
which have been well-studied in the social and social psychology literature). There
is therefore significant need and motivation to examine these interesting social phe-
nomena from the perspective of agent-based models, and investigate the precise me-
chanisms that drive said phenomena. The aim is to, for the first time, provide a
mathematical framework for the study of opinion evolution under pressure to con-
form. This chapter will introduce the EPO model, drawing inspiration from the
established Friedkin–Johnsen model. In the proposed EPO model, each individual
has both an expressed and a private opinion, and the expressed opinion is altered
from the private opinion due to a pressure to conform; this is a key departure from
most existing works. This chapter will focus on development and analysis of the
model from a systems and control perspective, including the establishing of conver-
gence results and drawing of semi-quantitative conclusions that give insight into how
stubbornness and resilience to pressure to conform affect the expressed and private
opinions of individuals in an influence network. In the subsequent Chapter 4, Solo-
mon E. Asch’s seminal experiments are revisited using the proposed model, and the
well-studied phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance is explained using the model.
3.1.1 Chapter Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the opinion
dynamics model. Section 3.3 provides convergence results and also establishes se-
veral semi-quantitative conclusions on the effects of individuals’ parameters on the
final opinion distribution. Concluding remarks are given in Section 3.4
3.2 A Model with Expressed and Private Opinions
To begin, the opinion dynamics model is formally introduced. Then, explanations are
provided on the motivation for modelling the evolution of the private and expressed
opinions in the manner described. Comments are also given to clarify the model and
its relation to existing works. To conclude, the model is presented in a compact form
to aid the theoretical analysis that will occur in Section 3.3.
3.2.1 The Opinion Dynamics Model
For a population of n individuals, whose interactions are captured by a directed
network G[W ], let yi(t) and ŷi(t), i ∈ I , represent, at time t = 0, 1, . . ., individual
i’s privately held and publicly expressed opinions on a given topic, respectively. In
general, yi(t) and ŷi(t) are not the same, and yi is regarded as individual i’s true opi-
nion. Individual i may refrain from expressing yi(t) for many reasons, e.g. political
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Figure 3.1: Each individual undergoes this process of influence and opinion evolution, occur-
ring simultaneously with all other individuals. At time step t, individual i expresses opinion
ŷi(t) and learns of i’s neighbours’ expressed opinions ŷj(t), j ∈ Ni. This might occur in a bo-
ardroom meeting or in an online social medium. Next, individual i’s privately held opinion
evolves to be yi(t + 1) under the influence of i’s own privately held opinion yi(t) and the
expressed opinions of i’s neighbours, ŷj(t). The precise algorithm is given in Eq. (3.1). Once
individual i has updated his/her privately held opinion, i then determines the new ŷi(t + 1)
to be expressed in the next round of discussion, as given in Eq. (3.2).
correctness when discussing a sensitive topic, to avoid conflict, or to leave a favoura-
ble impression on another individual [Kuran, 1997] (see Chapter 4 for comments on
preference falsification). Fig. 3.1 illustrates, and qualitatively describes, “the opinion
dynamics process”.
Formally, individual i’s private opinion evolves as
yi(t + 1) = λiwiiyi(t) + λi
n
∑
j 6=i
wijŷj(t) + (1− λi)yi(0), (3.1)
and individual i’s expressed opinion is determined according to
ŷi(t) = φiyi(t) + (1− φi)ŷavg(t− 1). (3.2)
The influence weight wij ≥ 0 represents the weight individual i accords to his/her
neighbour individual j’s expressed opinion ŷj(t). As in the DeGroot and Friedkin–
Johnsen models (see Chapter 2) it is assumed that for all i ∈ I , ∑nj=1 wij = 1. Simi-
larly to the Friedkin–Johnsen model (Section 2.3.2), the constant λi ∈ [0, 1] represents
individual i’s susceptibility to interpersonal influence changing i’s private opinion
(1− λi is i’s stubbornness in remaining attached to initial opinion yi(0)). The quan-
tity ŷavg(t) = 1n ∑
n
j=1 ŷi(t) is termed the public opinion of the influence network, and
represents the evolving group standard or norm. The constant φi ∈ [0, 1] encodes
individual i’s resilience to the pressures to conform to the public opinion (maximally
φi = 1, and minimally φi = 0), and is referred to as i’s resilience for short. Observe
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Interpersonal influence i exerts on others via ŷi
Resilience φiyi
Interpersonal influence exerted on i, λi ∑nj=1 wijŷj
Expressed Opinion ŷi
Pressure to conform
(1− φi)ŷavg
Stubbornness
(1− λi)yi(0)
Self-influence λiwiiyi
Private Opinion yi
Figure 3.2: Individual i’s private opinion yi(t) and expressed opinion ŷi(t) are represented by
the blue node and purple node, respectively. The arrows/edges represent quantities which
exert an influence on i’s private or expressed opinion. In particular, yi(t) is changed due
to interpersonal influence from other individuals in the influence network, i’s self-weight
(if there is a self-loop), and an attachment to initial opinion yi(0). The private opinion of
individual i exerts an influence on i’s expressed opinion via a resilience to conformity, while
the public opinion ŷavg exerts a pressure to conform. Individual i exerts an influence on
others in the network via i’s expressed opinion ŷi.
that substituting ŷj(t) from Eq. (3.2) into Eq. (3.1) yields
yi(t + 1) = λiwiiyi(t) + λi
n
∑
j 6=i
wijφjyj(t) +
λi
n
n
∑
j 6=i
wij(1− φj)1>n ŷ(t− 1) + (1− λi)yi(0)
(3.3)
This gives a clear indication of the different terms which exert an influence to change
i’s private opinion. The initial expressed opinion is set to be equal to the initial
private opinion, i.e. ŷi(0) = yi(0), which means Eq. (3.1) comes into effect for t = 1.
The influences that act on individual i to change i’s private and expressed opinion
are illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
Notice that setting φi = 1 for all i, i.e. all individuals express their private opinion
unaltered, recovers the Friedkin–Johnsen model. Setting φi = λi = 1, for all i, reco-
vers the DeGroot model. From one perspective, this implies that the EPO model is a
generalisation of both the Friedkin–Johnsen and DeGroot models. From a different
perspective, this gives some support to the EPO model, since it builds upon, and
is inspired by two established models which have been empirically validated (see
Chapter 1). Further validation of the EPO model is provided in Chapter 4, where the
model is used to examine Asch’s conformity experiments, including to show that the
experimental results are fully captured by the proposed model, and identify how the
accepted social phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance can arise.
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Model Explanation
Eq. (3.2) indicates that individual i’s expressed opinion ŷi(t) is a convex combina-
tion of i’s private opinion, yi(t), and the public opinion from the previous time step,
ŷavg(t− 1). The papers [Gorden, 1952; Asch, 1951] revealed that, perhaps unsurpri-
singly, normative pressure to conform was always exerted on an individual’s opinion
so that his/her expressed opinion moved from his/her private opinion in the direction
of the group norm (in this case, the public opinion). In other words, Eq. (3.2) represents
how individual i’s expressed opinion is his/her private opinion modified or altered due
to normative pressure, proportional to 1− φi, to be closer to the public opinion. Thus,
the pressure to conform exerts a “force” (1− φi)ŷavg(t− 1) onto individual i to ex-
press an opinion in line with the group norm.
In that sense, φi = 1 captures an individual i who is maximally resilient, and
expresses precisely his/her private opinion yi(t), with no fear of social isolation or
being viewed differently. An individual i with φi = 0 is minimally resilient, and is
someone who totally fears the appearance of being different from the group, and says
exactly what the group’s current view is. Some pressures of conformity may derive
from unspoken traditions [Merei, 1949], and others arise because of desire to be in
the group, driven by e.g. monetary incentives, status or rewards [Festinger, 1950].
As a result, heterogeneous φi are used to capture the fact that some individuals are
less inhibited or reserved than others when expressing their opinions. In addition,
pressures are exerted (or perceived to be exerted) differently for individuals, e.g. due
to status or rank within a group [Schachter, 1951; Gorden, 1952].
Comments on the Model
A key feature in the EPO model is the defining of two states yi, ŷi for each individual
and the restriction that only other ŷj (and no yj) may be available to individual i.
A second key feature is the proposal of Eq. (3.2) as the model for capturing how
an individual determines his/her expressed opinion, with motivation drawn from
social psychology literature. As it turns out, these two features allow the model to
capture phenomena that other agent-based opinion dynamics models are not able to
capture. In particular, this model departs from many established models, some of
which were covered in Chapter 1, and which assume only one opinion variable per
individual e.g. [DeGroot, 1974; Hegselmann and Krause, 2002; Dandekar et al., 2013;
Mäs et al., 2014; Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990].
The recent paper [Duggins, 2017] does have a model in which there are two states
yi, ŷi to represent the private and expressed opinion for each individual. However,
in addition to being highly complex and nonlinear, that model is fundamentally dif-
ferent in how yi(t) and ŷi(t) evolve. Many existing models e.g. [Duggins, 2017; Mäs
et al., 2014; Nowak et al., 1990], are sufficiently complex that there are no straightfor-
ward methods to systematically determine how the parameters affect the dynamical be-
haviour of the opinions. It may be possible to conduct an exhaustive parameter sweep,
but because there may be many parameters, a curse of dimensionality exists.
On the other hand, and by design, the EPO model attempts to strike a balance
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so that it is simple enough for theoretical analysis to be conducted, but sophisticated
enough to capture a range of social phenomena previously missing from agent-based
models. This leads to multiple approaches of analysis which complement each other;
simulations are used to Chapter 4 to study complex social phenomena and theoretical
analysis is conducted in this chapter to gain insight into how certain parameters of
individuals affect the behaviour of the overall network.
Remark 3.1. One can immediately notice the time-shift of ŷavg(t − 1) in Eq. (3.2). The
time-shift is required because otherwise use of ŷavg(t) would result in both the left and right
hand side of Eq. (3.2) being dependent on ŷi(t), which does not make sense and would create
an inconsistent equation. Eq. (3.2) is also consistent with the process described in Figure 3.1.
It will be shown in the sequel that such a time-shift can be dealt with. It was noted earlier
that the initial conditions are assumed to be ŷi(0) = yi(0). As it turns out, under mild
assumptions on the stubbornness of the individuals, the initial conditions ŷi(0) for all i ∈ I ,
are forgotten exponentially fast. Specifically, the equilibrium opinion values are dependent on
the initial private opinions yi(0) but independent of the initial expressed opinions ŷi(0). As
a consequence one could initialise ŷi(0) arbitrarily, and the final equilibrium opinions would
be unchanged (though the transient would change)
Remark 3.2. One may ask: why does the new expressed opinion ŷi(t + 1) depend explicitly
on the public opinion ŷavg(t), but the new private opinion yi(t+ 1) does not depend explicitly
on the public opinion? First, Eq. (3.3) indicates that the public opinion does in fact influence
the update of individual i’s private opinion, reflected in the term 1>n ŷ(t− 1)/n. This influence
arises indirectly through neighbour j’s expressed opinion. It is also possible to adjust the model
to include a direct influence by the public opinion in shaping the update of individual i’s
private opinion. This is done by introduction of a “virtual agent”. Specifically an additional
node is inserted into the influence network, labelled vn+1. One can set φn+1 = 1 and the
private opinion update is designed (easily) to ensure that yn+1(t) = 1n ∑
n
j=1 ŷj(t), ∀ t. One
can capture individual i’s private opinion being directly influenced by the public opinion by
setting the influence weight wi,n+1 > 0. In relation to the theoretical results presented later
in Section 3.3, one can verify that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2, and Corollary 3.1 will hold with
minor adjustments. Corollary 3.3 also holds with minor adjustment. However, Corollary 3.2
will not hold.
3.2.2 Local Public Opinion
In small networks, e.g. a boardroom of 10 people, the public opinion ŷavg, is likely to
be discernible to every individual. For large networks, such information may come
from opinion polls or social media trends. As an alternative, it is also possible to
study the model in which Eq. (3.2) is replaced by
ŷi(t) = φiyi(t) + (1− φi)ŷi,lavg(t− 1) (3.4)
where ŷi,lavg(t) = 1|Ni | ∑j∈Ni ŷj(t) is the local public opinion specific to individual i, and
includes only the expressed opinions of i’s neighbours. The cardinality of i’s set of
neighbours Ni is given by |Ni|. From here on, ŷavg is referred to as the global public
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opinion if there is a need to differentiate from the local public opinion ŷi,lavg. One of
the key results of Chapter 4 is to show that significant differences in the equilibrium
opinion distributions of the network, in the context of pluralistic ignorance, can arise
depending on whether Eq. (3.2) or Eq. (3.4) is used to model the expressed opinion.
Note that it is possible to further generalise Eq. (3.4) so that the local public
opinion is ŷi,lavg(t) = ∑j∈Ni aijŷj(t), where aij now become general weights satisfying
A ∼W and ∑nj=1 aij = 1, ∀ i. One potential, and reasonable, alternative to aij = |Ni|
−1
is to set aij = wij, ∀i, j ∈ I . The theoretical results detailed in Section 3.3 are not
changed, and so no further exploration of the choice of weights of the local public
opinion is taken. Rather, focus is placed on the differences in behaviour that may
arise between the global and local public opinion models.
3.2.3 Obtaining a Compact Form for the Influence Network
To better analyse the system, a compact form for the opinion dynamics on the influ-
ence network G[W ] is now obtained. Let y = [y1, y2, . . . , yn]> and ŷ = [ŷ1, ŷ2, . . . , ŷn]>
be the stacked vectors of private and expressed opinions yi and ŷi of the n indivi-
duals in the influence network G[W ], respectively. For convenience, define φ =
[φ1, . . . , φn]> and λ = [λ1, . . . , λn]>. The influence matrix W can be decomposed as
W = W̃ + Ŵ where W̃ = diag(wii), i.e. a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries wii.
The matrix Ŵ is then a matrix with zero diagonal and with the same offdiagonal
entries as W . That is, ŵij = wij for all j 6= i and ŵii = 0 for all i. Define Λ = diag(λi)
and Φ = diag(φi). Using Eq. (3.2) and Eq. (3.3), one can verify that the compact form
of the opinion dynamical system is given by
[
y(t + 1)
ŷ(t)
]
=
Λ (W̃ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n1>nn
Φ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
[ y(t)
ŷ(t− 1)
]
+
[
(In −Λ) y(0)
0n
]
. (3.5)
As stated earlier, the initialisation is ŷ(0) = y(0). Thus, for all i ∈ I , there holds
yi(1) = λiwiiyi(0) + λi
n
∑
j 6=i
wijyj(0) + (1− λi)yi(0), (3.6)
and Eq. (3.5) holds for t ≥ 1. The appearance of different time arguments within the
one vector is dealt with by defining x1(k) = y(t) and x2(k) = ŷ(t− 1). It follows that
[
x1(k + 1)
x2(k + 1)
]
=
Λ (W̃ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n1>nn
Φ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
[x1(k)
x2(k)
]
+
[
(In −Λ) x1(0)
0n
]
. (3.7)
The appropriate initialisation method is then to set x2(1) = x1(0), giving x1(1) =
ΛWx1(0) + (In −Λ) x1(0), and study Eq. (3.7) for k = 1, 2, . . .. Last, define for future
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5
Expressed ŷj(t) influences
new private yi(t + 1)
Expressed Opinion Graph G[P22]
Private yi(t) partially determines expressed ŷi(t)
INFLUENCE NETWORK G[P]
Private Opinion Graph G[P11]
Figure 3.3: The influence network G[W ] of n individuals, with each individual’s private and
expressed opinions evolving according to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2), is equivalent to the influence
network G[P] with 2n nodes, evolving according to the system dynamics Eq. (3.5). Nodes
Vp = {v1, . . . , vn} are associated with the private opinions y, and induce the private opinion
subgraph G[P11]. Nodes Ve = {vn+1, . . . , v2n} are associated with the expressed opinions ŷ,
and induce the expressed opinion subgraph G[P22]. The off-diagonal terms P12 and P21 describe
influences (edges) between nodes in Vp and Ve. Here, an illustrative example with n = 3 is
shown.
reference
P =
Λ (W̃ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n1>nn
Φ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
 = [P11 P12
P21 P22
]
. (3.8)
The influence network G[W ] with each individual’s private and expressed opinions
evolving according to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2) can be viewed as a larger influence
network G[P] with 2n nodes. This interpretation is explored in Fig. 3.3.
Following steps similar to those above, one can show that the evolution of opini-
ons over the influence network, with Eq. (3.4) replacing Eq. (3.2) for every individual,
is given by[
y(t + 1)
ŷ(t)
]
=
[
Λ
(
W̃ + ŴΦ
)
ΛŴ (In −Φ) A
Φ (In −Φ) A
][
y(t)
ŷ(t− 1)
]
+
[
(In −Λ) y(0)
0n
]
, (3.9)
where the ith row of A has entries such that wij = 0 ⇔ aij = 0 and wij > 0 ⇔ aij =
1
|Ni | . In other words, A ∼ W (see Section 2.1). Thus, G[A] is a strongly connected
and aperiodic graph where, for any given node i, the incoming edges have equal
weight aij = |Ni|−1. It follows that A is row-stochastic, and because G[A] is strongly
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connected and aperiodic, that A is primitive. For future purposes, define
Z =
[
Λ
(
W̃ + ŴΦ
)
ΛŴ (In −Φ) A
Φ (In −Φ) A
]
(3.10)
Having obtained a compact form for the system dynamics, attention will now turn
to study of the temporal evolution of the opinion vectors y(t) and ŷ(t).
3.3 Convergence Properties of the Model
This section will establish a number of results, providing sufficient conditions for the
opinions to converge to an equilibrium (as opposed to the system entering an oscil-
lating trajectory or becoming unstable). More importantly, detailed analysis of the
opinions at equilibrium will provide insightful conclusions on the role of resilience
and stubbornness in determining the final expressed and private opinions. To aid
the analysis of the model and establish the convergence properties of the opinion
dynamical system, an assumption is now formally introduced.
Assumption 3.1. The network G[W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic, and the influence
matrix W is row-stochastic. Furthermore, there holds λi, φi ∈ (0, 1), for all i ∈ I .
It should be noted that for the purpose of convergence analysis, this assumption
can almost certainly be relaxed to include graphs which are not strongly connected,
and for values of φi, λi in the closed interval [0, 1]. Relaxation of Assumption 3.1
would be interesting future work, but the focus in this chapter is to gain deeper
insight into the social processes governing the opinion evolution, for which Assump-
tion 3.1 is suitable. Two lemmas are introduced to establish several properties of P
and (I2n − P)−1, which will later be used to help prove several results in this section.
A third lemma is provided to establish an invariance property. The proofs of these
lemmas are given in Section 3.5.
Lemma 3.1. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Then, the matrix P given in Eq. (3.8) is
nonnegative, irreducible, and there holds ρ(P) < 1.
Lemma 3.2. Suppose that Assumption 3.1 holds. Define Q = I2n − P, where P is given in
Eq. (3.8), with Q decomposed as
Q =
[
Q11 Q12
Q21 Q22
]
=
[
In − P11 −P12
−P21 In − P22
]
.
Then, Q11 and Q22 are nonsingular, and Q−1 is a positive matrix which has the form
Q−1=
[
(Q11 −Q12Q−122 Q21)−1 −Q
−1
11 Q12(Q22 −Q21Q
−1
11 Q12)
−1
−Q−122 Q21(Q11 −Q12Q
−1
22 Q21)
−1 (Q22 −Q21Q−111 Q12)−1
]
. (3.11)
Moreover, R = (Q11−Q12Q−122 Q21)−1(In−Λ) and S = −Q
−1
22 Q21 are invertible, positive
row-stochastic matrices.
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Next, an invariant set result is established. In particular, it is shown that given a
set of initial conditions y(0), the set
S = {yi, ŷi : min
k∈I
yk(0) ≤ yi, ŷi ≤ max
j∈I
yj(0), i ∈ I} (3.12)
is a positive invariant set of the system Eq. (3.5). This is a desirable property for any
opinion dynamics model. Section 2.3.3 discussed how opinion yi may be scaled so
that a, b ∈ R represent the two extremes of the opinion spectrum. Then, if yi(0) ∈
[a, b] and the model has the below property, yi(t) ∈ [a, b] for all t ≥ 0, and so the
opinions are always well defined (it does not make sense for yi < a or yi > b if a, b
are the extremes).
Lemma 3.3 (Invariant Set). Consider a network G[W ] where each individual i’s opinions
yi(t) and ŷi(t) update according to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2), respectively. Suppose Assump-
tion 3.1 holds, and that y(0) = ŷ(0). Then, for all t ≥ 0, there holds
max
{
max
i∈I
yi(t), max
j∈I
ŷj(t)
}
≤ max
i∈I
yi(0) = max
i∈I
ŷi(0), (3.13)
min
{
min
i∈I
yi(t), min
j∈I
ŷj(t)
}
≥ min
i∈I
yi(0) = min
i∈I
ŷi(0). (3.14)
Note that the Friedkin–Johnsen model has the same property. In Section 3.5, a
simple simulation counterexample is given to show that there need not hold
max
{
max
i∈I
yi(t), max
j∈I
ŷj(t)
}
≥ max
{
max
i∈I
yi(t + 1), max
j∈I
ŷj(t + 1)
}
(3.15)
min
{
min
i∈I
yi(t), min
j∈I
ŷj(t)
}
≤ min
{
min
i∈I
yi(t + 1), min
j∈I
ŷj(t + 1)
}
(3.16)
for all t ≥ 0. This is a semi-contractive property held by the DeGroot model, see
Lemma 2.1. The main stability theorem, and a subsequent corollary for a condition
to guarantee a consensus of opinions, are now presented.
Theorem 3.1 (Exponential Stability). Consider a network G[W ] where each individual
i’s opinions yi(t) and ŷi(t) update according to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2), respectively. Sup-
pose Assumption 3.1 holds, and that y(0) = ŷ(0). Then, the system Eq. (3.5) converges
exponentially fast to a unique equilibrium, which is given as
lim
t→∞
y(t) , y∗ = Ry(0) (3.17)
lim
t→∞
ŷ(t) , ŷ∗ = Sy∗, (3.18)
where R, S ∈ Rn×n are positive, row-stochastic matrices defined in Lemma 3.2.
Proof. Lemma 3.1 established that the time-invariant matrix P satisfies ρ(P) < 1.
Standard linear systems theory [Rugh, 1996] is used to conclude that the linear, time-
invariant system Eq. (3.5), with constant input
[
((In −Λ)y(0))>, 0>n
]>
, converges
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exponentially fast to the following unique equilibrium[
limt→∞ y(t)
limt→∞ ŷ(t)
]
,
[
y∗
ŷ∗
]
= (I2n − P)−1
[
(In −Λ)y(0)
0n
]
= Q−1
[
(In −Λ)y(0)
0n
]
. (3.19)
Having calculated the form of Q−1 in Eq. (3.11), it can be verified that y∗ = Ry(0) and
ŷ∗ = SRy(0) = Sy∗. Here, the definitions of R and S are given in Lemma 3.2, which
also proved their positivity and row-stochasticity. This completes the proof.
This result indicates that the final private and expressed opinions depend on the
initial private opinions, while the initial expressed ŷ(0) are forgotten exponentially
fast. Thus, one could initialise ŷ(0) arbitrarily, and the final steady-state will be the
same, though the transient will differ and the conclusions of Lemma 3.3 may no
longer apply. The row-stochastic nature of R and S implies that the final private opi-
nions (respectively final expressed opinions) are a convex combination of the initial
private opinions (respectively the final private opinions). Additionally, positivity of
R and S means every individual i’s initial yi(0) has an influence in the determina-
tion of any other individual j’s final opinions y∗j and ŷ
∗
j , a reflection of the strong
connectedness of the network interactions. The following corollary establishes a con-
dition for consensus of opinions, though it must be noted that part of the hypothesis
for Theorem 3.1 is discarded.
Corollary 3.1 (Consensus of Opinions). Suppose that φi ∈ (0, 1), and λi = 1, for all
i ∈ I . Suppose further that G[W ] is strongly connected and aperiodic. Then, for the sy-
stem Eq. (3.5), all opinions converge exponentially fast to a consensus, i.e. limt→∞ y(t) =
limt→∞ ŷ(t) = α1n for some finite α ∈ R.
Proof. Under the corollary assumptions, Λ = In, which implies that Eq. (3.7) becomes
x(t + 1) = Px(t). It was established in the proof of Lemma 3.1 (see Section 3.5.1) that
P has row sum equal to one, i.e. P is nonnegative and row-stochastic. The lemma
proof also established that G[P] is strongly connected and aperiodic, and this remains
unchanged when Λ = In. Theorem 2.1 may then be used conclude that consensus
is achieved exponentially fast, i.e. limt→∞ x(t) = α12n for some α ∈ R. Recalling the
definition of x = [x>1 , x
>
2 ]
> yields y(∞) = ŷ(∞) = α1n.
3.3.1 Causes of Persistent Disagreement and Differences in Opinions
In this section, a result is obtained on the disagreement among the opinions at equi-
librium. A key conclusion is that stubbornness and resilience create different expres-
sed and private opinions in the same individual. This result and the social connota-
tions are discussed, before the proof is presented.
Theorem 3.2 (Disagreement). Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 3.1 hold. If there is
no consensus of the initial opinions, i.e. y(0) 6= α1n for some α ∈ R, then the final opinions
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obey the following inequalities
max
k∈I
yk(0) = ȳ0 > max
i∈I
y∗i = y
∗
max > max
j∈I
ŷ∗j = ŷ
∗
max (3.20a)
min
k∈I
yk(0) = y0 < mini∈I
y∗i = y
∗
min < minj∈I
ŷ∗j = ŷ
∗
min (3.20b)
and ŷ∗min 6= ŷ∗max. Moreover, given a network G[W ] and parameter vectors φ and λ, the set
of initial conditions y(0) for which m > 0 specific individuals ij ∈ {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ I have
y∗ij = ŷ
∗
ij
, i.e. m , |{i ∈ I : y∗i = ŷ∗i }|, lies in a subspace of Rn with dimension n−m.
This result shows that for generic initial conditions there is a persistent dis-
agreement of opinions at the steady-state. This is a consequence of individuals not
being maximally susceptible to influence, λi < 1 ∀ i ∈ I . If on the other hand λi = 1
for all i ∈ I then a consensus of opinions is reached exponentially fast (see Corol-
lary 3.1). A second observation is that for any individual i in the network, y∗i 6= ŷ∗i
generically, which is a subtle but significant difference from the result stated in
Eq. (3.20). That is, the presence of both stubbornness and pressure to conform, and the strong
connectedness of the network leads to an individual having different private and expressed opi-
nions in generic networks and with generic initial conditions1. Without stubbornness
(λi = 1 for all i), a consensus of opinions is reached, and without a pressure to con-
form (φi = 1 for all i), an individual has the same private and expressed opinions.
Without strong connectedness, some individuals will not be influenced to change
opinions. One further consequence of Eq. (3.20) is that y∗max − y∗min > ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min,
which implies that the level of agreement is greater among the expressed opinions
when compared to the private opinions. In other words, individuals are more wil-
ling to agree with others when they are expressing their opinions in a social network
due to a pressure to conform. Moreover, the extreme final expressed opinions are
upper and lower bounded by the final private opinions, which are in turn upper and
lower bounded by the extreme initial private opinions, clearly showing the effects of
interpersonal influence and a pressure to conform.
The above conclusions continue to hold if only local public opinions are avai-
lable, i.e. if Eq. (3.2) is replaced with Eq. (3.4), but key differences do exist (see
Section 3.3.4).
Proof. If y(0) = α1n, for some finite α ∈ R (i.e. the initial private opinions are at a
consensus), then y∗ = ŷ∗ = α1n because R and S are row-stochastic. In what follows,
it will be proved that if the initial private opinions are not at a consensus, then there
is disagreement at equilibrium. It is suggested that the reader become familiar with
the performance function V(x) and coefficient of ergodicity τ(A) in Appendix A.1.1,
as these will be used frequently in this proof.
First, the fact that y∗min 6= y∗max is established. Note that V(y∗) = 0 if and only
if the private opinions are at a consensus, i.e. y∗ = β1n, for some β ∈ R. Next,
observe that y∗ = β1n if and only if Ry(0) = β1n, for some β ∈ R. Note that R
1See Remark 3.3 below for further comments.
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is invertible, because it is the product of two invertible matrices (see Lemma 3.2).
Moreover, because R is row-stochastic, there holds R1n = 1n ⇔ R−1R1n = R−11n ⇔
R−11n = 1n. That is, R−1 has row sum equal to one. Thus, premultiplying by R−1
on both sides of Ry(0) = β1n yields y(0) = βR−11n = β1n. In other words, the only
possibility for there to be a consensus of the final private opinions, y∗ = β1n, is if the
initial private opinions are at a consensus. Recalling the hypothesis of the theorem
statement (that y(0) is not equal to α1n, for some α ∈ R), it is immediately clear that
y∗ is not at a consensus. Thus, y∗min 6= y∗max as claimed.
Next, the inequalities Eq. (3.20a) and Eq. (3.20b) are proved. The fact that R, S
are positive and row-stochastic implies that τ(R) < 1 and τ(S) < 1. Because R is
invertible, R cannot be a matrix where all the rows are equal, i.e. R 6= 1nz> for some
z ∈ Rn. This means that τ(R) > 0 (see below Eq. (A.9) in Appendix A). Similarly,
one can prove that τ(S) > 0. In the above paragraph, it was shown that if there is
no consensus of the initial private opinions, then there is no consensus of the final
initial opinions, i.e. V(y∗ = Ry(0)) > 0. Thus, by recalling that V(Ax) ≤ τ(A)V(x)
(see Eq. (A.11) in Appendix A) and the above facts, one can obtain the conclusion
that 0 < V(y∗ = Ry(0)) < V(y(0)), which establishes the left hand inequality of
both Eq. (3.20a) and Eq. (3.20b). Following steps similar to the above, but which are
omitted, one can show that 0 < V(ŷ∗ = Sy∗) < V(y∗), which establishes the right
hand inequality of both Eq. (3.20a) and Eq. (3.20b), and also establishes the fact that
ŷ∗min 6= ŷ∗max. This means there is disagreement in the final expressed opinions.
Last, it remains to prove2 that for generic initial conditions, y∗i 6= ŷ∗i . First, the
case for m ≥ 2 will be proved. Consider the final private opinions. From y∗ = Ry(0),
it is clear that y∗i = y
∗
j for any i, j ∈ I and i 6= j, if and only if (ri − rj)>y(0) = 0,
where r>i is the i
th row of R. Since R is invertible, rank(R) = n, and thus ri 6= rj for
any i 6= j. This implies that y(0) lies on a hyperplane of dimension n− 1 orthogonal
to ri − rj 6= 0n (if ri = rj then the space Rn would be orthogonal to y(0)). Recall that
R is determined uniquely by W , φ and λ, and is independent of y(0). Thus, for a
given network with a given set of parameters W , φ and λ, one is able to conclude
that the set of initial conditions for which m ≥ 2 individuals have the same private
opinion lies in a subspace of Rn of dimension n−m.
LetH1, . . . ,HH be the H disjoint sets of individuals i ∈ I who have the same final
private opinion, with the private opinion value for each disjoint set being different.
That is, for h ∈ {1, . . . , H}, Hh = {ih, jh ∈ I : y∗ih = y
∗
jh
} with y∗ip 6= y
∗
iq for all
p, q ∈ {1, . . . , H} and p 6= q. Denote the cardinality of Hh by mh = |Hh|, and denote
the set K = {i ∈ I : y∗i = ŷ∗i }, with cardinality K = |K|. From Eq. (3.2), it follows
trivially that for any i ∈ I , y∗i = ŷ∗i if and only if y∗i = ŷ∗avg. It then follows that
2During the thesis examination process, one examiner identified a different proof to show that
generically, y∗i 6= ŷ
∗
i , the summary of which is provided here. First, one observes that ŷ
∗
i = y
∗
i ⇒ ŷ
∗
avg =
1>n ŷ∗/n. Thus, ŷ∗i = y
∗
i for m specific individuals if and only if ŷ
∗ lies in an n−m-dimensional subspace
of Rn, denoted as D, because there must be m independent equations satisfying (ei − 1n 1n)>y∗ = 0.
From Lemma 3.2, one has y∗ = RSy(0). It follows that ŷ∗i = y
∗
i for m specific individuals only if y(0)
belongs to the inverse image (by RS) of D; the inverse image has dimension n − m because R, S are
invertible.
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K ≤ maxh∈{1,...,H} mh. Thus, for a given network with a given set of parameters W , φ
and λ, the set of initial conditions y(0) for which m ≥ 2 individuals i have y∗i = ŷ∗i
lies in a subspace of Rn with dimension of at most n−m.
The case of m = 1 will now be proved, i.e. there is a single individual i in the
network with y∗i = ŷ
∗
i = ŷ
∗
avg. One has ŷ∗avg = r̃>y(0), where r̃> =
1
n 1
>
n SR, which
implies that y∗i = ŷ
∗
i if and only if (ri − r̃)>y(0) = 0. In other words, ri − r̃ must
be orthogonal to y(0). First, it must be proved that ri 6= r̃i. Define s̃> = 1n 1>n S,
and observe that s̃>R = r̃> is a linear combination of the rows of R, denoted as
r>1 , . . . , r
>
n . Thus, r>i = s̃
>R if and only if r>i is a linear combination of the rows of R.
But since R is invertible, then clearly r>i cannot be a linear combination of r
>
1 , . . . , r
>
n
(otherwise R would not have full rank). Since S and R are independent of y(0) then
so is r̃, and it follows that for a network with a given set of parameters W , φ, λ, the
set of y(0) which leads to a single individual i having y∗i = ŷ
∗
i is in a subspace of R
n
of dimension n− 1. This completes the proof.
Remark 3.3. From Theorem 3.2 and its proof, one can then say that for generic networks
and generic initial conditions, there will be no individuals who have the same final private
opinions, and no individual will have the same final private and expressed opinion. Suppose
that the parameters defining the network are given, i.e. W , φ and λ. Suppose further that
each yi(0), i ∈ I is sampled from some continuous distribution (which might be a uniform,
normal, beta, etc.). If the distribution is over a non-degenerate interval3 (which may be
infinite), one can then see that, with probability zero, there will be m > 0 individuals that
have y∗i = ŷ
∗
i . In other words, if one runs p experiments in which one independently selects
initial condition vectors y(0) from a non-degenerate distribution, and if q is the number of
those experiments which result in y∗i = ŷ
∗
i for some i ∈ I , then limp→∞ q/p = 0. This
can be viewed from another perspective: the set of y(0) for which y∗i = ŷ
∗
i for some i ∈ I
belongs in a subspace of Rn of at most dimension n− 1, and any such subspace has a Lebesgue
measure of zero. The same can be said for the initial conditions which lead to y∗i = y
∗
j for
i 6= j.
3.3.2 Estimating Disagreement in the Private Opinions
This section presents a method for estimating the disagreement among the private
opinions at equilibrium given limited knowledge of the network. The social implica-
tions of the result are discussed, with the proof presented in Appendix Section 3.5
Corollary 3.2 (Estimating Private Disagreement). Suppose that the hypotheses in Theo-
rem 3.1 hold. Then, there holds
ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min
κ(φ)
≤ y∗max − y∗min (3.21)
where κ(φ) = 1− φminφmax (1− φmax) ∈ (0, 1) and φmax = maxi∈I φi, φmin = mini∈I φi.
3A statistical distribution is degenerate if the cumulative distribution function F(x, k0) = 0 if x < k0
and F(x, k0) = 1 if x ≥ k0.
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For the purposes of monitoring the level of unvoiced discontent in a network
(e.g. to prevent drastic and unforeseen actions or violence [Goodwin, 2011; Kuran,
1989; Duggins, 2017]), it is of interest to obtain more knowledge about the level of
disagreement among the private opinions of the individuals in the network. This
can be represented by y∗max − y∗min. A fundamental issue is that such information is
unlikely to be obtainable (by definition private opinions are not readily observable
except in certain situations like the post-experimental interviews conducted by Asch
in his experiments, see Chapter 4). On the other hand, for a given influence network,
one expects that the level of disagreement ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min is readily available (by defini-
tion opinions are expressed). While one cannot expect to know every φi, the author
argues that φmax and φmin might be obtained, if not accurately then approximately.
Corollary 3.2 therefore gives a method for computing a lower bound on the level of
private disagreement given limited knowledge of (i) the final expressed opinions,
and (ii) an estimate of the resilience levels of the individuals.
It is obvious that if κ(φ) is small, then even strong agreement among the expres-
sed opinions (small ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min) does not preclude significant disagreement in the
final private opinions of the individuals. A small κ(φ) may occur if φmax is small
and the ratio φmin/φmax is close to 1. One example is a highly structured group with
rigid protocols, such as an authoritarian government.
Proof. See Section 3.5.5.
Remark 3.4 (Tightness of the bound). Key to Corollary 3.2 is the proof that the coefficient
of ergodicity for S is bounded from above as τ(S) ≤ κ(φ). The tightness of this bound
depends on the ratio φmin/φmax; the closer the ratio is to one (i.e. as the “force” of the
pressure to conform felt by each individual becomes more uniform), the tighter the bound. If
φmin/φmax = 1, i.e. all resilience values are equal, then τ(S) = κ(φ). This can be concluded
by examining the proof, and noting that the key inequalities in Eq. (3.37) and Eq. (3.38)
involve φmin and φmax. If φi ∀ i are know, one can obtain y∗ = S−1ŷ∗ precisely.
3.3.3 An Individual’s Resilience Affects Everyone
An interesting result is now presented, that shows how individual i’s resilience to the
pressure to conform, as measured by φi, has a effect on the final expressed opinions
of all other individuals. In particular, i’s resilience is propagated through the public
opinion and the strongly connected network. Again, a discussion of the theoretical
result from a sociological context is given immediately after the corollary statement,
with the proof provided last.
Corollary 3.3 (Individual Resilience). Suppose that the hypotheses in Theorem 3.1 hold.
Then, the matrix S ∈ Rn×n appearing in Eq. (3.18) is a function of φi, i ∈ I and has partial
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derivative ∂(S)∂φi ∈ R
n×n with the following sign pattern
∂(S)
∂φi
=

ithcolumn
− − . . . − + − . . . −
− − . . . − + − . . . −
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
. . . −
− − . . . − + − . . . −
− − . . . − + − . . . −
. (3.22)
That is, ∂(S)∂φi has positive entries in the i
th column and all other entries are negative.
From the fact that ŷ∗ = Sy∗, where S is positive and row-stochastic, it follows that
individual k’s final expressed opinion ŷ∗k is a convex combination of all individuals’
final private opinions y∗j , with convex weights skj, j = 1, . . . , n. Intuitively, increasing
φk makes individual k more resilient to the pressure to conform, and this is confirmed
by the above; ∂skk∂φk > 0 and
∂skj
∂φk
< 0 for any j 6= k and thus ŷ∗k → y∗k .
More importantly, the above result yields a surprising and nontrivial fact; every
entry of the kth column of ∂(S)∂φk is strictly positive, and all other entries of
∂(S)
∂φk
are
strictly negative. In context, any change in individual k’s resilience directly impacts
every other individual’s final expressed opinion due to the network of interpersonal
influences. In particular, as φk increases (decreases), an individual j’s final expressed
opinion ŷ∗j becomes more influenced by (less influenced by) the final private opinion
y∗k of individual k due to the convex weight sjk increasing, since
∂sjk
∂φk
> 0 (decrea-
sing, since ∂sjk∂φk < 0). Thus, one concludes that an individual (agent) level process of
being resilient to conforming to a group norm can have wide reaching consequences
on network-level dynamics. This will be highlighted in Chapter 4, where it will be
shown how a few stubborn extremists with high resilience can create massively dif-
ferent expressed and private opinions among the general network population. Here,
a mathematical treatment is provided to help explain the phenomena that is reported
in Chapter 4.
Proof. First, one may verify that S is dependent only on φ, and S is invertible, and
continuously differentiable, for all φi ∈ (0, 1). It follows from Lemma A.3 that
∂S(φ)
∂φi
= −S(φ)
(
∂S−1(φ)
∂φi
)
S(φ), (3.23)
and note that in future, the argument φ will be dropped from S(φ) and S−1(φ) when
there is no confusion. First, note that ∂Φ
−1
∂φi
= −φ−2i eie>i , where ei is the ith canonical
unit vector (see Section 2.1). It can be proved that S−1 = Φ−1−Φ−1(In−Φ) 1n1
>
n
n (see
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Eq. (3.31) in Section 3.5.2), and by using Lemma A.3, one obtains
∂S(φ)
∂φi
= −S
(
− 1
φ2i
eie>i +
1
φ2i
eie>i
1n1>n
n
)
S
=
1
φ2i
Sei
(
e>i −
1
n
1>n
)
S,
with the second equality being obtained by noting that e>i 1n = 1. It suffices to prove
the corollary claim, if it can be shown that the row vector
(
e>i − 1n 1>n
)
S has a strictly
positive ith entry and all other entries are strictly negative. This is because S > 0
implies that the row vector Sei > 0. This will be achieved by showing that(
e>i −
1
n
1>n
)
Sei > 0 (3.24)(
e>i −
1
n
1>n
)
Sej < 0 , ∀ j 6= i. (3.25)
Toward this end, the following useful quantity is first calculated:
e>i S
−1 = e>i
(
Φ−1 −Φ−1(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
)
=
1
φi
e>i −
1
n
(
1
φi
− 1
)
1>n ,
which holds because e>i Φ
−1 = φ−1i e
>
i . Postmultiplying by S on both sides of the
equation e>i S
−1 = 1φi e
>
i − 1n
(
1
φi
− 1
)
1>n yields e>i =
1
φi
e>i S− 1n
(
1
φi
− 1
)
1>n S. Rear-
ranging this yields the following two equalities
e>i S = φie
>
i +
1
n
(1− φi)1>n S (3.26)
1>n S =
n
1− φi
(
e>i S− φie>i
)
. (3.27)
First, Eq. (3.25) will be proved. By using the equality of Eq. (3.26) for substitution,
observe that the left hand side of Eq. (3.25) can be evaluated as(
e>i S−
1
n
1>n S
)
ej =
(
φie>i +
1
n
(1− φi)1>n S−
1
n
1>n S
)
ej
= −φi
n
1>n Sej, (3.28)
by making use of the fact that e>i ej = 0 for any j 6= i. Note that the quantity 1>n Sej
is the sum of all entries of the jth column of S, and this quantity is strictly positive
because S > 0. Thus, −φi1>n Sej/n < 0, which proves Eq. (3.25). Next, Eq. (3.24) will
be proved. Using the equality of Eq. (3.27) for substitution, observe that the left hand
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side of Eq. (3.24) is
(e>i S−
1
n
1>n S)ei = e
>
i Sei −
1
1− φi
(
e>i Sei − φie>i ei
)
=
φi
1− φi
(
1− e>i Sei
)
> 0. (3.29)
The inequality is obtained by observing that 1) 0 < φi < 1 ⇒ φi/(1− φi) > 0, and
2) 1− e>i Sei > 0 because e>i Sei is simply the ith diagonal entry of the positive row-
stochastic matrix S. That is, 0 < e>i Sei = sii < 1. This proves Eq. (3.24), and the
corollary proof is complete.
For completeness, note that ∂S(φ)∂φi 1n = 0n, i.e.
∂S(φ)
∂φi
is a matrix with zero row sum.
This property is related to the fact that S is row-stochastic: any increase in an entry’s
magnitude must be matched with decreases in all other entries of the same row.
3.3.4 Local Public Opinions
As detailed in Section 3.2.2, one can consider a model where the global public opinion
ŷavg is unavailable, but a local, individual specific, public opinion ŷi,lavg is available.
In other words, Eq. (3.2) is replaced by Eq. (3.4). The previously detailed theoretical
results all continue to hold with obvious adjustments to the statements, except for
Corollary 3.2. No proofs are given, other than the following comments which point
out the major differences in analysis with the global public opinion model.
Regarding Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2: Observe that to go from P in Eq. (3.8) to Z in
Eq. (3.10), one simply replaces the row-stochastic and primitive matrix 1n1
>
n
n with the
row-stochastic and primitive matrix A (because W is primitive under Assumption 3.1
and A vW , then A is also primitive). This means that the result of Lemma 3.1 conti-
nues to hold if P is replaced with Z in the lemma statement, because all the properties
of G[ 1n1
>
n
n ] used in the proof (e.g. strong connectedness, and row-stochasticity of
1n1>n
n )
also hold for G[A]. It also means that Lemma 3.2 also applies for Q̄ = I2n−Z. Again,
the fact that A is row-stochastic and primitive is all that is need to prove the lemma
statement for Q̄.
Regarding the remaining results: One can readily prove that Theorems 3.1 and 3.2,
with the obvious adjustments, continue to hold, since the proofs primarily rely on
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. Corollary 3.1 and Lemma 3.3 will also continue to hold. A
key difference however, is that S depends on A, which in turn is dependent on W
(A is dependent on the structure of W , but not the value of its entries). This means
that S, i.e. the matrix whose entries form the convex weights which relate ŷ∗ to y∗,
now depends on the structure of W . Investigations of pluralistic ignorance in the
following Chapter 4 will show that the effects of changes in A can be substantial.
Corollary 3.3 can also easily be extended. Note that e>i A = a
>
i , where a
>
i is the i
th
row of A. Since A is irreducible, then at least one entry of a>i is strictly positive. The
proof method then follows identical steps, but with A replacing 1n1
>
n
n .
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Note that Corollary 3.2 was proved using nontrivial calculations that made ex-
plicit use of the fact that the global public opinion updating Eq. (3.2) was captured
by an all-to-all (or complete) influence network G[ 1n1
>
n
n ]. With local public opinion
updating Eq. (3.4), these calculations no longer hold. This suggests that obtaining
a similar result, but for local public opinion updating, might be extremely difficult,
but not necessarily impossible and may be a future direction of research.
3.3.5 Simulations
A simulation is now presented to illustrate the theoretical results of this chapter.
A 3−regular network4 G[W ] with n = 18 is generated; the matrix W is given in
Section 3.5.6. Self-loops are added to each node (to ensure G[W ] is aperiodic), and
the influence weights wij are obtained as follows. The value of each wij is drawn
randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval (0, 1) if (vj, vi) ∈ E , and once
all wij are determined, the weights are normalised by dividing all entries in row
i by ∑nj=1 wij. This ensures that W is row-stochastic and nonnegative. For i 6= j,
it is not required that wij = wji (which would result in an undirected graph), but
for simplicity and convenience the simulations impose5 that wij > 0 ⇔ wji > 0.
The values of yi(0), φi, and λi, are picked from beta distributions, which have two
parameters α and β. For α, β > 1, a beta distribution of the variable x is unimodal
and satisfies x ∈ (0, 1), which is precisely what is required to satisfy Assumption 3.1
regarding φi, λi. The beta distribution parameters are (i) α = 2, β = 2 for yi(0), (ii)
α = 2, β = 2 for φi, and (iii) α = 2, β = 8 for λi.
The temporal evolution of opinions is shown in Fig. 3.4. Several of the results
detailed in this chapter can be observed. In particular, it is clear that Eq. (3.18) holds.
That is, there is no consensus of the expressed or private opinions at equilibrium. Mo-
reover, the disagreement among the final expressed opinions, ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min, is strictly
smaller than the disagreement among the final private opinions, y∗max − y∗min. Se-
parate to this, the final private opinions enclose the final expressed opinions from
above and below. For the given simulation, the largest and smallest resilience values
are φmax = 0.9437 and φmin = 0.1994, respectively. This implies that κ(φ) = 0.9881.
One can also obtain that ŷ∗max − ŷ∗min = 0.1613. From Eq. (3.21), this indicates that
y∗max− y∗min ≥ 0.163. The simulation result is consistent with the lower bound, in that
y∗max − y∗min = 0.3455. Also, the bound is not tight, since φmin/φmax is far from 1 (see
Remark 3.4).
For the same G[W ], with the same initial conditions yi(0) and resilience φi, a
second simulation is run with λ1 = 1, ∀i ∈ I . As shown in Fig. 3.5, the opinions con-
verge to a consensus y∗ = ŷ∗ = α1n, for some α ∈ R, which illustrates Corollary 3.1.
4A k-regular graph is one which every node vi has k neighbours, i.e. |Ni| = k ∀ i ∈ I .
5Such an assumption is not needed for the theoretical results, but is a simple way to ensure that all
directed graphs generated using the MATLAB package are strongly connected.
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Figure 3.4: Temporal evolution of opinions for 18 individuals in an influence network. The
green and dotted blue lines represent the expressed and private opinions of the individuals,
respectively.
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Figure 3.5: Temporal evolution of opinions for 18 individuals in an influence network. The
green and dotted blue lines represent the expressed and private opinions of the individuals,
respectively. The lack of stubbornness, λi = 1, ∀ i, means that all opinions reach a consensus.
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3.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduced an opinion dynamics model where each individual had a
private and an expressed opinion on the same topic. In particular, the expressed
opinion of an individual was altered from his/her private opinion due to a pressure
to conform. A number of results were obtained, beginning with establishing of the
dynamical properties of the opinions evolving on the influence network. Beyond the
stability analysis, a number of semi-quantitative conclusions were drawn on the dis-
tributions of opinions at equilibrium, which in the social context of the model gave
illuminating insight into how stubbornness and resilience affected the opinion evo-
lution. A number of exciting possible future works are discussed in Chapter 10 after
a further study of the model, focussing on the explanation of social psychological
phenomena using the model, is conducted in Chapter 4.
3.5 Appendix: Proofs and Simulations
3.5.1 Proof of Lemma 3.1
First, it is easily verified that P is a nonnegative matrix by using the fact that W , Λ,
In−Φ, 1n1>n /n are all nonnegative matrices (since 0 < φi, λi < 1). Next, observe that[
Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ) ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
Φ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
] [
1n
1n
]
=
[
Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ)1n + ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n
Φ1n + (In −Φ) 1n
]
=
[
Λ(W̃ + Ŵ)1n
1n
]
=
[
Λ1n
1n
]
. (3.30)
with the first equality obtained by observing that 1n1
>
n
n 1n = 1n, and with the last
equality obtained by recalling that W = W̃ + Ŵ is row-stochastic, i.e. W1n = 1n.
Because λi < 1 ∀ i, it is immediately clear that Eq. (3.30) implies that rows 1, . . . , n of
P each have row sum equal to a value strictly less than one, while rows n + 1, . . . , 2n
each have row sum precisely equal to one. In other words, P is row-substochastic.
Notice that the graph G[P] = (V , E [P], P) has 2n nodes, with V = {1, . . . , 2n}. The
node subset V1 = {v1, . . . , vn} contains node vi which is associated with individual
i’s private opinion yi, i ∈ I . The node subset V2 = {vn+1, . . . , v2n} contains node
vn+i which is associated with individual i’s expressed opinion ŷi, i ∈ I . Define the
following two subgraphs; G1 = (V1, E [P11], P11) and G2 = (V2, E [P22], P22). The edge
set of G[P] can be divided as follows
E11 = E
[
P11 0n×n
0n×n 0n×n
]
, E12 = E
[
0n×n P12
0n×n 0n×n
]
,
E21 = E
[
0n×n 0n×n
P21 0n×n
]
, E22 = E
[
0n×n 0n×n
0n×n P22
]
,
In other words, E11 contains only edges between nodes in V1 and E22 contains only
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edges between nodes in V2. The edge set E12 contains only edges from nodes in V2
to nodes in V1, while the edge set E21 contains only edges from nodes in V1 to nodes
in V2. Clearly E [P] = E11 ∪ E12 ∪ E21 ∪ E22. It will now be shown that G[P] is strongly
connected and aperiodic, which in turn establishes that P is primitive.
Since the diagonal entries of Λ, Φ are strictly positive, it is obvious that P11 =
Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ) ∼W . Because W is primitive, it follows that P11 is primitive, which in
turn implies that G1 is strongly connected and aperiodic. Similarly, the edges of G2
are E [P22]. Because In −Φ has strictly positive diagonal entries, one concludes that
P22 = (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n ∼ G[1n1>n ]. From the fact that G[1n1>n ] is a complete graph, it
follows that G2 is a complete graph. Since G1 and G2 are both, separately, strongly
connected, then if there exists 1) an edge from any node in V1 to any node V2, and
2) an edge from any node in V2 to any node in V1, one can conclude that the graph
G[P] is strongly connected. It suffices to show that E12 6= ∅ and E21 6= ∅, i.e.,
P21 = Φ 6= 0n×n and P12 = ΛŴ (In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n 6= 0n×n. Since Φ has strictly positive
diagonal entries, this proves that E12 6= ∅. From the fact that In − Φ has strictly
positive diagonal entries, and because Ŵ is irreducible, it follows that P12 ∼ 1n1>n .
This shows that E21 6= ∅. It has therefore been proved that G[P] is strongly connected
and aperiodic, which also proves that P is primitive. The arguments below Eq. (3.30)
led to the conclusion that at least one row of P has row sum strictly less than one.
Lemma A.1 is then used to conclude that ρ(P) < 1, i.e. all eigenvalues of P are inside
the unit circle. This completes the proof. 
3.5.2 Proof of Lemma 3.2
First, observe that Q−1 = (I2n − P)−1. Because ρ(P) < 1, it follows that P is a
bounded operator. That is, there exists a norm ‖ · ‖′ such that ‖P‖′ < 1 (see [Bern-
stein, 2009, Corollary 9.3.4]). This implies that limk→∞ Pk = 02n×2n. The Neumann
series yields Q−1 = (I2n − P)−1 = ∑∞k=0 Pk. It was concluded in Section 3.5.1 above
that G[P] is strongly connected and aperiodic. Lemma 2.1 indicates that P is pri-
mitive. This implies, from the Neumann series evaluation, that Q−1 > 0. Next, it
will be shown Q11, Q22 and Q22 − Q21Q−111 Q12 are all invertible, which will allow
Lemma A.2 to be used to express Q−1 in the form of Eq. (3.11).
Recall that Q11 = In − P11 and Q22 = In − P22. One can verify that under As-
sumption 3.1, P11 and P22 are both primitive because G1[P11] and G2[P22] are both
strongly connected and aperiodic, and ρ(P11), ρ(P22) < 1. Using precisely the same
method as above, but which is omitted here, one can show that Q11 and Q22 are
invertible, and that their inverses satisfy Q−111 > 0 and Q
−1
22 > 0.
In order to prove that Q22 −Q21Q−111 Q12 is invertible, the matrix S = −Q
−1
22 Q21
is first shown to be a positive, row-stochastic matrix. Since it was just established
that Q−122 is positive, it follows from the fact that Φ = diag(φi) is a diagonal matrix
with positive diagonal entries, that S = Q−122 P21 = Q
−1
22 Φ > 0. To prove that S is
row-stochastic, first note that S is invertible because det(S) = det(Q−122 )det(Φ) 6= 0
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(because φi ∈ (0, 1), ∀ i⇒ det(Φ) 6= 0). Observe that
S =
(
In − (In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
)−1
Φ =
(
Φ−1 −Φ−1(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
)−1
, (3.31)
because (AB)−1 = B−1A−1 for any invertible A, B. Observe that
S−11n =
(
Φ−1 −Φ−1(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
)
1n = 1n −Φ−11n + Φ−11n = 1n.
It then follows that SS−11n = S1n ⇔ S1n = 1n, i.e. S has row sums equal to one. The
proof that S is positive and row-stochastic is thus complete.
One now turns to proving that T = Q11 −Q12Q−122 Q21 is invertible, and because
Q11 is invertible, this is equivalent to proving that Q22−Q21Q−111 Q12 is invertible, see
[Bernstein, 2009, pg. 108–109]. First, note that S = −Q−122 Q21, and −Q12 = P12 =
ΛŴ(In−Φ) 1n1
>
n
n , and Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ) are all nonnegative matrices. One can thus write
T = In −U where U = Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ) + P12S is a nonnegative matrix. Observe that
U1n =
(
Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ) + ΛŴ(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
S
)
1n
= Λ
(
W̃ + ŴΦ
)
1n +
(
ΛŴ (In −Φ)
)
1n = Λ1n.
where the last equality was obtained by recalling that Ŵ +W̃ = W is a row-stochastic
matrix, i.e. (Ŵ + W̃)1n = 1n. The above computation proves that the ith row of
U sums to λi ∈ (0, 1) (see Assumption 3.1). In other words, U is positive and
strictly row-substochastic, which implies that ‖U‖∞ < 1, and this in turn implies that
ρ(U) < 1. Again, utilisation of the Neumann series shows that T−1 = (I −U)−1 =
∑∞k=0 U
k converges to a finite limit. That is, T is invertible. Moreover, because it
was shown in Section 3.5.1 that G[Λ(W̃ + ŴΦ)] is strongly connected and aperiodic,
one can readily verify that G[U] is strongly connected and aperiodic. It follows
that U is primitive, i.e. ∃k ∈ N : Uk > 0. This primitivity property implies that
T−1 = ∑∞k=0 U
k > 0. It follows that R = T−1(In − Λ) is positive, because In − Λ
is a diagonal matrix with positive diagonal entries. Finally, one can verify that R is
row-stochastic with the following computation: T1n = (In −U)1n = (In − Λ)1n ⇒
R1n = T−1(In −Λ)1n = T−1T1n = 1n. This completes the proof of Lemma 3.2. 
3.5.3 Proof of Lemma 3.3
Note that the right hand side equality of Eq. (3.13) and Eq. (3.14), respectively, hold
because the initial conditions are ŷ(0) = y(0), as stated below Eq. (3.5). The proof
will use Eq. (3.7) for simplicity, which can be written as
x(k + 1) = Px(k) + Bx(0), (3.32)
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where x(k) = [x1(k)>, x2(k)>]>, k = 1, 2, . . . , ∞, and with
B =
[
In −Λ 0n×n
0n×n 0n×n
]
.
For k = 1, and as stated below Eq. (3.7), one has x2(1) = x1(0) and x1(1) =
ΛWx1(0) + (In −Λ)x1(0). In other words, x(1) = M1x(0) where
M1 =
[
ΛW + (In −Λ) 0n×n
In 0n×n
]
≥ 0,
Verify that M112n = 12n. This indicates that each entry of x(1) is a convex combina-
tion of the entries of x1(0). It follows that Eq. (3.13) and Eq. (3.14) hold for k = 1.
The solution of Eq. (3.32), for k > 1, can be obtained in the follow recursive form:
x (2) = Px (1) + Bx (0) = (PM1 + B) x (0) := M2x (0) ,
...
x (k− 1) = Px (k− 2) + Bx (0) = (PMk−2 + B) x (1) := Mk−1x (0) ,
x (k) = Px (k− 1) + Bx (0) = (PMk−1 + B) x (0) := Mkx (0) .
The matrices M2, M2, . . . , Mk are now shown to be row-stochastic. First, observe that
(P + B)12n = P12n + B12n =
[
Λ1n
1n
]
+
[
(I −Λ)1n
0n
]
=
[
1n
1n
]
= 12n,
where Eq. (3.30) has been used. In other words, P + B is row-stochastic. Observe
then that, for any row-stochastic matrix A, PA + B is row-stochastic as well, because
(PA + B)12n = (P + B)12n. It was already shown that M1 was row-stochastic. It
follows, by induction, that Mk is row-stochastic for all k ≥ 1, which, after recalling
that y(t) = x1(k) and ŷ(t− 1) = x2(k), proves the assertion in Lemma 3.3. 
3.5.4 Simulation Counter-Example
The two inequalities Eq. (3.16) and Eq. (3.15) constitute a stronger form of nonexpan-
siveness which exists in other weight averaging algorithms such as the DeGroot or
Hegselmann–Krause model (see Corollary 2.1). For the counter-example, consider a
network of 4 individuals, with y(0) = [1, 0, 0, 0]>, φ1 = 0.8, φ2 = 0.03, φ3 = 0.02, φ4 =
0.05, and λ1 = 0.1, λ2 = 0.2, λ3 = 0.12, λ4 = 0.15. The influence matrix is
W =

0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3
0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2
0.2 0.2 0.1 0.5
 . (3.33)
The trajectory of the system is shown in Fig. 3.6. Clearly maxi∈I yi(t) dips at t = 1
and then increases again for t > 1, which contradicts Eq. (3.15). A counter-example
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Figure 3.6: Evolution of opinions for counter-example to nonexpansive dynamics.
to Eq. (3.16) is obtained simply by setting y(0) = [−1, 0, 0, 0]>.
3.5.5 Proof of Corollary 3.2
Recall the definition of the performance function V in Appendix A.1.1. From Theo-
rem 3.1, one has that V(ŷ∗) = V(Sy∗) ≤ τ(S)V(y∗), which implies that there holds
V(ŷ∗)/τ(S) ≤ V(y∗). Thus, Eq. (3.21) can be proved by showing that τ(S) ≤ κ(φ).
Recall that Q−122 can be expressed using the Neumann series as Q
−1
22 = (I − P22)−1 =
∑∞k=0 P22. Since P22 = (In −Φ)
1n1>n
n and Q21 = −Φ, it follows that
S = −Q22−1Q21 =
∞
∑
k=0
[
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
]k
Φ = Φ +
∞
∑
k=1
[
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
]k
Φ.
For convenience, let a = mini,j aij denote the smallest element of a matrix A. From
the definition of τ (see Eq. (A.9)), it follows that, for any positive A ∈ Rn, there holds
τ(A) ≤ 1− na (3.34)
Define H = ∑∞k=1
[
(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
]k
Φ and verify easily that H > 0. Observe that there
holds s = h because S = Φ + H has the same offdiagonal entries as H, and the ith
diagonal entry of S is greater than that of H by φi. Since S, H > 0, it follows from
Eq. (3.34) that τ(S), τ(H) ≤ 1− nh, and thus the matrix H will now be analysed.
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Consider a matrix A ∈ Rn×n, with ai denoting the ith column. Observe that
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
A =
1
n
(1− φ1)1
>
...
(1− φn)1>
 [a1 · · · an]
=
1
n
(1− φ1)∑
n
j=1 a1j · · · (1− φ1)∑nj=1 anj
...
. . .
...
(1− φn)∑nj=1 a1j · · · (1− φn)∑nj=1 anj
 .
From this, it is straightforward to compute that
[
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
]2
=
1
n2
(1− φ1)∑
n
j=1(1− φj) · · · (1− φ1)∑nj=1(1− φj)
...
. . .
...
(1− φn)∑nj=1(1− φj) · · · (1− φn)∑nj=1(1− φj)
 .
Similarly, by noting that ∑ni=1 ∑
n
j=1 aibj =
(
∑ni=1 ai
)
∑nj=1 bj = ∑
n
i=1 ai
(
∑nj=1 bj
)
, it
follows that[
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
]3
= (In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
[
(In −Φ)
1n1>n
n
]2
=
1
n3
(1− φ1)∑
n
j=1 ∑
n
k=1(1− φj)(1− φk) · · · (1− φ1)∑nj=1 ∑nk=1(1− φj)(1− φk)
...
. . .
...
(1− φn)∑nj=1 ∑nk=1(1− φj)(1− φk) · · · (1− φn)∑nj=1 ∑nk=1(1− φj)(1− φk)

By recursion, one obtains that the (i, j)th entry of
[
(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
]k
is given by
1
nk
(1− φi)
[
n
∑
p1=1
n
∑
p2=1
· · ·
n
∑
pk−1=1
(1− φp1)(1− φp2) · · · (1− φpk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-1 summation terms
]
. (3.35)
This is obtained using ∑ni=1 ∑
n
j=1 aibj =
(
∑ni=1 ai
)
∑nj=1 bj = ∑
n
i=1 ai
(
∑nj=1 bj
)
, except
now operated on k− 1 summation terms. Next, define Zk =
[
(In −Φ) 1n1
>
n
n
]k
Φ, and
from Eq. (3.35), computations show that the (i, j)th element of Zk is given by
zij(k) =
1
nk
(1− φi)φj
[
n
∑
p1=1
n
∑
p2=1
· · ·
n
∑
pk−1=1
(1− φp1)(1− φp2) · · · (1− φpk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-1 summation terms
]
. (3.36)
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It follows that the smallest element of Zk, denoted by z(k), is bounded as follows
z(k) ≥ 1
nk
(1− φmax)φmin
[
n
∑
p1=1
n
∑
p2=1
· · ·
n
∑
pk−1=1
(1− φp1)(1− φp2) · · · (1− φpk−1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
k-1 summation terms
]
. (3.37)
Observe that 1− φi ≥ 1− φmax, ∀ i⇒ ∑na=1 1− φa ≥ n(1− φmax). It follows that
z(k) ≥ 1
nk
(1− φmax)φmin(1− φmax)k−1nk−1 ≥
1
n
φmin(1− φmax)k. (3.38)
Since H = ∑∞k=1 Z
k, it follows that
h ≥
∞
∑
k=1
z(k)
≥ 1
n
φmin
[
∞
∑
k=1
(1− φmax)k
]
≥ 1
n
φmin
[
1
1− (1− φmax)
− 1
]
≥ 1
n
[
φmin
φmax
(1− φmax)
]
,
where the third inequality is obtained by recalling that for any r ∈ R such that |r| < 1,
the geometric series is ∑∞k=0 r
k = 11−r ⇔ ∑
∞
k=1 r
k = 11−r − 1, and 0 < 1− φmax < 1. It
follows from Eq. (3.34), and the arguments immediately below it, that
τ(S) ≤ 1− nh = 1− φmin
φmax
(1− φmax) = κ(φ) (3.39)
as in the corollary statement. Since 0 < φmin/φmax < 1 and 0 < 1− φmax < 1, one
has 0 < φminφmax (1− φmax) = κ(φ) < 1 and thus τ(S) ≤ κ(φ) holds ∀ φi ∈ (0, 1). 
3.5.6 Simulation Influence Matrix
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Chapter 4
The EPO Model’s Connections with
Social Psychology Concepts
Chapter Summary
This chapter will study the Expressed–Private Opinion (EPO) model first introduced
in the previous Chapter 3. First, the model is used to revisit and re-examine Asch’s
seminal conformity experiments. Analytical calculations are used to establish the
opinion evolution of the test individuals in the experiments. With the aid of simula-
tions, it is shown that all of the different ways that individuals were recorded to have
reacted in the experiments are captured and predicted by the proposed model. Then,
pluralistic ignorance is investigated. This phenomenon considers how the perceived
and true positions of the general population on a given topic can be completely dif-
ferent. Using extensive simulations, the role of stubborn extremists (termed zealots)
in creating pluralistic ignorance is revealed.
4.1 Introduction
A number of works from the sociology and social psychology communities were
presented in Section 3.1, introducing concepts such as how an individual may have
different expressed and private opinions, and how individuals often face a pressure
to conform to a group norm or standard. Continuing from that, two established
results are further investigated.
4.1.1 Introduction to Asch’s Experiments
The context in which Asch’s seminal experiments on conformity to pressure is rele-
vant to the proposed model was outlined in the introduction of Chapter 3. In addition
to providing much of the motivation for the EPO model, it is also of great interest to
revisit Asch’s results using the model. This can be used to provide some validation
for the model, while simultaneously gaining access to new insight via analysis from
a networked, agent-based mathematical framework.
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In order for the reader to fully appreciate and understand the results to be cove-
red in this chapter, a brief overview of Asch’s conformity experiments and its results
are now given, and the reader is referred to [Asch, 1951] for full details on the re-
sults. In summary, the Asch experiments studied an individual’s response to “two
contradictory and irreconcilable forces” of (i) a clear and indisputable fact, and (ii) a
unanimous majority of the others in the group who take positions opposing this fact.
In the first set of experiments (which is what this chapter will focus on), eight
individuals (all male college students) are instructed to judge a series of line lengths.
Of the eight individuals, one is in fact the test subject, and the other seven have been
told a priori about what they should do. These other individuals have become re-
ferred to as “confederates” in later literature for convenience, and this thesis adopts
this terminology. An example of the line length judging experiment, and the influ-
ence network, is shown in Figure 4.1. There are three lines of unequal length, and
the group has open discussions concerning which one of the lines A, B, C is equal
in length to the green line. Each individual is required to independently declare his
choice. The group is required to conduct this experiment for twelve iterations in
sequence (using different sets of lines for each experiment). For each iteration, there
is an indisputable and obvious answer. Control groups without confederates were
extremely successful (close to 100% of groups) in determining the correct answer,
and so there is no issue of ambiguity in the correct answer.
At predetermined iterations, the seven confederates unanimously and confidently
choose the same wrong answer. They stubbornly persist in this answer and even
openly question the choice made by the eighth individual. The actions of the eig-
hth, the test individual, are recorded to determine whether he also selects the wrong
answer, or maintains his expressed belief for the correct answer in the face of pres-
sure to conform to a unanimous majority. After the experiment, the test individual is
interviewed to further understand his decisions and thoughts. These interviews were
critical in Asch’s classification of the individuals. In particular, Asch identified three
broad types of test individuals, these being (i) independent individuals, (ii) yielding
individuals who showed distortion of judgment/perception, and (iii) yielding individuals
who showed distortion of action. The nature of each type of individual will be clarified
in the sequel, when the Asch experiments are framed within the EPO model.
4.1.2 Pluralistic Ignorance in Social Networks
Although racial segregation still existed in United States in the 1960s, it turns out
that there was a misconception among the population at large about the popularity
of segregation. Specifically, [O’Gorman, 1975] found that at the time, segregation
was not supported by the majority of white Americans, but the majority of white Ame-
ricans believed that segregation enjoyed majority support among white Americans. This is a
phenomenon known as pluralistic ignorance, in which there is a misconception about
the true views of the population. Closely related to pluralistic ignorance is the social
psychological phenomenon called “the spiral of silence” [Noelle-Neumann, 1993], in
which an individual may cease to express his/her opinion if that individual percei-
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Figure 4.1: Example of the Asch experiment, with an illustrative influence network of eight
individuals in the Asch. Here, the edges are bidirectional (for convenience only), indicating
both individuals influence one another. The individuals are required to openly discuss the
length of lines, and state their individual beliefs as to which one of A, B, C has the same
length as the green line. Clearly A is equal in length to the green line. The confederates
(seven blue individuals) unanimously express belief in the same wrong answer, e.g. B.
ves the general public to be shifting away from his/her current opinion. Conversely,
individuals may become extremely vocal even when they hold an opinion in the mi-
nority, because they perceive the general public’s opinions to be shifting toward their
current position. The two phenomena have been studied together [Taylor, 1982]; plu-
ralistic ignorance is typically seen as a reflection of the individual’s knowledge of the
current state of the social network, whereas the spiral of silence is an act from an
individual based on predictions of the future state of the network (these predictions
may be based on inaccurate information arising from pluralistic ignorance).
The psychological process of preference falsification was introduced in Section 1.2.3,
and is now explained in further detail to aid in the discussion of the results to be pre-
sented in Section 4.3. The term is widely attributed to political and economic scientist
Timur Kuran, as discussed in [Kuran, 1997, Chapter 1]. Preference falsification occurs
when an individual misrepresents his/her genuine (i.e. private) wants and/or opi-
nions under social pressure that is perceived by the individual. A politician may
deliberately falsify his/her expressed preferences to garner the votes of the people.
An individual may unconsciously falsify his/her preference under real or imaginary
social pressure arising from a group situation. Often times, an individual will falsify
his/her preference in order to please, or avoid conflict and confrontation with an
individual(s) he/she likes or wishes to impress. From this point of view, Eq. (3.2)
represents individual i falsifying i’s private (true) opinion, and specifically in the di-
rection of the public opinion ŷavg. For the purposes of this thesis, no attempt will be
made to differentiate whether there is deliberate or unconscious falsification; focus is
instead placed on the fact that an individual has acted to falsify his/her preference. Mo-
reover, and in the context of this thesis, pluralistic ignorance is a measure of a group or
individual’s incorrect knowledge of the opinions of the wider social network, whereas
preference falsification is an action.
It is obvious why misconceptions about the views of the general population are,
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in most circumstances, undesirable. It was already mentioned in Chapter 3 that
large differences in the private and expressed opinions of a population can lead to
violent and unexpected actions, such as the Arab Spring movement and the fall of
the Soviet Union. Without a clear knowledge of what the population’s positions are
on a given topic, there is little hope of genuine discourse for divisive topics. Recent
events have highlighted the dangers of large scale social media in the spreading
of conspiracies and falsehoods [Del Vicario et al., 2016], and the use of hostile bot
accounts on Twitter, Facebook, and other social media to influence and manipulate
voters in recent elections [McCright and Dunlap, 2017; Calabresi, 2017; Rizoiu et al.,
2018]. Using simulations, Section 4.3 will show that just a few stubborn and resilient
extremists (termed zealots) are capable of creating massive pluralistic ignorance in
a large population. It turns out that some network types are more susceptible to
disruption by zealots than others, and further analysis provides several methods for
reducing the impact of the zealots.
4.1.3 Chapter Organization
The remainder of the chapter has the following structure. Section 4.2 studies the Asch
experiments using the EPO model via analytical calculations and simulations. The
phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance is investigated in Section 4.3, and concluding
remarks are given in Section 4.4.
4.2 Investigation of Asch’s Conformity Experiments
Since Asch’s experiments deal with an individual’s position on a statement which
is provable to be true or false1, the variables yi, ŷi are referred to as “beliefs” only in
this section, i.e. Section 4.2. For all other parts of the thesis, the use of “opinion” is
maintained when referring to yi, ŷi, for the sake of consistency.
On first observation, Asch’s experiments presented individuals with a set of dis-
crete choices, and thus the proposed model, with yi, ŷi ∈ R, is not applicable. Ho-
wever, the EPO model is in fact applicable for analysis purposes if the beliefs yi, ŷi
are framed correctly. Consider Figure 4.1 as the example. The topic of discussion is
on the truth of the statement: “The green line is of the same length as line A.” In
this section, the beliefs yi, ŷi are scaled to be in [0, 1], in which yi = 1 (respectively
yi = 0) implies individual i is maximally certain that A is of the same length as the
green line (respectively maximally certain that A is not of the same length as the
green line). Because line A being equal in length to the gree line is an indisputable
fact, it is expected for non-confederates to have yi(0) close to, if not equal to 1. This
is supported in [Asch, 1951], where the control groups had no difficulty in obtaining
the correct line length answer.
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that individual 1 is the test subject, with
individuals 2, . . . , n being the confederates. The initial conditions are y(0) = ŷ(0) =
1See Section 2.3.3 for the differences between opinion and belief as defined in this thesis.
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[1, 0, . . . , 0]>, i.e. test individual 1 has selected the correct answer A, while the group
(v2, . . . , vn) is unanimous in claiming that A is not correct. For i = 2, . . . , n set λi = 0
and φi = 1. That is, the confederates are maximally stubborn in their initial belief
(since they were informed a priori by the experimenter to unanimously choose the
wrong answer) and their private and expressed beliefs are equal, yi = ŷi, because
they have been told to be maximally resilient. The global public opinion updating
rule Eq. (3.2) is used, since the network is small and thus yavg(t) is easily known for
the test individual.
It should be noted here that in the experiment, Asch never assigned values of
susceptibility λi, and resilience φi to the test individuals because the quantitatively
measured data by Asch was the number of incorrect answers over 12 iterations and
the behaviour of the individual being tested. However, based on his written descrip-
tion of individuals (including excerpts of the interviews), it was clear to the author
of this thesis what the approximate range of values of the parameters λi, φi should
be for each type of individual. (Some of these descriptions and excerpts will be
provided immediately below). Also, the experiments did not attempt to determine
the influence matrix W (at the time, influence network theory in the sense of De-
Groot etc. had not yet been developed). The qualitative observations made in this
section are invariant to the weights wij, and focus is instead placed on examining
Asch’s experimental results from the perspective of the EPO model. In the following
Section 4.2.1, the impact of W (and in particular the weights w11), and parameters φ1
and λ1, are shown using analytic calculations.
Types of Individuals
Asch observed three broad types of individuals. In particular, he divided the test
individuals as: (i) independent individuals, (ii) yielding individuals with distortion
of judgment, and (iii) yielding individuals with distortion of action.
Independent individuals in [Asch, 1951] can be divided further into different sub-
groups depending on the reasoning behind their independence, but this will not be
considered because this chapter focuses on only on the final outcome or observed
result and not the reasons. Asch identified an independent individual as someone
who was strongly confident that A was correct. This individual did not change his
expressed belief, i.e. did not yield to the confederates’ unanimous declaration that A
was incorrect, despite the confederates insistently questioning the individual. Asch’s
descriptions indicate that the test individual is extremely stubborn (i.e. closed to
influence) and confident his belief is correct, and is resilient to the group pressure.
It is then obvious that one expects λ1 to be close to zero and φ1 to be close to one.
Values of φ1, λ1 in this neighbourhood generate responses that are qualitatively the
same at a high level; the differences lie in the exact values of the final opinions. This
will become apparent in the following two sections.
Asch also identified yielding individuals, who could be divided into two groups.
Those who experienced a distortion of judgment/perception either (i) lacked confi-
dence, assumed the group was correct and thus concluded A was incorrect, or (ii)
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did not realise he had been influenced by the group at all and changed his private
belief to be certain that A was incorrect. This indicates that the individual is open to
influence (i.e. not stubborn in y1(0) = 1) and is highly affected by the group pressure
(i.e. not resilient). One concludes that λ1 is likely to be close to one, and φ1 to be
close to zero. As shown in the sequel, it turns out that the value of φ1 plays only a
minor role for such an individual because he is already extremely open to influence.
Other yielding individuals experienced a distortion of action. This type of indi-
vidual, on being interviewed (and before being informed of the true nature of the
experiment) stated that he remained privately certain that A was the correct answer,
but suppressed his observations as to not publicly generate friction with the group.
Such an individual has full awareness of the difference between the truth and the majo-
rity’s position. This individual is closed to influence (i.e. stubborn) but not resilient,
and it is predicted that such individuals will have λ1 and φ1 both close to zero.
4.2.1 Theoretical Analysis
This section will present theoretical calculations of Asch’s experiments in the frame-
work of the EPO model, and provide analytic expressions to describe how the test
subject’s beliefs y1, ŷ1 vary with W , λ1 ∈ [0, 1] and φ1 ∈ [0, 1]. Analysis will be con-
ducted for arbitrary n ≥ 2, to also investigate if the increasing of the majority size
affects the belief evolution. The details of the confederates’ parameters are given at
the start of Section 4.2. It is assumed that w11 ∈ (0, 1), which is mild, and simply
implies that individual 1 considers his/her own belief during the discussions.
Because λi = 0 and φi = 1 for all i = 2, . . . , n, one concludes from Eq. (3.1)
and Eq. (3.2) that yi(t) = ŷi(t) = 0 for all t. Recalling the initial conditions y(0) =
[1, 0, . . . , 0]>, it follows that individual 1’s belief evolves as[
y1(t + 1)
ŷ1(t)
]
=
[
λ1w11 0
φ1
1
n (1− φ1)
] [
y1(t)
ŷ1(t− 1)
]
+
[
1− λ1
0
]
. (4.1)
From the fact that n ≥ 2, λ1 ∈ [0, 1], w11 ∈ (0, 1), and φ1 ∈ [0, 1], it follows that
V =
[
λ1w11 0
φ1
1
n (1− φ1)
]
(4.2)
has eigenvalues inside the unit circle and thus the system in Eq. (4.1) converges
to a unique equilibrium exponentially fast (this is consistent with the results in
Section 3.3). This equilibrium is given by[
limt→∞ y1(t)
limt→∞ ŷ1(t)
]
,
[
y∗1
ŷ∗1
]
= (I2 − V)−1
[
1− λ1
0
]
, (4.3)
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where I2 is the 2× 2 identity matrix, and one obtains
(I2 − V)−1 =
[
(1− λ1w11)−1 0
nφ1
(1−λ1w11)(n−1+φ1)
n
1−φ1
]
.
It follows that the final beliefs are given as
y∗1 =
1− λ1
1− λ1w11
(4.4)
ŷ∗1 =
nφ1
n− 1 + φ1
y∗1 . (4.5)
From this, one concludes that the test subject’s final private belief is dependent
on his level of stubbornness in believing that A is the correct answer, i.e. λ1, and
on his self-weight w11, i.e. how much he trusts his own belief relative to the ot-
hers in the group. Interestingly, y∗1 does not depend on individual 1’s resilience φ1,
though it must be noted that this is a special case when the other individuals are all
confederates. In general, y∗1 will depend not only on φ1, but also the other φi (as dis-
cussed in Section 3.3). For simplicity, consider a natural selection of wii = 1− λi (see
Section 2.3.2). As a result, one obtains that y∗1 = (1− λ1)/(1− λ1(1− λ1)). Examina-
tion of the function f (λ1) = (1−λ1)/(1−λ1(1−λ1)), for λ1 ∈ [0, 1], reveals how the
test subject’s final private belief changes as a function of his openness to influence; the
function f (λ1) is plotted in Fig. 4.2. Notice that f (λ1) = (1− λ1)/(1− λ1(1− λ1)) ≥
1− λ1 for λ1 ∈ [0, 1] with equality if and only if λ1 = {0, 1}. This implies that the
test individual’s final y∗1 will always be greater than his stubbornness 1− λ1, except
if he has λ1 = 0 (maximally stubborn) or λ1 = 1 (maximally open to influence).
Next, consider the final expressed belief, which is given as ŷ∗1 =
nφ1
n−1+φ1 y
∗
1 . The
relative closeness of ŷ∗1 to y
∗
1 , as measured by ŷ
∗
1/y
∗
1 , is determined by n and φ1.
Define g(φ1, n) =
nφ1
n−1+φ1 . The function g(φ1, n) is plotted in Fig. 4.3. Observe that
g(φ1, n) ≥ φ1 for any n, for all φ1 ∈ [0, 1], and with equality if and only if φ1 = {0, 1}.
This implies that the test individual’s final expressed belief will always be closer
to his final private belief than his resilience level. Most interestingly, observe that
g(φ1, n) → φ1 from above, as n → ∞, but the difference between g(φ1, n) and φ1
when going from n = 2 to n = 2× 2 = 4 is much greater than the differences going
from n = 4 to n = 4 × 2 = 8. This may explain the observation in [Asch, 1951]
that increasing the majority size did not produce a correspondingly larger distortion
effect beyond majorities of three to four individuals, at least for test individuals
with low λ1. That is, an increase in n does not produce a matching increase in
distortion of the final expressed opinion from the final private opinion, represented
as ŷ∗1/y
∗
1 = g(φ1, n)→ 1 as n→ ∞.
Also of note is that for individuals with λ1 close to one, y∗1 is already close to zero,
and bounds ŷ∗1 from above. The magnitude of the difference, |y∗1 − ŷ∗1 |, only changes slig-
htly as φ1 is varied, which indicates that for individuals who yielded with distortion
of judgment, the value of φ1 plays only a minor role in the determining the absolute
(as opposed to relative) difference between expressed and private beliefs. This is in
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Table 4.1: The types of individuals and their associated parameters in simulation examples
Susceptibility λ1 Resilience φ1
Independent λ1 = 0.1 φ1 = 0.9
Yielding, distortion of judgment λ1 = 0.9 φ1 ∈ [0, 1]
Yielding, distortion of action λ1 = 0.1 φ1 = 0.1
contrast to individuals with low susceptibility, where the behaviour of an individual
can vary significantly by varying φ1 from 1 to 0. The relation between φ1, λ1 and the
type of test individual becomes clear in the following section, when simulations are
used to illustrate each type of test individual.
4.2.2 Simulations
The Asch experiments are now simulated using the EPO model. It was mentioned
in the last paragraph of Section 4.2 that W was not identified by Asch during the
experiments. The effect of w11 was studied theoretically in the previous Section 4.2.1.
In these simulations an arbitrary W is generated with weights wij sampled randomly
from a uniform distribution and normalised to ensure ∑nj=1 wij = 1. As above, indi-
vidual 1 is set as the test subject, with individuals 2, . . . , 8 being the 7 confederates
in an n = 8 network. The initial conditions are y(0) = ŷ(0) = [1, 0, . . . , 0]>, while
λi = 0 and φi = 1 for i = 2, . . . , 8. Table 4.1 gives an overview of the three types
of test individuals observed in the Asch experiments, and the values that the author
assigned for the associated parameters of openness to influence λ1, and resilience to
conformity φ1 (see page 55 for a commentary on the types of individuals and the
author assigned approximate values of λ1, φ1).
In the following plots of Fig. 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7, red lines correspond to test indi-
vidual 1; the solid line shows the time evolution of his private belief y1(t) and the
dotted line shows the time evolution of his expressed belief, ŷ1(t). The blue line
represents the confederates v2, v3, . . . , v8, i.e. the seven other participants; since they
are maximally resilient and closed to influence, yk(t) = ŷk(t) = 0 for all t, and
k = 2, . . . , 8.
Discussion of Simulation Results
Figure 4.5 shows the evolution of beliefs when the test individual is independent. It
can be seen that both the private and expressed beliefs of v1 are largely unaffected by
the confederates’ unanimous expressed belief and the pressure exerted by the group.
Note that ŷ∗1 < y
∗
1 , which is also reported in [Asch, 1951]; despite expressing his
belief that A is the correct answer, one independent test individual stated “You’re
probably right, but you may be wrong!", which might be seen as a concession towards
the majority belief. There is also a small shift away from maximal certainty of yi = 1,
with y∗1 ≈ 0.93; in [Asch, 1951], one independent test individual stated
I would follow my own view, though part of my reason would tell me that I might
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Figure 4.2: The function f (λ1) and 1− λ1 plotted against λ1. The analy-
tical calculations show that y∗1 = f (λ1), and thus the red line represents
individual 1’s final private belief as a function of his susceptibility to in-
fluence.
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Figure 4.3: The function g(φ1, n), with n = 2, 4, 8, plotted against φ1. The
analytical calculations show that ŷ∗1 = g(φ1, n)y
∗
1 , and thus the plot shows
how the test individual’s final expressed opinion is changed from his final
private opinion by his resilience φ1, and by n.
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Figure 4.4: Behaviour of the test individual as a function of susceptibility
to influence, λ1, and resilience to pressure, φ1.
Figure 4.5: Evolution of beliefs for an independent individual, λ1 =
0.1, φ1 = 0.9.
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Figure 4.6: Evolution of beliefs for a yielding individual with distortion of
judgment/perception, λ1 = 0.9, φ1 = 0.1.
Figure 4.7: Evolution of beliefs for a yielding individual with distortion of
action, λ1 = 0.1, φ1 = 0.1.
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be wrong.
Figure 4.6 shows the belief evolution of a yielding test individual who, under
group pressure, exhibits distortion of judgment/perception. The figure shows that both
y∗1 and ŷ
∗
1 are heavily influenced by the group pressure, and thus individual 1 is no
longer privately certain that A is the correct answer. In other words, this individual
is highly susceptible to interpersonal influence, and even his private view becomes
affected by the majority. Of great interest is the evolution of beliefs observed in
Fig. 4.7, which involves an experiment with a yielding test individual exhibiting
distortion of action. According to Asch, Individual 1
yields because of an overmastering need to not appear different or inferior to
others, because of an inability to tolerate the appearance of defectiveness in the
eyes of the group ~[Asch, 1951].
In other words v1’s expressed belief y∗1 is heavily distorted by the pressure to con-
form to the majority. However, this individual is still able to “conclude that they
[themselves] are not wrong” [Asch, 1951], i.e. y∗i ≈ 0.93.
Other simulations with parameters of λ1, φ1 in the neighbourhood of those iden-
tified in Table 4.1 also display similar behaviour as shown in Fig. 4.5 to 4.7. This is
captured by Fig. 4.4, which shows the type of individual as a function of λ1 and φ1.
From the theoretical and simulation results, it is clear that all three types of individu-
als can be predicted by the EPO model using pairs of parameters λi, φi, and that their
behaviour in the EPO model accurately captures the empirical findings of Asch’s ex-
periments. This provides a measure of validation for the EPO model, while at the
same time, provides a useful way for analysing the Asch experiments (and the many
subsequent works derived from the paper) in a mathematical context. It is noted
here that in [Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011], Noah E. Friedkin and Eugene Johnsen also
applied the Friedkin–Johnsen model to the Asch experiments. However, their model
was not able to capture all of the types of individuals reported, and specifically was
not able to differentiate between the two different types of yielding individuals. This
is because the Friedkin–Johnsen model does not assume that each individual has a
separate private and expressed belief.
4.3 A Few Zealots Can Create Pluralistic Ignorance
In this section, a number of simulations of the EPO model are used to show how plu-
ralistic ignorance and preference falsification can occur in large networks as a result
of only a few zealots (the definition of which will be provided in the sequel). The
purpose of the simulations is not to provide a complete characterisation of the plura-
listic ignorance phenomenon and how the opinion trajectories change with network
type, distributions of φi, λi, yi(0), etc. This requires an exhaustive and comprehensive
study, which is left as possible future work. Instead, these simulations are intended
to demonstrate the use of the model in revealing and examining the causes of plura-
listic ignorance. This section also explores the mechanics that drive this phenomenon
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under the EPO model. This is done by studying the EPO model on both small-world
and scale-free networks. In addition, both the local and global public opinion va-
riants are investigated. It turns out that for scale-free networks, there is a major
difference in the level of pluralistic ignorance depending on whether the local or glo-
bal public opinion model is used, whereas there is less of a difference for scale-free
networks. These differences are then examined to help explain how the impact of the
zealots might be reduced
Several slightly different definitions of pluralistic ignorance exist. This thesis
adopts the broader definition, as detailed by Robert K. Merton in [Merton, 1968]. In
particular, pluralistic ignorance refers to the situation whereby individuals hold an
incorrect assumption about the thoughts, feelings and/or behaviour of other people.
The most common situation, and the situation dealt with in this thesis, is where a
group of individuals2 underestimate the number of others who hold similar opinions3.
Specifically, the individuals hold (private) opinions similar to that of the majority but
think that they are in the minority because of what is observed. The definition also
includes the situation where individuals incorrectly think they hold (private) opini-
ons similar to the majority, but are in fact holding opinions similar to the minority.
To begin, the base simulation set-up is explained. Then, the specifics of the small-
world and scale-free network simulations are explained, and results presented. In a
separate section, discussions are provided on the results.
4.3.1 Base Simulation Set-Up
The base set-up for the simulations is now described; specific changes to this set-up
are detailed in the relevant latter sections. It is of interest to investigate the effects
of increasing the number of zealots within a network of n = 200 individuals. The
opinions are initialised in the interval [0, 1]. From Lemma 3.3, all opinions will stay
in the interval [0, 1] for all time. The definition of a zealot is now introduced.
Definition 4.1 (Zealot). An individual i is said to be a zealot4 if yi(0) = 1 and λi = 0.001
and φi = 0.999.
According to Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.2), a zealot holds (for practical purposes) an opi-
nion at one extreme of the interval [0, 1], and is (for practical purposes) maximally
stubborn and maximally resilient to pressures to conform to the public opinion. Zea-
lots may be partisan media sources, fake news websites, leader figures, or individual
fanatics [McCright and Dunlap, 2017]. The fraction of zealots in a network of n in-
dividuals is defined as fz so that fzn is the total number of zealots, and fz(1− n)
2The definition in [O’Gorman, 1975] is given for two or more individuals.
3Note that the literature also refers to “the same opinion”, because the opinions considered in the
social science literature are often discrete variables. Since this thesis deals with opinions as real values
on a continuous interval, the word “similar” is used to mean opinions which are approximately of the
same value.
4The choice of values for λi and φi are arbitrary, and selected only for convenience in running the si-
mulations while ensuring Assumption 3.1 holds. The results and conclusions drawn in this section will
hold if zealots have values of λi and φi that are in the neighbourhood of 0.001 and 0.999, respectively.
This includes allowing for heterogeneous parameter values between the zealots.
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is the number of non-zealot individuals, who are called “civilians” for purposes of
clarity in subsequent writing (in the simulations, fz is always chosen such that fzn
is an integer, with the choice of fz specified later). For all of this section, mention of
opinions will be a reference to the civilians’ private and expressed opinions, denoted by
the column vectors yc, ŷc. If reference is made to the essentially constant opinions of
the zealots, then this will be clearly differentiated; yz(t) ≈ ŷz(t) ≈ 1 fzn for all t ≥ 0
will be used to denote the opinions of the zealots.
Small-world networks approximate real-world networks in terms of transitivity5
and the fact that the shortest-path distance between most pairs of vertices is small
[Newman, 2010, Chapter 15.1], but do not accurately approximate the degree dis-
tribution of many real world networks. On the other hand, scale-free networks are
more appropriate to capture the degree distribution of real world networks, but not
in terms of transitivity and shortest-path distance. Thus, both small-world and scale-
free networks will be studied6. The network G[W ] is generated using standard MAT-
LAB packages for generating small-world and scale-free networks. These packages
generate an undirected and unweighted network G̃[W̃ ], where w̃ij = w̃ji = 1 for any
w̃ij > 0. For convenience in ensuring the network is strongly connected and that W is
row-stochastic (and thus satisfying Assumption 3.1), the graph G̃[W̃ ] is transformed
into a directed graph G[W ] in the following manner. First, a self-loop eii is added for
each i ∈ I . Then, for every row i, the value of each wij is drawn randomly from a uni-
form distribution in the interval (0, 1) if (vj, vi) ∈ E . Once all wij are determined, the
weights wij are normalised by dividing all entries in row i by ∑nj=1 wij, which ensures
that W is row-stochastic. A consequence of this method is that wij > 0 ⇔ wji > 0,
which is convenient in facilitating discussion of the results using network statistics
such as degree distribution (in this Section 4.3, the degree of individual i is therefore
the cardinality of Ni)7.
The n − fzn civilians are assigned values of yi(0), φi and λi, picked from beta
distributions, which have two parameters α and β. For α, β > 1, a beta distribution
of the variable x is unimodal and satisfies x ∈ (0, 1), which in turn satisfies As-
sumption 3.1 regarding λi, φi. The beta distributions for yi(0), φi and λi are given by
α = 2, β = 15; an example distribution of φi is shown in Fig. 4.8. This means that on
average, civilians have low resilience and susceptibility, and initial private opinions
close to yi(0) = 0.1. This may represent a society with established and traditional
opinions, leading to λi ≈ 0.1. However, the topic may be politically sensitive, leading
to a low resilience, φi ≈ 0.1. One example may be the 2017 Australian Postal Survey
on the legalisation of same-sex marriage [ABS].
Because the network is large, most simulations will consider the local public opi-
nion model, Eq. (3.4). However, as explained in Chapter 3, the author believes use
5For details on transitivity and shortest-path distance, see [Newman, 2010, Chapter 7].
6It is standard practise in network science to consider several different graph models, e.g. small-
world, scale-free, Erdős-Rényi. A number of standard software packages exist for graph generation,
and graphical properties such as transitivity, clustering coefficient etc. are well studied. They are widely
accepted, despite each model’s shortcomings (which are different between the models) in resembling
real-world networks.
7Such a condition on the edge weights is not needed for the theoretical results reported in Chapter 3.
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Figure 4.8: Histogram example of distribution of civilian resilience, φi following a beta dis-
tribution with α = 2, β = 15.
of the global public opinion model Eq. (3.2) is also reasonable even though ŷavg(t)
is a global quantity, and in general the network G[W ] is not all-to-all. The quantity
ŷavg(t) may be available via opinion polls, news and media reports, or in the modern
setting, via trends on social media such as hashtags. It is of interest whether availa-
bility of the global public opinion has any impact on the opinion evolutions, and this
is investigated in Section 4.3.3.
4.3.2 Simulation Set-Up and Results For Small-World Networks
A small-world network is generated as follows. First, a k-regular ring lattice graph
of n = 200 nodes is generated, with each node connected to k of its nearest nodes, k
being an even number. Then, for every edge in the ring lattice graph, an edge is ad-
ded with probability p between two nodes selected uniformly at random [Newman,
2010]8. The small-world networks are generated with k = 6 and wiring probability
p = 0.3. The mean degree distribution over all small-world networks of a given type,
e.g. k = 6 and p = 0.3, can be computed analytically, [Newman, 2010, Chapter
15.1.1], and this is shown in Fig. 4.9. For each given network, fzn individuals are
randomly selected to be zealots (examples of appropriate values for fz are given be-
low). An example simulation, with fz = 0.1 and n = 200, is provided in Figs. 4.10
8Note that this is slightly different to the original small-world model, which removed an edge and
then added an edge between two nodes as describe above, with probability p. Both the network
generation method used in this paper, and the original method are described in detail in [Newman,
2010]. The modified generation method ensures that there is no risk that removal of an edge results in
disconnected sub-graphs.
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Figure 4.9: Mean of the degree distributions for the small-world networks in the simulations.
and 4.11, showing the evolution of the private and expressed opinions y(t), ŷ(t) over
time; the red line at y = 1 represents the zealots’ opinions.
For a given fz, whose values are given below, 100 small-world networks are ge-
nerated, with a different set of W , y(0), φ, λ for each network. (See Section 4.3.1
on how these parameters are generated). For these 100 examples, the opinion evo-
lution model Eq. (3.1) and Eq. (3.4) is employed until t = 1500 so that the opi-
nions will have converged to the steady state values y∗ and ŷ∗. The results for
fz = 0, 0.005, 0.025, 0.05, 0.1 are shown in Figs. 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16, respecti-
vely. Blue lines represent distributions of final civilian private opinions, y∗c , and red
lines represent distributions of final civilian expressed opinions, ŷ∗c . In each figure, a
dotted line represents a single simulation, and specifically, the distribution of the final
civilian opinions y∗c and ŷ∗c , normalised so that the sum of the points in the distri-
bution is equal to 1. The zealots’ opinions change infinitesimally, and are therefore
not recorded or displayed (see Fig. 4.10). The thick solid lines denote the mean of
the distributions of opinions for the 100 example simulations. It can be seen that while
there is significant “fuzziness” in some figures, in the sense that there is variation in
the distributions between individual simulations due to the network and associated
parameter generation process being random, it is also clear that almost all simulation
example distributions follow a shape similar to the mean of the distributions.
4.3.3 Simulation Set-Up and Results For Scale-Free Networks
The same basic set-up as discussed above is used, except now with scale-free net-
works. These networks were generated using a preferential attachment algorithm
[Newman, 2010], with n = 200 final desired nodes and m = 2 edges attached per
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Figure 4.10: Evolution of private opinions, yi(t), over time t, for an example small-world
network with n = 200 and 20 zealots. The red bold line at y = 1 represents the zealots’
opinions. The other coloured lines represent civilian opinions.
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Figure 4.11: Evolution of expressed opinions, ŷi(t), over time t, for an example small-world
network with n = 200 and 20 zealots. The red bold line at y = 1 represents the zealots’
opinions. The other coloured lines represent civilian opinions.
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Figure 4.12: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
0 zealots in n = 200 small-world network.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Opinion Value
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
Mean Private Opinion
Mean Expressed Opinion
Figure 4.13: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
1 zealot in n = 200 small-world network.
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Figure 4.14: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
5 zealots in n = 200 small-world network.
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Figure 4.15: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
10 zealots in n = 200 small-world network.
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Figure 4.16: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
20 zealots in n = 200 small-world network.
step of the algorithm9. An example of the degree distribution of a scale-free network
used in the simulations is given in Fig. 4.17. Under the scheme Targeted Zealot Place-
ment, the fzn highest degree nodes are assigned to be the zealots. Under the scheme
Random Zealot Placement, fzn nodes are assigned to be zealots randomly. Intuitively,
one would expect that with targeted zealot placement, a greater shift of opinions of
civilians would result.
This is borne out by the simulation results, which are now described for both
schemes. The edge weights wij, and civilian initial opinions, resilience, and stub-
bornness are generated as described in Section 4.3.1. Simulations were run for 100
scale-free networks with fz = 0.025, i.e. 5 zealots in an n = 200 individual network,
for both zealot placement schemes. This is repeated for both the local public opinion
variation, Eq. (3.4), and the global public opinion variation, Eq. (3.2). The results are
shown in Fig. 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23. As above, the blue lines represent distributions of
final civilian private opinions, y∗c , and red lines represent distributions of final civi-
lian expressed opinions, ŷ∗c . A dotted line represents a single simulation, normalised
so that the sum of the points in the distribution is equal to 1. The thick solid lines
denote the mean of the distributions of opinions for the 100 example simulations. The
global public opinion simulation results using random zealot placement are omitted
because there was little difference to the results using the local public opinion update
Eq. (3.4) with random zealot placement (see Fig. 4.23). Fig. 4.18, 4.19 and 4.20 show
9Roughly speaking, the algorithm begins with a node v1. Then, new nodes are added to the network
one at a time and edges are added. Specifically, each new node vi is connected to m nodes vj1 , . . . , vjm ,
with j1, . . . , jm < i. The probability pj of connecting vi to vj is proportional to the degree of vj prior to
any connection of vi and any nodes added after vi.
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Figure 4.17: Example degree distribution of a scale-free network used in the simulations.
trajectories of the opinions over time for a single simulation. Because civilians are
highly stubborn, the private opinions when using local public opinion update and
global public opinion update do not differ greatly, and therefore only the private opi-
nions under local public opinion update are shown in Fig. 4.18. On the other hand,
there is significant difference in the expressed opinions depending on what update
rule is used, as shown in Fig. 4.19 and Fig. 4.20. Discussion of the results will be
presented shortly.
4.3.4 Discussion for Small-World Networks
It is clear from Figs. 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15 and 4.16 that an increase in the number of
zealots results in the distributions of yc and ŷc diverging. For convenience, denote Z
as the set of zealot nodes of the graph G. Denote the set of civilians who are 1-hop
neighbours of a zealot by C1, i.e. C1 = {vj : vk ∈ Z , vk ∈ Nj, j ∈ V\Z}. Similarly, for
i = 2, 3, ..., denote with the set Ci the civilian neighbours that are i-hop neighbours of
a zealot, i.e. Ci = {vj : vk ∈ Ci−1, vk ∈ Nj, j ∈ V\Z}.
First, consider Fig. 4.10 and 4.11 in conjunction with Fig. 4.16. From Fig. 4.10,
one can see that the civilians’ private opinions do not change by much because the
civilians are on average closed to influence, i.e. with small λi. This can be verified by
looking at Eq. (3.1), where (1−λi)yi(0) is the dominating term on the right hand side,
for any civilian i, and for all t. However, civilians on average have low resilience, and
are therefore more likely to exhibit preference falsification towards their local public
opinion. For any civilian vj ∈ C1, his/her local public opinion will be closer to 1
due to the presence of the zealot as a neighbour, and vj will therefore express an
opinion ŷj(t) closer to 1. Because the zealots’ opinions are constant, after each time
step, vj ∈ C1 will express an opinion ŷj(t) that progressively moves ever closer to 1,
until equilibrium is reached for vj. Likewise, civilian vk ∈ C2 observes that his/her
72 The EPO Model’s Connections with Social Psychology Concepts
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Time step, t
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 4.18: Evolution of private opinions, yi(t), over time t, for an example scale-free net-
work with n = 200 and 5 zealots, using targeted zealot placement, and local public opinion.
Notice the similarity to Fig. 4.10 because civilians typically have low susceptibility λi. The
red bold line at y = 1 represents the zealots’ opinions. The other coloured lines represent
civilian opinions.
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Figure 4.19: Evolution of expressed opinions, ŷi(t), over time t, for an example scale-free
network with n = 200 and 5 zealots, using targeted zealot placement, and local public
opinion. The red bold line at y = 1 represents the zealots’ opinions. The other coloured lines
represent civilian opinions.
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Figure 4.20: Evolution of expressed opinions, ŷi(t), over time t, for an example scale-free
network with n = 200 and 5 zealots using targeted zealot placement, and global public
opinion. The red bold line at y = 1 represents the zealots’ opinions. The other coloured lines
represent civilian opinions.
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Figure 4.21: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
5 zealots in n = 200 scale-free network, using targeted zealot placement scheme and local
public opinion.
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Figure 4.22: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
5 zealots in n = 200 scale-free network, using targeted zealot placement scheme and global
public opinion.
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Figure 4.23: Distribution of civilians’ final private and expressed opinions, y∗c and ŷ∗c , with
5 zealots in n = 200 scale-free network, using random zealot placement scheme and local
public opinion.
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neighbour j ∈ C1 has expressed an opinion ŷj that is moving towards 1. This affects
the local public opinion of vk, and in turn, vk also begins to express an opinion closer
to 1. The same holds for Ci, i = 3, 4, ... but unsurprisingly, the effects are lessened
significantly as the hop distance to a zealot increases. To summarise, at steady state,
the civilians are falsifying their expressed opinions y∗c in the direction of the zealots’
opinions because the presence of zealots results in a pressure to conform to a local
public opinion which is not reflective of the true average civilian expressed opinion (this
is especially true for those who are 1- and 2-hop neighbours of the zealots).
Next, notice in Fig. 4.16 that, averaged over 100 simulations, the majority of the
civilians hold a final private (true) opinion y∗i,c ≈ 0.15. Consider a civilian in the net-
work: whether he/she is able to obtain the global public opinion, or just his/her local
public opinion, the civilian would see most final expressed opinions at ŷ∗i,c ≈ 0.65.
This implies that, all civilians will show strong signs of pluralistic ignorance because
they are led to believe that the majority position is approximately 0.65 whereas the
true majority position is significantly different, at 0.15. In contrast, Fig. 4.12 shows
that when there are no zealots, averaged over 100 simulations, the civilians falsify
their final expressed opinions to a negligible extent, but towards the true average
civilian public opinion ŷc,avg. There is no pluralistic ignorance in this case.
Having established that the presence of zealots can result in pluralistic ignorance
and preference falsification towards the zealots’ opinion, one turns to study the effect
of varying fz, the fraction of zealots in the network. From Figs. 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, 4.15
and 4.16, it can be concluded that the amount and intensity of pluralistic ignorance
and preference falsification toward the zealots’ opinion, increases as fz increases.
This is expected. More surprisingly, Fig. 4.14 indicates that it takes only 5 zealots
in a n = 200 size network, i.e. fz = 0.025, to create a major divergence between
the civilians’ majority private opinion and expressed opinion. With only 10 zealots,
i.e. fz = 0.05 there is significant pluralistic ignorance and preference falsification in
most of the civilian population, as shown in Fig. 4.15. It is conjectured that this is
due to the small-world effect; any zealot is able to indirectly influence (in a manner
explained in the second paragraph of this subsection) a large number of the civilians
over short path-lengths (roughly speaking, strength of influence decreases as path-
length increases).
4.3.5 Discussion for Scale-Free Networks
First, consider Fig. 4.19, which shows the expressed civilian opinions for a simula-
tion with 5 zealots under the targeted placement scheme in an n = 200 scale-free
network, where each civilian used local public opinion updating. The level of plu-
ralistic ignorance and preference falsification is significantly higher in Fig. 4.19 than
what occurs even with 20 zealots in the small-world network; compare with Fig. 4.11.
Note that the private opinions are similar for both scale-free and small-world net-
works, due to civilians having on average high stubbornness (low λi), see Fig. 4.10
versus 4.18. Therefore, no further discussion of private opinions will occur in any de-
tail. One concludes that for local public opinion updating, high degree zealot nodes
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can drastically increase pluralistic ignorance and preference falsification in scale-free
networks, when compared to small-world networks. On the other hand, when using
global public opinion updating, high degree zealot nodes are much less effective, see
Fig. 4.19 versus 4.20. This is verified in Fig. 4.21 and 4.22.
This distinction arises because in scale-free networks, most civilians connect to
only 2-5 other nodes (in the example in Fig. 4.17, this is 80% of all nodes). This means
that under the targeted placement scheme, it is highly likely that almost any civilian is a
small hop distance from a zealot. Thus, under local public opinion updating, zealots
will have a high impact in shaping ŷi,lavg(t) for many civilians, at any time t. This
means that, zealots are able to spread misinformation about public opinion to most
civilians in the network directly, instead of indirectly as in small-world networks. On
the other hand, when using global public opinion updating, the zealots contribute
only a small amount to ŷavg(t). Influence on most civilians is then via the network W ;
a large number of civilians will update their private opinion using Eq. (3.1), which
will include a zealot as ŷj,z in the term ∑nj 6=i wijŷj(t). Because civilians are stubborn,
this influence is small. As Fig. 4.20 shows, the civilians eventually settle on final
expressed opinions which are much more representative of the true civilian public
opinion of the network, though there is still a shift toward y = 1. Moreover, the
distribution of final expressed opinions has much smaller spread when using global
public opinion compared to local public opinion, because the low resilience means
that civilians express values close to ŷ∗avg, see Fig. 4.22 versus 4.21. The relevant
theoretical result is in Section 3.3.2.
In contrast to the situation for scale-free networks, extensive simulations in small-
world networks found no observable differences between local public opinion upda-
ting and global public opinion updating for small-world networks with k = 6 and
p = 0.3. Last, compare the result of 5 zealots for small-world networks, shown in
Fig. 4.14 with 5 zealots placed using the random placement scheme in scale-free net-
works with local public opinions, i.e. Fig. 4.23. Clearly, there is lower pluralistic
ignorance in scale-free networks when zealots are randomly placed than in small-
world networks. This is entirely reasonable, because there is a much higher probabi-
lity that the zealots in the scale-free network have lower degree. One concludes that
indirect influence, as measured by transitivity and shortest-path distance, does have
a role in creating pluralistic ignorance, but is less important than high degree zealots.
4.3.6 Key Observations and Insights
There are clear differences in the level of pluralistic ignorance that arise from the
different network types. The causes are summarised and explained, with the aid of
Fig. 4.24.
For scale-free networks with high degree zealots, most civilians have a low de-
gree (few neighbours) and are likely connected to a zealot, as illustrated in Fig. 4.24a.
Thus, a high degree zealot in a scale-free network is a major contributor to the ci-
vilian’s local public opinion when using Eq. (3.4), but is largely drowned out in the
global public opinion; compare Fig. 4.24a and 4.24b. Pluralistic ignorance is greatly
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Figure 4.24: The key ways a zealot is able to influence the civilian population for different
types of networks are illustrated here. Note that while the edges in the simulations are
bidirectional, for clarity, only some key unidirectional edges are shown here.
reduced when civilians have access to the global public opinion (compare Fig. 4.19
and 4.20), with higher levels of agreement in the final expressed opinions. When 5
zealots are placed randomly on a scale-free network the level of pluralistic ignorance
is lower than with high degree zealots, regardless of whether Eq. (3.2) or Eq. (3.4) is
used. This is because there is a high probability that the zealot has low degree and
can directly influence far fewer civilians, see Fig. 4.24c. See also Fig. 4.21, 4.22, 4.23.
In small-world networks, the impact of the zealots is reduced (but not eliminated),
compare Fig. 4.12–4.16 to Fig. 4.21–4.23. This is because, as illustrated in Fig. 4.24d,
most civilians are connected to several other civilians, so that the effect of the zealot
on the local public opinion is diluted. Roughly speaking, it takes 20 zealots in an
n = 200 small-world network to achieve a similar level of pluralistic ignorance as 5
zealots in scale-free networks; compare Fig. 4.10 and 4.11 to Fig. 4.18 and 4.19. The
author conjectures that targeted zealot placement in small-world networks would
increase pluralistic ignorance, due to the higher degree of the zealots, but would still
be less effective than targeted zealot placement in scale-free networks because of the
aforementioned diluting effect.
To summarise, for local public opinion updating, the highest degree nodes are
most important in the EPO model because of their direct influence, whereas high
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transitivity and shortest-path distance are less important because these determine
indirect influence. Scale-free networks for which individuals only know local public
opinion ŷi,lavg are particularly susceptible to disruption by zealots, whereas small-world
networks are more robust. Availability of global public opinion ŷavg(t) greatly reduces
the level of pluralistic ignorance.
Connecting civilians together, even if they have differing opinions, and ensuring
reliable access to global ŷavg(t), are therefore good ways to counter high degree ze-
alots and reduce pluralistic ignorance, even if private yi(t) are not known. This is
particularly important in the age of digital information and social media where indi-
viduals increasingly interact only with others of similar opinions and consume media
from partisan sources. The author notes that misinformation has been identified in
[Kuran, 1997] as a key reason for pluralistic ignorance and preference falsification.
From one point of view, one might say that the civilians have incorrect knowledge
about the public opinion; the true public opinion is much closer to 0, but the zea-
lots are distorting this information. In complex network theory, high degree nodes
play important roles in determining the behaviour of many dynamical processes
[Newman, 2010]. The significant influence of zealots spreading falsehoods in mass
consumed media has been identified [McCright and Dunlap, 2017]. In addition, the
“minority effect” has been reported, whereby a small but vocal minority are able to
exert influence over a larger community [Smaldino and Epstein, 2015; Wood et al.,
1994; Yildiz et al., 2013]. Here, a mathematical, agent-based examination and expla-
nation of these ideas in the context of opinion formation in influence networks has
been provided.
4.4 Conclusions
This chapter has reviewed two established results from social psychology literature;
the Asch experiments and the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. Using a com-
bination of theoretical and simulation based analysis, these two issues have been
examined using the EPO model. In particular, Section 4.2 showed that the three
different types of individuals observed in Asch’s experiments could be accurately
captured and predicted by suitable values of stubbornness and resilience for that in-
dividual. Also of note is that the model provides an explanation for why Asch obser-
ved no proportional increase in the distortion of the individual’s judgment or action
when the majority size was increased. Section 4.3 showed how zealots could gene-
rate massive pluralistic ignorance in a general population of individuals. Through
extensive simulation and analysis, differences between (i) scale-free and small-world
networks, and (ii) global public opinion updating and local public opinion updating
were identified. As a result, the author concludes that increasing connectivity among
civilians and making the global public opinion more readily available are good ways
to reduce the influence of zealots. A number of possible future works are detailed in
Chapter 10.
Part II
Evolution of Individual Social
Power
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Chapter 5
Evolution of Social Power in
Networks with Constant Topology
Part Summary
Part II moves away from the EPO model, and turns to study of the recently propo-
sed DeGroot–Friedkin model [Jia et al., 2015], which describes how an individual’s
self-weight (referred to as social power) evolves as a network discusses opinions on
a sequence of topics (in contrast, the EPO model considers discussion of a single to-
pic). Chapters 5 and 6 study convergence properties of the model with constant and
dynamic network topology, respectively. Chapter 7 studies a network modification
problem on star graphs, which are special networks where a single individual even-
tually holds all of the social power. This part is concluded with Chapter 8, which
applies a recent nonlinear mapping convergence result to the DeGroot–Friedkin mo-
del.
Chapter Summary
This chapter considers the DeGroot–Friedkin model on networks with a constant
topology, an assumption which is relaxed in the following chapter. A novel analysis
framework is built using nonlinear contraction theory, which allows the drawing of
a new and general exponential convergence result. Specifically, it will be shown that
each individual’s social power converges exponentially fast to a constant value that
depends only on the network topology. Previous results establish asymptotic, but
not exponential convergence. Additional analysis yields an explicit upper bound on
the individual’s social power at equilibrium that is dependent on the graph topology,
and the convergence rates for a general class of graph topologies are obtained.
5.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, focus has been placed on the study of how the opinions of
individuals evolve via interpersonal influence. In each instance (from the DeGroot
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and Friedkin–Johnsen models to the EPO model), the influence weights wij have been
assumed to be time-invariant. However, this time-invariant property clearly does not
hold over long periods of time. Many models assume that the weights wij evolve
according to certain social processes that often depend on the opinion values, e.g.
the Hegselmann–Krause model1 [Hegselmann and Krause, 2002] assumes that the
wij are dependent on the magnitude of |yi − yj|. Part II now turns to a model which
examines how wii, i.e. an individual’s self-weight (or social power) evolves over a
sequence of topic discussions via the social process of reflected self-appraisal.
The concept of social power or social influence has been integral throughout the
development of many agent-based models of opinion dynamics. Indeed, French Jr’s
seminal paper [French Jr, 1956] was an attempt to quantitatively study an individual’s
social power in a group discussion. Broadly speaking, and in the context of opinion
dynamics, an individual’s social power is the amount of influence an individual has
on the overall opinion discussion. It is expected that the social power of an individual
in a group can change over time as group members interact and are influenced by
each other. Recently, the DeGroot–Friedkin model was proposed in [Jia et al., 2015]
to study the dynamical evolution of an individual’s social power as a social network
discusses opinions on a sequence of topics (also know as issues).
The discrete-time DeGroot–Friedkin model is a two-stage model. In the first stage,
individuals update their opinions on a particular issue using the DeGroot model (see
Section 2.3.1), and in the second stage, each individual’s self-weight (referred to as
social power) wii for the next issue is updated. Under some mild conditions on the
network topology, the opinions reach a consensus on every issue. At the end of the
discussion of an issue, i.e., when opinions have effectively reached a consensus, each
individual undergoes the socio-psychological process of reflected self-appraisal (as de-
tailed in the seminal work [Cooley, 1992]) to determine his/her impact or influence
on the final consensus value of opinion. Such a mechanism is well accepted as a
hypothesis [Shrauger and Schoeneman, 1979; Gecas and Schwalbe, 1983] and has
been empirically validated [Yeung and Martin, 2003]. Immediately before discussion
on the next issue, each individual i self-appraises and updates individual social po-
wer wii according to the impact or influence i had on the discussion of the previous
issue. In updating wii, individual i also updates the weight i accords to i’s neig-
hbours’ opinions wij, by scaling using a relative interaction matrix. This is to ensure
that the influence matrix of the DeGroot process, W , remains row-stochastic for the
next issue. The relative interaction matrix encodes the relative “trust” or “friendship”
between the individuals in the network, and in the original model [Jia et al., 2015],
the relative interaction matrix was assumed to be constant over all issues, and con-
stant throughout the opinion discussion on any given issue. The primary objective of
the DeGroot-Friedkin model is to study the dynamical evolution of the individual social
powers over the sequence of issues, with self-appraisal occurring after each discussion.
In order to fully capture the novel contributions of this chapter, the DeGroot–
Friedkin model must be formally introduced. This is done immediately below, along
1The reader is referred to Chapter 1 for a review of some relevant models.
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with a review of existing results. Note that Chapters 5 through 8 in Part II use the
terms “self-weight”, “social power”, “self-confidence” and “individual social power”
interchangeably, and the terms “topic” and “issue” interchangeably.
5.1.1 The DeGroot–Friedkin Model
Consider a social network which discusses a sequence of issues, with the set of indi-
ces for the sequential issues denoted by S = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. For a given issue s ∈ S , the
opinions are assumed to evolve according to the DeGroot model (with constant in-
fluence weights throughout the discussion of the issue). At the end of the discussion
of a particular issue s (i.e. when the DeGroot model has effectively reached steady
state), each individual undergoes reflected self-appraisal, with “reflection” referring
to the fact that self-appraisal occurs following the completion of discussion on the
particular issue s. Each individual then updates his/her own self-weight, and discus-
sion begins on the next issue s + 1 (using the DeGroot model but now with adjusted
influence weights).
The structure of the social network is captured by the directed graph G[C] =
(V , E [C], C), where C ∈ Rn×n is the “relative interaction matrix” (the relation of C
to the influence matrix W in the DeGroot model is explained below). The matrix
C has nonnegative entries cij, termed “relative interpersonal weights” in [Jia et al.,
2015]. It is assumed that cii = 0 (i.e., there are no self-loops), and the restriction that
∑j∈Ni cij = 1 is imposed (i.e., C is a row-stochastic matrix). The word “relative” is
used to reflect that cij can be considered as a percentage of the total weight or trust
individual i places on individual j compared to all of individual i’s neighbours. A
mild assumption is now made on the relative interpersonal interaction network G[C],
which will hold not only for this chapter but all other chapters in Part II.
Assumption 5.1. The graph G[C], with n ≥ 3 nodes, is strongly connected and no node vi
has a self-loop. Furthermore, the relative interaction matrix C is row-stochastic.
Because there are no self-loops, C has zero diagonal entries. The strongly con-
nected nature of G[C] implies that C is irreducible. The dominant left eigenvector of
the row-stochastic C is denoted by γ> > 0 satisfying γ>1n = 1 (see Section 2.2 in
Chapter 2). It should be noted that this assumption was in place in [Jia et al., 2015]
by and large throughout the development of the DeGroot–Friedkin model, though a
recent work has extended the result to consider graphs with reducible C [Jia et al.,
2017b]. A key portion of the works of Part II focus on using new techniques to extend
convergence results for the model (including for dynamically changing topology), for
which the strongly connected assumption is appropriate.
It is suggested that the reader review the definition of the n-dimensional simplex
∆n, and related definitions for ∆̃n and int(∆n) in Section 2.1, as these will appear
repeatedly over the next four chapters. Next, the mathematical modelling of the
opinion dynamics for an issue and the updating of self-weights from one issue to the
next, are explained.
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5.1.1.1 DeGroot Consensus of Opinions
For each issue s ∈ S , individual i’s opinion yi(s, t) ∈ R evolves according to the
DeGroot process (see Section 2.3.1)
yi(s, t + 1) = wii(s)yi(s, t) +
n
∑
j 6=i
wij(s)yj(s, t).
Note that ∀ i, j, wij(s) ∈ [0, 1] is constant for any given s, but changes between each s
due to the reflected self-appraisal process (as explained below). The parameter wii(s)
is the “self-weight” or “social power” of individual i. The opinion dynamics for the
entire social network can be expressed as
y(s, t + 1) = W(s)y(s, t), (5.1)
where y(s, t) = [y1(s, t), . . . , yn(s, t)]> is the vector of opinions of the n individuals
for issue s, at time instant t. The original DeGroot model arises simply when S = {0}
(i.e., only one issue is discussed).
Let the self-weight (individual social power) of individual i be denoted by xi(s) ,
wii(s) ∈ [0, 1] (the ith diagonal entry of W(s)) [Jia et al., 2015], with the social power
vector of the individuals in the network given as x(s) = [x1, . . . , xn]>. For a given
issue s, the influence matrix W(s) is defined as
W(s) = X(s) + (In − X(s))C, (5.2)
where C is the relative interaction matrix of the social network G[C], and the matrix
X(s) , diag(xi(s)). From the fact that C is row-stochastic with zero diagonal entries,
Eq. (5.2) implies that W(s) is a row-stochastic matrix. An assumption2 is imposed
that the starting self-weights xi(0) ≥ 0 satisfy ∑ni=1 xi(0) = 1, i.e. x(0) ∈ ∆n. It has
been shown in [Jia et al., 2015] that under this initial condition assumption and As-
sumption 5.1, W(s) defined as in Eq. (5.2) has the property that for any given s ∈ S ,
there holds limt→∞ y(s, t) = (ζ(s)>y(s, 0))1n. Here, ζ(s)> is the unique nonnega-
tive left eigenvector of W(s) associated with the eigenvalue 1, normalised such that
1>n ζ(s) = 1. That is, for every issue, the opinions converge to a constant consensus
value (see Chapter 2). Next, the model for the updating of W(s) (specifically wii(s)
via a reflected self-appraisal mechanism) is introduced.
5.1.1.2 Friedkin’s Self-Appraisal Model for Determining Self-Weight
The Friedkin component of the model proposes that at the end of the discussion of
issue s, the self-weight vector updates as
x(s + 1) = ζ(s), (5.3)
2This assumption is not strictly required, and will be relaxed in Chapter 6.
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where ζ(s) was defined below Eq. (5.2). Note that ζ(s)>1n = 1 implies that x(s) ∈ ∆n,
i.e., ∑ni=1 xi(s) = 1 for all s. From Eq. (5.2), and because C is row-stochastic, it is appa-
rent that by adjusting wii(s + 1) = ζi(s), individual i also scales wij(s + 1), j 6= i using
cij to be (1 − wii(s + 1))cij to ensure that W(s) remains row-stochastic. It should
now become apparent to the reader why the cij are referred to as “relative interaction
weights”; as individual i’s self-weight changes over the sequence of issues S , i uses
the relative interaction weight cij to scale the influence weight wij(s) accorded to neig-
hbour j. The objective of the DeGroot–Friedkin model can therefore be summarised
as follows
Objective 5.1. Consider a network G[C] of n individuals that discuss a sequence of issues
indexed by S = {0, 1, 2, . . .}, using the DeGroot process Eq. (5.1) for each issue s, with the
influence matrix W(s) determined according to Eq. (5.2). Suppose that at the end of issue
s ∈ S , the vector of social power x(s) defined above Eq. (5.2) changes according to Eq. (5.3).
Then, the objective is to investigate the dynamical evolution of x(s) over the sequence of issues
S , and determine what (if any) parameters of G[C] determine the evolution of x(s).
Remark 5.1 (Social Power). The precise motivation behind using Eq. (5.3) to update x(s)
is heavily explored in [Jia et al., 2015], but a brief overview is provided here in the interest
of making Part II self-contained. As discussed in Section 5.1.1.1, for any given s, there holds
limt→∞ y(s, t) = (ζ(s)>y(s, 0))1n. In other words, for any given issue s, the opinions
reach a consensus value ζ(s)>y(s, 0) equal to a convex combination of the individuals’ initial
opinion values y(s, 0) for that issue. The elements of ζ(s) are the convex weights. For
a given issue s, ζi(s) is therefore a precise manifestation of individual i’s social power or
influence in the social network, as it is a measure of the ability of individual i to determine the
outcome of a discussion, relative to other individuals[Cartwright, 1959]. The reflected self-
appraisal mechanism in Eq. (5.3) therefore describes an individual (a) observing how much
power he/she had on the discussion of issue s, captured by the nonnegative quantity ζi(s),
and (b) for the next issue s + 1, adjusting his/her self-confidence to be equal to this power,
i.e. xi(s + 1) = wii(s + 1) = ζi(s). For a constant W , the entries ζi of the dominant left
eigenvector ζ> is closely related to what is sometimes referred to as the eigenvector centrality
of node i, which is a measure of i’s importance in the network (in general, networks G[W ]
do not have row-stochastic W and may not be strongly connected, meaning the eigenvector
centralities are not precisely equivalent to ζi). Eigenvector centrality [Newman, 2010] is of
importance for a number of network problems including Google’s PageRank Algorithm [Brin
and Page, 1998], and measuring integration in financial markets [Xu and Corbett, 2015]. An
extensive survey of centrality in networks is given in [Gleich, 2015].
Remark 5.2. The model is centralised in the sense that individuals are able to observe and
detect their impact relative to every other individual in the opinion discussions process (as
measured by ζ>(s)), which indicates that the DeGroot–Friedkin model is best suited for net-
works of small or moderate size. Such networks are found in many decision making groups
such as boards of directors, government cabinets or jury panels. A distributed model, refer-
red to as the “modified DeGroot–Friedkin model”, was studied in discrete-time in [Xu et al.,
2015; Xia et al., 2016b]. In continuous-time, [Chen et al., 2017] studied a model referred to
86 Evolution of Social Power in Networks with Constant Topology
as the “distributed DeGroot–Friedkin model”. Dynamic topology, but restricted to doubly-
stochastic relative interaction matrices, was studied in [Xia et al., 2016b].
Remark 5.3 (Time-scales). The DeGroot–Friedkin model assumes the opinion dynamics
process operates on a different time-scale than that of the reflected appraisal process. This
allows for a simplification in the modelling and is reasonable since separate time-scales merely
imply that the network reaches a consensus on opinions on one issue before beginning the
process of reflected self-appraisal and then moving onto discussion on the next issue. For a
single issue, convergence to consensus occurs exponentially fast (or in finite time in some
instances [Hendrickx et al., 2015]). The distributed DeGroot–Friedkin model studies the case
when the time-scales are comparable, but the analysis of the distributed model is much more
involved, and has not yet reached the same level of understanding as for the original model.
5.1.1.3 Existing Results
It was shown in [Jia et al., 2015, Lemma 2.2] that the system Eq. (5.3) is equivalent to
the discrete-time system3
x(s + 1) = F(x(s)), (5.4)
where the nonlinear map F(x) is defined as
F(x) =

ei if x = ei for any i
α(x)

γ1
1−x1
...
γn
1−xn
 otherwise
, (5.5)
with α(x) = 1/ ∑ni=1
γi
1−xi where γ
> = [γ1, . . . , γn] is the dominant left eigenvector4
of C. Note that ∑i Fi = 1.
A special topology studied in [Jia et al., 2015] is termed “star topology”, the
definition and relevance of which follow.
Definition 5.1 (Star topology). A strongly connected graph5 G[C] is said to have star
topology if ∃ a node vi, called the centre node, such that every edge of G[C] is either to or
from vi.
3The system Eq. (5.1) with W(s) defined in Eq. (5.2) updating according to Eq. (5.3) can be viewed
as a hybrid system with state-dependent switching, which can be challenging to analyse. It is unclear
to the author whether the following contraction analysis in Section 5.2 may be useful for analysis of
other hybrid system with state-dependent switching, since the system in this chapter is a special case,
with switching occurring once y(s, t) has reached a steady state.
4It is clear that the entries γi play a role in the evolution of social power (the precise role is investi-
gated throughout Part II). As detailed in [Jia et al., 2015; Proskurnikov and Tempo, 2017], γ is closely
related to the PageRank measure for webpage ranking on the World Wide Web. Much of the PageRank
literature focuses on its decentralised computation [Ishii and Tempo, 2014; You et al., 2017].
5While it is possible to have a star graph that is not strongly connected, the chapters of Part II,
similarly to [Jia et al., 2015], deals only with strongly connected graphs.
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The irreducibility of C implies that a star G must include edges in both directions
between the centre node vi and every other node vj, j 6= i. A lemma and a theorem
(the key results of [Jia et al., 2015]) are now provided regarding the convergence of
F(x(s)) as s→ ∞, along with a fact useful for analysis throughout the paper.
Lemma 5.1 ([Jia et al., 2015, Lemma 3.2]). Suppose that n ≥ 3, and suppose further that
G[C] has star topology, which without loss of generality has centre node v1. Let G[C] satisfy
Assumption 5.1. Then, for the system Eq. (5.4), there holds lims→∞ x(s) = e1, ∀ x(0) ∈ ∆̃n.
This implies that ∀ x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, a network with star topology converges to an “au-
tocratic configuration” where the centre individual 1 holds all of the social power6.
Fact 5.1. [Jia et al., 2015, Lemma 2.3] Suppose that n ≥ 3 and let γ> be the dominant left
eigenvector of C ∈ Rn×n, satisfying Assumption 5.1. If G[C] is a star topology graph, then
γi = 0.5 where i is the centre node and γj < 0.5 for j 6= i; otherwise, ‖γ‖∞ < 0.5.
Theorem 5.1 ([Jia et al., 2015, Theorem 4.1]). For n ≥ 3, consider the DeGroot-Friedkin
dynamical system Eq. (5.4) with G[C] satisfying Assumption 5.1. Assume further that the
graph G[C] does not have star topology. Then,
(i) For all initial conditions x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, the self-weights x(s) converge to x∗ as s → ∞,
where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point satisfying x∗ = F(x∗).
(ii) There holds x∗i < x
∗
j if and only if γi < γj for any i, j, where γi is the i
th entry of the
dominant left eigenvector γ>. There holds x∗i = x
∗
j if and only if γi = γj.
(iii) The unique fixed point x∗ is determined only by γ, and is independent of the initial
conditions x(0).
Remark 5.4. Since the DeGroot model was introduced in [DeGroot, 1974], many different
opinion dynamics models have been proposed, of increasing sophistication. Some of these
were covered in Chapter 1. However, the DeGroot model continues to be of relevance; the
recent paper [Becker et al., 2017] applied the DeGroot model to show how discussion over
social networks could improve the “wisdom of crowd” effect, then experimentally validated
the results. In future, one could replace Eq. (5.1) with other opinion dynamics models. The key
difficulty will be in defining the influence of the individuals, currently captured by ζ(s)> (see
Remark 5.1) and obtaining a system Eq. (5.4) with an analysable map F. For the Friedkin–
Johnsen model, experimental and simulation results [Friedkin et al., 2016a] are available but
theoretical study has proved to be extremely difficult, with limited (at least to this point)
results [Mirtabatabaei et al., 2014].
Two useful properties of F(x) established in [Jia et al., 2015] are now presented.
Property 5.1. The map F(x) in Eq. (5.5) is continuous on ∆n.
6A second class of special topologies exists, where G[C] is such that C is doubly-stochastic, i.e. with
row and column sums equal to 1. Then, γ = 1n/n and from Theorem 5.1, the social power vector x(s)
converges to x∗ = 1n/n, known in [Jia et al., 2015] as a democratic configuration. However, this thesis
does not focus on this class of topologies, though all results in Chapters 5 and 6 do continue to hold.
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If G[C] does not have star topology, then the following contraction-like property
holds [Jia et al., 2015, pp. 390, Appendix F].
Property 5.2. For the system Eq. (5.4), there exists a positive constant r such that for all
r′ < r, xi(s) ≤ 1− r′ implies xi(s + 1) < 1− r′, for all i. Defining the set A = {x ∈ ∆n :
1− r ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, one has F(A) ⊂ A.
This is termed a contraction-like property so as not to confuse the reader with the
main result established in Section 5.2 using nonlinear contraction analysis; the above
property establishes a contraction only near the boundary of the simplex ∆n, since
the proof of this property establishes that r is small. The size of this “contraction-
like” region is explicitly obtained in Section 5.3 by obtaining an exact value for r.
Last, a third easily verifiable property is presented.
Property 5.3. For the system Eq. (5.4), if x(s1) ∈ ∆̃n for some s1 < ∞, then x(s) ∈ int(∆n)
for all s > s1.
Proof. Since x(s1) ∈ ∆̃n, ∃ j : 0 < xj(s1) < 1. In addition, γi > 0, ∀ i because C
is irreducible. It follows that α(x(s1)) > 0, and xi(s1 + 1) > 0, ∀ i. Along with
Property 5.2, it follows that x(s) ∈ int(∆n)∀s > s1.
This completes the formal introduction of the original DeGroot–Friedkin model,
which will be studied (and extended) in Part II of this thesis. In this chapter, a no-
vel analysis method based on nonlinear contraction theory is used in Section 5.2 to
conclude that for non-star graphs, convergence to the fixed point x∗ is in fact ex-
ponentially fast. The work [Jia et al., 2015], i.e. Theorem 5.1, was able to conclude
asymptotic, but not exponential, convergence. In addition, the stability of the equili-
bria ei are characterised; it is shown that these equilibria (in which individual i holds
all of the social power) are unstable except if individual i is the centre of a star graph.
In that case, ei is an asymptotically stable equilibrium, and exponential stability is
ruled out. Section 5.3 significantly extends the “contraction-like” Property 5.2. As a
result of the extension, an analytic upper bound is obtained on an individual’s social
power at equilibrium; the bound for x∗i depends only on γi. Also, the convergence
rate for a class of C is determined, which is again linked to γ. These give important
insights into how the topology, and in particular C, affect both the transient dynamics
and limiting values of each individual’s social power. Importantly, the nonlinear con-
traction framework also greatly simplifies the analysis for dynamic, or issue-varying
C(s), as will become evident in Chapter 6.
5.1.2 Chapter Organization
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 uses nonlinear contraction
analysis to establish an exponential convergence result for the original DeGroot–
Friedkin model. Section 5.3 conducts further analysis on the DeGroot–Friedkin mo-
del to obtain an analytic upper bound on an individual’s social power, and draw
conclusions on the convergence rates for a class of graph topologies. Concluding
remarks are given in Section 5.4
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5.2 Exponential Convergence to Constant Social Power
A fundamental convergence result of the system Eq. (5.4) will now be presented. In
the original work [Jia et al., 2015], LaSalle’s Invariance Principle was used to prove an
asymptotic convergence result. Moreover, a Lyapunov function that was dependent
on the unique fixed point x∗ of the map F was used. Neither of these techniques
can be extended to general dynamic and issue-varying C(s), which is addressed in
the next chapter. This chapter strengthens the result by establishing exponential
convergence, and builds an analysis framework upon which dynamic C(s) can be
studied in the next chapter.
Remark 5.5. It should be noted that as a consequence of Properties 5.1 and 5.2, one can
easily show using Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem (as in [Jia et al., 2015]), that there exists
at least one fixed point x∗ = F(x∗) in the convex compact set A. In [Jia et al., 2015], a
method involving multiple complicated inequalities is used to show that the fixed point x∗ is
unique. This is done separately to the convergence proof. In the following result, one is able
to establish exponential convergence, and as a consequence of the method used, immediately
prove that it is to a unique fixed point.
In the following proof, a property is said to hold uniformly if the property holds
for all x(s) ∈ A, where A was defined in Property 5.2.
Theorem 5.2. Suppose that n ≥ 3 and suppose further that the network G[C] satisfies As-
sumption 5.1. Suppose further that G[C] does not have star topology. Then, the system
Eq. (5.4), with initial conditions x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, converges exponentially fast to a unique equili-
brium point x∗ ∈ int(∆n).
Proof. Consider any given initial condition x(0) ∈ ∆̃n. According to Property 5.2,
x(s) ∈ A, ∀ s > 0 for a sufficiently small r. It remains to study the system Eq. (5.4)
for x(s) ∈ A; in the following analysis, it is assumed that s > 0. The reader should
review the concepts and terminology of Appendix A.3, which will be heavily utilised.
Define the Jacobian of F evaluated at x as JF(x) = { ∂Fi∂xj (x)}. One obtains
∂Fi
∂xi
(x) =
γiα(x)
(1− xi)2
−
γ2i α(x)
2
(1− xi)3
(5.6)
∂Fi
∂xj
(x) = −
γiγjα(x)2
(1− xi)(1− xj)2
, j 6= i. (5.7)
From Eq. (5.4) and Eq. (5.5), one is able to readily verify that the Jacobian entries, as
given above, can be expressed as
∂Fi
∂xi
(x(s)) = xi(s + 1)
1− xi(s + 1)
1− xi(s)
∂Fi
∂xj
(x(s)) = −
xi(s + 1)xj(s + 1)
1− xj(s)
, j 6= i,
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which establishes (via a slight abuse in notation) the relation between the Jacobian
JF(x(s)) evaluated at x(s) and the social power vector x(s + 1). The reason for doing
so will become clear shortly. Accordingly, this yields the following virtual dynamics
δx(s + 1) = JF(x(s))δx(s).
Note that JF(x(s)) is well defined and uniformly continuous because xi(s) < 1− r, ∀ i, s
for some sufficiently small r > 0. One can now proceed to use nonlinear contraction
analysis. Specifically, consider the transformed virtual displacement
δz(s) = Θ(x(s))δx(s), (5.8)
where Θ(x(s)) = diag((1 − xi(s))−1), i.e. Θ is dependent on the state x(s) but
not dependent explicitly on s. Property 5.2 establishes that 1 > 1 − xi(s) > r >
0, which in turn implies that Θ(x(s)) is uniformly nonsingular, with eigenvalues
λmin
(
Θ(x(s))
)
> 1 and λmax
(
Θ(x(s))
)
< 1/r. In other words, κ < ‖Θ(x(s))‖1 < κ−1
for some κ > 0, ∀ x(s) ∈ A, as required (see Appendix A.3).
The transformed virtual dynamics is given by
δz(s + 1) = Θ(x(s + 1))JF(x(s))Θ(x(s))
−1δz(s)
= H̄(x(s))δz(s). (5.9)
where H̄(x(s)) = Θ(F(x(s)))JF(x(s))Θ(x(s))−1 is the Jacobian associated with the
transformed virtual dynamics. By denoting Φ̄(x(s)) = JF(x(s))Θ(x(s))−1, one can
write H̄(x(s)) = Θ(F(x(s)))Φ̄(x(s)). The matrix Φ̄(x(s)) is computed in Eq. (5.10)
(see page 91), and note that it can be considered as being solely dependent on x(s +
1) = F(x(s)). Therefore, define Φ(x(s + 1)) = Φ̄(x(s)). For brevity, the argument
x(s + 1) is dropped where there is no ambiguity and one simply writes Φ.
For each row i, one has φii = xi(s+ 1)
(
1− xi(s+ 1)
)
and φij = −xi(s + 1)xj(s + 1)
where φij is the (i, j)th element of Φ. Because s > 0, Properties 5.2 and 5.3 establish
that 0 < xi(s) < 1− r, ∀ i. It follows that all diagonal entries of Φ are uniformly
strictly positive and all off-diagonal entries of Φ are uniformly strictly negative. No-
tice that Φ = Φ>. Lastly, for any row i, observe that there holds
n
∑
j=1
φij = xi(s + 1)
[
1− xi(s + 1)−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
xj(s + 1)
]
= 0
because xi(s + 1) + ∑nj=1,j 6=i xj(s + 1) = 1. In other words, Φ has row and column
sums equal to 0. One can thus conclude that Φ is the weighted Laplacian7 associated
with an undirected, completely connected8 graph with edge weights which vary with
x(s + 1). The edge weights, −φij, are uniformly lower bounded away from zero and
upper bounded away from 1. This implies that 0 = λ1(Φ) < λ2(Φ) ≤ . . . ≤ λn(Φ) <
7See Appendix A.2 for the definition and spectral properties of the Laplacian matrix of a graph.
8By completely connected, the author means that there is an edge going from every node i to every
other node j.
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∞, i.e., Φ is uniformly positive semidefinite with a single eigenvalue at 0, with the
associated eigenvector 1n.
Since Φ̄(x(s)) = Φ(x(s + 1)) and Θ(x(s + 1)) = Θ(F(x(s))), H̄(x(s)) can be
considered as depending solely on x(s + 1). Letting H(x(s + 1)) = H̄(x(s)), the
calculation H(x(s + 1)) = Θ(x(s + 1))Φ(x(s + 1)) yields that, for any i ∈ I ,
hii(x(s + 1)) = xi(s + 1)
hij(x(s + 1)) = −
xi(s + 1)xj(s + 1)
1− xi(s + 1)
, j 6= i,
where hij(x(s + 1)) is the (i, j)th element of H(x(s + 1)). For brevity, and when there
is no risk of confusion, the argument x(s + 1) is dropped, writing H. Observe that
the diagonal entries and off-diagonal entries of H(x(s + 1)) are uniformly strictly
positive and uniformly strictly negative, respectively. Notice that Φ1n = 0n ⇒ H1n =
Θ(x(s + 1))Φ(x(s + 1))1n = 0n. In other words, each row of H sums to zero. It
follows that H is the weighted Laplacian matrix associated with a directed, completely
connected graph with edge weights which vary with x(s + 1). The edge weights, −hij,
are uniformly upper bounded away from infinity and lower bounded away from
zero. It follows that the associated Laplacian matrix H has a single eigenvalue at 0,
and all other eigenvalues have positive real parts (see Appendix A.2).
With Θ(x(s + 1)) uniformly symmetric and positive definite, and Φ(x(s + 1))
uniformly symmetric and positive semidefinite, it follows from Lemma A.4 that all
eigenvalues of H = ΘΦ are real and nonnegative. Combining with the above analy-
sis, it follows that H has a single zero eigenvalue and all other eigenvalues are strictly
positive and real. Observing that trace(H) = ∑ni=1 xi(s + 1) = 1 = ∑
n
i=1 λi(H), yields
maxi
(
λi(H)
)
< 1 uniformly, since n ≥ 3.
The stronger result, that ‖H‖1 < 1 uniformly, is now established. Because A is
compact, observe that ‖H‖1 < 1 if and only if, for all i ∈ I , there holds ∑nj=1 |hji| < 1.
Equivalently,
xi +
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
xi
1− xj
)
xj < 1, (5.11)
and notice that the time argument s + 1 has been dropped for brevity. From the fact
that xi > 0, ∀ i (recall Property 5.3 and that one is considering s > 0), and n ≥ 3, it
follows that xi + xj < 1 ⇒ xi/(1− xj) < 1 for all j 6= i. Combining this with the
fact that xi + ∑nj=1,j 6=i xj = 1, one can immediately verify that Eq. (5.11) holds for all i.
Because A is bounded and compact, this implies that ‖H‖1 < 1− η for some η > 0
and all x(s) ∈ A. Recalling the transformed virtual dynamics in Eq. (5.9) yields
‖δz(s + 1)‖1 = ‖H(x(s + 1))δz(s)‖1 < (1− η)‖δz(s)‖1.
It follows that the transformed virtual displacement δz converges to zero exponen-
tially fast. Recall the definition of δz(s) in Eq. (5.8), and the fact that Θ(x(s)) is
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uniformly nonsingular. It follows that δx(s)→ 0n exponentially, ∀ x(s) ∈ A.
The above results have established that A is a generalised contraction region in
accordance with Definition A.1. Because A is compact and convex, it follows from
Theorem A.4 and Corollary A.1 that all trajectories of x(s + 1) = F(x(s)) with x(0) ∈
∆̃n, converge exponentially fast to a single trajectory. According to Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem [Khamsi and Kirk, 2011], there is at least one fixed point x∗ = F(x∗) ∈
int(∆n), which is a trajectory of x(s + 1) = F(x(s)). It then immediately follows that all
trajectories of x(s + 1) = F(x(s)) converge exponentially fast to a unique fixed point
x∗ ∈ int(∆n).
Having established a general convergence result, the following corollary presents
some additional insight on the equilibria at the corners of the simplex ∆n. As a
by-product, a greatly simplified proof is obtained to show that F is continuous and
smooth, which extends the result of Property 5.1.
Corollary 5.1 (Vertex Equilibrium). For the system Eq. (5.4), the fixed point ei of the map
F(x) in Eq. (5.5) is unstable if γi < 1/2. If γi = 1/2, i.e., vi is the centre node of a star
graph, then the fixed point ei is asymptotically stable, but is not exponentially stable.
Proof. Without loss of generality, consider i = 1. Observe that
F1(x) =
γ1
γ1 + ∑nk=2
(1−x1)γk
1−xk
Fj(x) =
γj(1− x1)
(1− xj)(γ1 + ∑nk=2
γk(1−x1)
1−xk )
, ∀j 6= 1,
and it is evident that these expressions are analytic in x1 for all x ∈ ∆n. The same
is then necessarily true of all their derivatives. It follows that F is continuous and
smooth9 on ∆n.
At x = e1, the expressions above yield that F(e1) = e1, and differentiating the
expressions yields a value for the Jacobian at x = e1 in which ∂F1∂x1 =
1−γ1
γ1
, ∂Fi∂x1 = −
γi
γ1
,
∂Fi
∂xj
= 0 for all i, j 6= 1. It follows that JF(x) has a single eigenvalue at (1− γ1)/γ1 and
all other eigenvalues are 0. If γ1 < 1/2, then (1− γ1)/γ1 > 1 and the fixed point
e1 is unstable. If γ1 = 1/2, then JF(x) has a single eigenvalue at 1. The discrete-time
counterpart10 to [Khalil, 2002, Theorem 4.15] then rules out e1 as an exponentially
stable fixed point of F(x) (asymptotic stability was established in Lemma 5.1).
Remark 5.6. During the analysis of H, it was first established that ∀ i, the eigenvalues of
λi(H) are real, nonnegative and less than 1. This indicates that the trajectories of Eq. (5.4)
9The proof in [Jia et al., 2015, Lemma 2.2] established continuity but not smoothness, and used a
series of complex inequality calculations.
10[Khalil, 2002, Theorem 4.15] states that the equilibrium point x = 0 of the nonlinear continuous-time
system ẋ = f (t, x) is exponentially stable if and only if x = 0 is an exponentially stable equilibrium
point of the linear system ẋ = A(t)x, where A(t) = ∂ f∂x (t, x)|x=0. The proof of the discrete-time
counterpart theorem follows the same steps as the proof of [Khalil, 2002, Theorem 4.15]
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about x∗ are not oscillatory in nature. It also follows that ρ(H) < 1. According to [Horn and
Johnson, 2012, Lemma 5.6.10], there exists a submultiplicative matrix norm ‖ · ‖′ such that
‖H‖′ < 1. However, it must be recalled that H(x(s + 1)) is in fact a non-constant matrix
which changes over the trajectory of the system Eq. (5.4). It is not immediately obvious, and
in fact is not a consequence of the eigenvalue property, that a single submultiplicative matrix
norm ‖ · ‖′′ exists such that ‖H‖′′ < 1 for all x ∈ A. Existence of such a norm ‖ · ‖′′ would
establish the desired stability property.
In fact, the system δz(s + 1) = H(x(s + 1))δz(s), with H ∈ M,M = {H(x(s + 1)) :
x(s + 1) ∈ A}, can be considered as a discrete-time linear switching system with state δz,
and thus under arbitrary switching, the system is stable if and only if the joint spectral
radius is less than 1, that is ρ(M) = limk→∞ maxi{‖Hi1 . . . Hik‖1/k : Hi ∈ M} < 1
[Blondel and Tsitsiklis, 2000]. This is of course a more restrictive condition than simply
requiring that ρ(Hi) < 1. It is known that even when M is finite, computing ρ(M) is
NP-hard [Tsitsiklis and Blondel, 1997] and the question “ρ(M) ≤ 1?" is an undecidable
problem [Blondel and Tsitsiklis, 2000]. The problem is made even more difficult because in
this instant, the setM is not finite. This motivated the search for the stronger, and nontrivial,
result that ‖H‖1 < 1, ∀ x ∈ A.
Remark 5.7. For δz given in Eq. (5.8), one can integrate to obtain zi = − ln(1 − xi)
where zi is the ith element of z(x). However, the above convergence arguments were not
presented by first defining z(x) and then seeking to study z(s + 1) = G(z(s)). This is
because the proof arose from considering x(s + 1) = F(x(s)) using nonlinear contraction
analysis, which studies stability via differential concepts. It was through Eq. (5.8) that one
integrated11 to obtain zi = − ln(1− xi). Moreover, it will be observed in Chapter 6 that by
conducting analysis on the transformed Jacobian using nonlinear contraction theory, one can
straightforwardly deal with issue-varying C(s).
Remark 5.8. Simulations showed that sometimes |λmax(JF)| > 1, which implies that it is
not always possible to find a matrix norm ‖ · ‖′ such that ‖JF(x(s))‖′ < 1 uniformly. Such a
result would allow application of a standard method for proving Banach’s Contraction The-
orem on the map F [Khamsi and Kirk, 2011]. This is what motivated an approach using
nonlinear contraction analysis, with transformation Θ. The work [Lohmiller and Slotine,
1998] specifically discusses contraction in the Euclidean metric ‖δz‖2 = ‖Θδx‖2. One
requires λmax
(
H(x)>H(x)
)
< 1 to hold uniformly to guarantee that ‖δz(s)‖2 → 0 expo-
nentially fast. However, simulations showed that λmax
(
H(x)>H(x)
)
was often much larger
than 1. This motivated the consideration of contraction in the absolute sum metric, with
appropriate adjustments to the proof presented in Appendix A.3. Such an approach is alluded
to in [Lohmiller and Slotine, 1998, Section 3.7].
Having established an exponential convergence result, study is now undertaken
to obtain additional results on the dynamics of the system Eq. (5.4), which in turn
reveal insights about the evolution of social power in the context of a social network.
11In general, the entries of Θ may have expressions which do not have analytic antiderivatives, and
thus an analytic z(x(s), s) cannot always be found, but δz(s) can always be defined.
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5.3 Further Analysis of Dynamical Behaviour
In this section, a result is first established that significantly expands Property 5.2 and
introduces a stronger contraction-like result that is also applicable to social networks
with star topology, unlike Property 5.2. This contraction-like property is used to es-
tablish two further results. The first is an upper bound on individual i’s social power
at equilibrium x∗i , as a function of γi, the i
th entry of the dominant left eigenvector
γ> of C. The second result is on the convergence rate to x∗ for a class of C.
5.3.1 A Contraction-Like Property
Recall Property 5.2, which established that if the system Eq. (5.4) was close to the
boundary of the simplex ∆n, then there was a contraction towards the centre of the
simplex. The following theorem gives an explicit value for the region on which this
contraction-like property holds, which for xj depends only on γj.
Theorem 5.3. Suppose that n ≥ 3, x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, and the social network G[C] satisfies As-
sumption 5.1. Define
rj =
1− 2γj
1− γj
, (5.12)
where γj is the jth entry of γ>, the dominant left eigenvector of C. If γj < 1/2, which implies
that rj > 0, then for any 0 < r ≤ rj, there holds
xj = 1− r ⇒ Fj(x) < 1− r, (5.13)
where Fj(x) is the jth entry of F(x) given in Eq. (5.5). If γj = 1/2, then @r > 0 : r ≤ rj,
and thus Eq. (5.13) does not hold.
Proof. Property 5.3 established that for x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, there holds xi(s) > 0, ∀ i and s > 0.
Consider then s > 0. Since xj = 1− r and γj < 1/2, then with r ≤ rj, there holds
Fj(x) = α(x)
γj
1− xj
=
1
γj
1−xj (1 +
∑nk 6=j γk/(1−xk)
γj/(1−xj) )
γj
1− xj
=
1
1 +
∑nk 6=j γk/(1−xk)
γj/(1−xj)
=
1
1 + ∑nk 6=j
r
γj
γk
(1−xk)
. (5.14)
Because 1− xk < 1 ∀ k ∈ I , one obtains γk/(1− xk) > γk, which implies that the
right hand side of Eq. (5.14) obeys
1
1 + ∑nk 6=j
r
γj
γk
(1−xk)
<
1
1 + ∑nk 6=j
γkr
γj
(5.15)
=
1
1 + (1−γj)rγj
=
γj
γj + (1− γj)r
, (5.16)
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with the first equality obtained by noting that ∑nk 6=j γk = 1 − γj according to the
definition of γ. It follows from Eq. (5.14) and Eq. (5.16) that
1− r− Fj(x) > 1− r−
γj
γj + (1− γj)r
=
γj + (1− γj)r− rγj − (1− γj)r2 − γj
γj + (1− γj)r
=
r(1− 2γj)− r2(1− γj)
γj + (1− γj)r
=
r(1− γj)
[
1−2γj
1−γj − r
]
γj + (1− γj)r
.
Substituting in rj from Eq. (5.12) then yields
1− r− Fj(x) >
r(1− γj)(rj − r)
γj + (1− γj)r
≥ 0 (5.17)
because rj ≥ r. In other words, 1− r > Fj(x), which completes the proof.
This contraction-like result is now used to establish an upper bound on the social
power of an individual at equilibrium.
5.3.2 Upper Bound on Individual’s Social Power at Equilibrium
Theorem 5.1, Property (iii) established that the social power at equilibrium x∗ is
dependent only on the network topology, C, and specifically the dominant left ei-
genvector γ> of C. Property (ii) of Theorem 5.1 provides an ordering result of x∗i
and x∗j . However, no general results appear to exist for analytical computation of the
vector x∗ given γ>. Results exist for some special cases, though, such as for doubly
stochastic C and for G with star topology [Jia et al., 2015]. While no explicit equality
relating x∗i to γi is provided, an explicit inequality is provided.
Corollary 5.2 (Upper bound on x∗i ). Suppose that n ≥ 3 and x(0) ∈ ∆̃n. Suppose further
that G[C] satisfies Assumption 5.1, and is not a star graph. Then, the ith entry of the unique
fixed point x∗ of F, given in Eq. (5.5), satisfies x∗i < γi/(1− γi).
Proof. Theorem 5.3 established that, for any j ∈ I , if xj = 1− r with r ≤ rj, then the
system Eq. (5.4) will contract so that Fj(x(s)) < xj. It is straightforward to conclude
that the map F(x) continues to contract towards the centre of the simplex ∆n until
xi(s) < 1− ri, ∀ i, where ri is given by Eq. (5.12).
Suppose that x∗j ≥ 1 − rj = γj/(1 − γj). According to the arguments in the
paragraph above, there holds Fj(x∗) < 1− rj ≤ x∗j . On the other hand, the definition
of x∗ as a fixed point of F implies that x∗j = Fj(x
∗), which leads to a contradiction.
Therefore, x∗j < 1− rj = γj/(1− γj) as claimed.
Note that this result is separate from the result of Theorem 5.2, which deals with
convergence to x∗. Here, an upper bound is established for the values of the entries of
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the unique fixed point x∗, i.e., the social power at equilibrium, given γ. In particular,
the bound for individual i’s social power at equilibrium depends only on γi.
Remark 5.9. Three specific conclusions can be drawn from these two results. First, in relation
to the transient behaviour of x(s), Theorem 5.3 indicates that for any i and with xi(0) small,
the peak overshoot of xi(s) above x∗i is bounded as xi(s) ≤ γi/(1− γi). Second, suppose
that G[C] has star topology with centre node v1. Then, γ1 = 0.5 according to Fact 5.1, and
thus x1 does not decrease according to Theorem 5.3. This is consistent with the findings in
[Jia et al., 2015], i.e., Lemma 5.1. Last, suppose that G is strongly connected and that γi <
1/3, ∀ i ∈ I . Then, according to Corollary 5.2, no individual will have more than half of the
total social power at equilibrium, i.e., x∗i < 1/2, ∀ i ∈ I . This provides a sufficient condition
on the social network topology to ensure that no individual has a dominating presence in the
opinion discussion.
Remark 5.10. [Tightness of the Bound] The tightness of the bound x∗i < γi/(1− γi) increa-
ses as γk decreases ∀ k 6= i. This is in the sense that the ratio x∗i (1−γi)/γi approaches 1 from
below as γk decreases ∀ k 6= i. This conclusion can be drawn by noting that in order to obtain
Eq. (5.15), the inequality 1− xk < 1 is employed. From the fact that limxk→0 1− xk = 1,
and because the contraction-like property of Theorem 5.3 holds for xk ≥ γk/(1− γk), it fol-
lows that the tightness of the bound x∗i < γi/(1− γi) increases as γk decreases ∀ k 6= i. If
there is a single individual i with γi  γk, ∀ k 6= i, one can accurately estimate x∗i , e.g. if
γi > 1/3 γk, ∀ k 6= i, it can be said with high confidence that individual i will hold more
than half of the total social power at equilibrium, i.e., x∗i > 0.5.
5.3.3 Convergence Rates
A result is now presented bounding the convergence rate for a C belonging to an
important subset of all possible C matrices; in this subset, no individual i will have
more than half the social power at equilibrium, i.e. @i : x∗i ≥ 0.5.
Lemma 5.2 (Convergence Rate). Suppose that C ∈ L, where L = {C ∈ Rn×n : γi <
1/3, ∀ i, n ≥ 3}12 and γi is the ith entry of the dominant left eigenvector γ> associated with
C. Then, with x(0) ∈ ∆̃n, there exists a finite s1 such that for all s ≥ s1, the system Eq. (5.4)
contracts to its unique equilibrium point x∗ with a convergence rate obeying
‖x∗ − x(s + 1)‖1 ≤ (2β− ε)‖x∗ − x(s)‖1 (5.18)
where 2β− ε < 1, with β = maxi∈I γi/(1− γi) < 1/2 and ε being a sufficiently small
positive constant.
Proof. From Theorem 5.3, one concludes that xi(s) ≥ 1− β ⇒ Fi(x(s)) = xi(s + 1) <
xi(s), where β = maxi βi. This means that there exists a sufficiently small positive
constant ε and s1 < ∞ such that xi(s) ≤ β − ε for all s ≥ s1. (That s1 < ∞ is a
consequence of the compactness of ∆̃n). In other words, xi(s) will be no greater than
12According to Fact 5.1, L does not contain any C whose associated graph has a star topology.
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β− ε/2 in a finite number of issues after s = 0; this fact will be used below to upper
bound the norm of the untransformed Jacobian.
Each column sum of the Jacobian JF(x(s)) is equal to zero, which comes from the
fact that ∑i Fi(x) = 1 (one can verify this property using the expressions in Eq. (5.6)
and Eq. (5.7)). Note also that the diagonal entries of the Jacobian are strictly positive
and for s ≥ s1, there holds ∂Fi/∂xi ≤ β − ε/2, ∀ i. This is because xi(1 − xi) ≤
(β − ε/2)(1− β + ε/2) for xi ≤ β − ε/2 < 0.5 and 1/(1− xi) ≤ 1/(1− β + ε/2).
Combining the column sum property and the fact that the off-diagonal entries of
the Jacobian are strictly negative, it follows that for s ≥ s1, there holds ‖JF(x(s))‖1 =
2 maxi ∂Fi/∂xi ≤ 2β− ε < 1− η where η is an arbitrarily small positive constant. The
inequality in Eq. (5.18) follows immediately.
Remark 5.11. The quantity 2β− ε (which is a Lipschitz constant associated with the map
F) is an upper bound on the convergence rate of the system as in Eq. (5.18). By assuming
γi < 1/3, ∀ i, one is able to work directly with the Jacobian JF , as opposed to the transformed
Jacobian H. It is in general much more difficult to compute an upper bound on ‖H‖1 using
γ and Corollary 5.2 when ∃ i : γi ≥ 1/3. Note that L includes many of the topologies
likely to be encountered in social networks. Topologies for which ∃ i : γi ≥ 1/3 will have an
individual who holds more than half the social power at equilibrium. Such topologies are more
reflective of autocracy-like or dictatorship-like networks, as opposed to a group of nominally
equal peers.
5.4 Conclusions
This chapter revisited the recently proposed DeGroot–Friedkin model, with constant
network topology. The model considers how an individual’s social power evolves
as the influence network discusses a sequence of issues. A number of extensions
have been presented on the original model. The key contribution is the employ-
ment of nonlinear contraction analysis to establish an exponential convergence result
for general topologies, whereas the original paper [Jia et al., 2015] only established
an asymptotic convergence result. Unstable equilibria have also characterised. For
special star-topology networks, it has been proved that the stable equilibrium was
asymptotically stable, but was not exponentially so. The second major development
was to extend an existing “contraction-like” property, from which two further results
were established; an upper bound on an individual’s social power at equilibrium,
and the convergence rate of the model for a general class of network topologies.
Chapter 6
Dynamic Social Networks:
Exponential Forgetting of Perceived
Social Power
Chapter Summary
This chapter extends the DeGroot–Friedkin model by introducing dynamic network
topology, and in particular, issue-varying relative interaction topology (the term “is-
sue” is used interchangeably with “topic”). The dynamic network topology problem
is formally defined, with motivating examples provided as to why issue-varying net-
works are reflective of real-world social networks. Then, the nonlinear contraction
analysis framework introduced in Chapter 5 is used to draw a key conclusion: under
mild assumptions on the properties of the issue-varying network, each individual’s
initial (perceived) social power is forgotten exponentially fast, and in the limit of
the issue sequence, each individual’s social power converges to a “unique limiting
trajectory” that depends only on the issue-varying network topology. The results in
Section 5.3 concerning the upper bound on an individual’s social power at equili-
brium and convergence rate for a class of topologies are also extended, with obvious
modifications due to the dynamic topology. As a special case, periodically-varying
topologies are also considered.
6.1 Introduction
In real-world social networks, the network topology is almost always evolving over
time. New interpersonal relationships may be formed, old ones might be removed,
or the strength of the interaction may change. This gives is a strong incentive to
study opinion dynamics models where the topology is time-varying or dynamic.
Roughly speaking, dynamic topology can fall into at least two broad categories.
The first is where the topology varies explicitly as a function of time, e.g. the in-
fluence weight wij(t) in the DeGroot or Friedkin–Johnsen models. In such studies,
a typical objective is to obtain graphical conditions on the topology which guaran-
tee a certain phenomenon is achieved. For example, a “repeatedly jointly strongly
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connected” condition on the switching of G[W(t)] is a sufficient condition for the
time-varying DeGroot model
y(t + 1) = W(t)y(t) (6.1)
to reach a consensus of opinions exponentially fast. A number of results exist, with
some works stating equivalent graphical conditions using different terminology or
definitions. Thus, no attempt will be made to provide a detailed comparison and
study of these results. For the DeGroot model, time-varying G[W(t)] has been stu-
died in e.g. [Ren and Beard, 2005; Cao et al., 2008; Jadbabaie et al., 2003; Nedić and
Liu, 2017; Shi and Johansson, 2013]. The continuous-time Abelson model has also
been heavily studied on time-varying networks, because of its relevance to distribu-
ted control of multi-agent systems (see Section 1.2.5). Example works include [Ren
and Beard, 2005; Anderson et al., 2017; Shi and Johansson, 2013; Mesbahi and Eger-
stedt, 2010a; Ren and Beard, 2007] . The time-varying Altafini model has been stu-
died in discrete-time [Liu et al., 2017a] and in continuous-time [Proskurnikov et al.,
2016]. These works consider topology that is explicitly dependent on time, and may
be interested in establishing the conditions for which the same phenomenon arises in
time-varying networks as in time-invariant networks.
The second category is where the topology changes in a state-dependent manner,
and since the state (typically the individuals’ opinions in an opinion dynamics mo-
del) often evolves over time (before perhaps reaching a steady state in some models),
then necessarily the network topology is dynamic, though this thesis will refrain
from calling these time-varying networks since the network is not an explicit function
of time. For example, the influence weight wij(y(t)) of the DeGroot model may de-
pend on the values of opinion yi(t), yj(t). A large number of works fall into this
category, including the Hegselmann–Krause model (and its many variants), and the
works of e.g. [Mäs et al., 2014; Duggins, 2017; Dandekar et al., 2013; Amelkin et al.,
2017]. A key aspect of such works is to establish proper motivation of the process
by which the network topology evolves. Almost certainly, the functional dependence
of an influence weight on the opinions, given as wij = fi(y), must be carefully mo-
delled to reflect established sociological and social psychological concepts such as
homophily, bias assimilation, pressure to conform, etc. It is often the case that the
initial opinion values and the functional dependence (including parameters in the
function) determines the limiting behaviour (assuming the opinions exist in the li-
mit), and there is no guarantee that the network remains connected. For example,
the number of clusters, and distance between clusters in the Hegselmann–Krause
model is linked to the size of the confidence bound on each individual. Moreover,
each cluster is disconnected from the others. Attempts to study such networks may
be undertaken only with help of thorough examination of supporting literature from
the social sciences (including phenomena arising from the social processes).
It should now be clear why dynamic networks are of interest in agent-based opi-
nion dynamics models. With respect to the DeGroot–Friedkin model, the influence
weights already vary between the issues s ∈ S , i.e. wij(s), via the social process of
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reflected self-appraisal. In this chapter, dynamic topology is therefore in reference
to relative interaction matrices C(s) which are different between issues, but remain
constant during the period of discussion for any given issue. Relative interaction matri-
ces encode trust or relationship strength between individuals in a network, and in
Section 6.1.1 below, reasons are given as to why the topology might be dynamic, with
examples provided in support. It is assumed that the relative interaction matrices do
not vary in a manner dependent on the social powers of the individuals, but can
otherwise vary arbitrarily. In other words, this chapter deals with the first category
of dynamic networks, but as will be clarified in the sequel, the set of such networks
within the DeGroot–Friedkin framework is large.
In this chapter, a general convergence result is explained in the context of the
DeGroot–Friedkin model. In particular, it is discovered that the process of DeGroot
opinion updating and reflected self-appraisal leads to a self-regulating network. That
is, one can consider an individual’s initial social power as the individual’s own esti-
mate of his/her social power before any discussion occurs (it can also be considered
as his/her perceived power), and analysis shows that each individual forgets his/her
initial (i.e. perceived) social power exponentially fast. The true social power of any indi-
vidual at any given issue is determined only by the previously occurring sequence
of dynamic relative interpersonal interaction topology.
6.1.1 Motivating Examples for Issue-Varying Topology
In the introduction above, qualitative reasons were provided as to why social net-
works might have dynamically changing topology, for a variety of models. Here,
quantitative details on the problem of interest are provided. Having introduced the
DeGroot–Friedkin model in the previous chapter, it is appropriate to expand on the
motivation here with specific reference to the model (see Section 5.1.1). Specifically,
examples are provided to show how relative interaction matrices C(s) may vary
dynamically between issues as a result of issue-driven or individual-driven topology
change. Henceforth, reference to “dynamic” topology or C(s) is a reference to C(s)
which varying between issues si, sj ∈ S , but remain constant for a given s.
Issue-driven: Consider a government cabinet that meets to discuss the issues of
defence, economic growth, social security programs and foreign policy. Each minister
(individual in the cabinet) has a specialist portfolio (e.g. defence) and perhaps a
secondary portfolio (e.g. foreign policy). While every minister will partake in the
discussion of each issue, the weights cij(s) will change. For example, if minister i’s
portfolio is on defence, then cji(sdefence) will be high as other ministers j place more
trust on minister i’s opinion. On the other hand, cji(ssocial) will be low. It is then
apparent that C(sdefence) 6= C(ssocial) in general. This motivates the incorporation of
issue-dependent or issue-driven topology change into the DeGroot–Friedkin model.
Individual-driven: Dynamic relative interaction matrices are a natural way of des-
cribing network structural changes over time. For many reasons, relationships may
form, change, or die out. As an example, consider individual i and individual j in a
network, with cij(0) > 0, and suppose that yi(0, s)  yj(0, s) for s = 0, 1, . . . , 5, i.e.
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individual j consistently holds an initial opinion vastly different from individual i.
Then, i may decide that j is not worth listening to, and set cij(6) = 0. This is simi-
lar to the concept of homophily as it appears in the Hegselmann–Krause model (see
Section 1.2.2), where individuals interact only with others who hold similar views.
The two examples above are different from each other, but both equally provide
motivation for dynamic topology. It is therefore of interest to consider the DeGroot–
Friedkin model with dynamic C(s) and to determine how such dynamic topology
may affect or change an individual’s social power evolution over the issue sequence.
6.1.2 Chapter Organization
In Section 6.2, the DeGroot–Friedkin model with dynamic topology is presented.
Section 6.3 presents the main convergence result and extends a “contraction-like”
property to include dynamic topology. Section 6.4 studies the special case of periodically-
varying topology, and simulations are given in Section 6.5 to illustrate the main re-
sults. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.6.
6.2 The Dynamic Topology Model and Objective
To begin, the DeGroot–Friedkin model is extended to consider dynamic topology,
and an assumption is then placed on the properties of the dynamic C(s).
First, the opinion dynamics for each issue is given by
y(s, t + 1) = W(s)y(s, t), (6.2)
where
W(s) = X(s) + (In − X(s))C(s). (6.3)
This records the fact that C(s) varies between issues but is constant for all t for a given
issue, in distinction to Eq. (5.2) in the previous chapter, where C was constant for each
issue, and constant over the issue sequence. Precise details of the adjustments to the
model arising from dynamic C are stated below. Here, an assumption is placed on
the way in which C(s) varies ∀ s ∈ S .
Assumption 6.1. For a given sequence of C(s), s = 0, 1, 2, . . ., the sequence is such that the
entries of C(s1), given as cij(s1), do not depend on x(s′), ∀ s′ ≤ s1.
Assumption 6.1 ensures that the dominant left eigenvector γ>(s) is independent
of the state x(s), because C(s) is independent of x(s). Notice that both the issue-
driven and individual-driven examples in Section 6.1.1 satisfy Assumption 6.1. Al-
most all issue-driven dynamics C(s) satisfy the assumption because the sequence of
C(s) depends only on the sequence of issues. That is, for analysis purposes the se-
quence of C(s) is considered to be determined before discussion begins on s = 0, but
individual i may not necessarily know the sequence of cij(s) a priori.
However, a situation where individual i adjusts cij(s) to be larger because i obser-
ved that individual j had large impact ζ j(s− 1), does not satisfy the assumption. For
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social network models with state-dependent parameters, limiting behaviour depends
critically on the function relating the parameters to the state (as detailed earlier).
For social systems (as opposed to e.g. autonomous robotic systems), this functio-
nal dependence must necessarily reflect socio-psychological concepts. It is beyond
the scope of this chapter to propose such functional dependence. Thus, Assump-
tion 6.1 is in place, and investigation of how individuals might determine C(s) based
on x(s), . . . , x(0) may give rise to interesting future work. Furthermore, Assump-
tion 5.1 is also assumed to hold throughout this chapter, and it is restated here for
the reader’s convenience, with a minor adjustment to reflect the dynamic topology.
Assumption 6.2. For all s ∈ S , the graph G[C(s)] = (V , E [C(s)], C(s)), with the same
node set V of n ≥ 3 nodes, is strongly connected and no node vi has a self-loop. Furthermore,
the relative interaction matrix C(s) row-stochastic for all s ∈ S .
The problem treated in this chapter is embedded in the following key objective.
Objective 6.1. Consider a network G[C(s)] of n ≥ 3 individuals that discuss a sequence
of issues indexed by s ∈ S = {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Suppose that Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 hold.
For each issue s, the DeGroot process Eq. (6.2) is used to describe the opinion dynamics,
with the influence matrix W(s) determined according to Eq. (6.3). Suppose that at the end
of each issue, the vector of social power x(s) defined above Eq. (5.2) changes according to
Eq. (5.3). Then, the objective is to study the dynamical evolution (including convergence) of
x(s) over the sequence of issues S , and determine what (if any) parameters of G[C(s)] affect
the evolution of x(s)
For a population of n ≥ 3 individuals, consider a social network G[C(s)] =
(V , E [C(s)], C(s)), with a finite set C of P possible relative interaction matrices defi-
ned as C = {Cp ∈ Rn×n : p ∈ P} where P = {1, 2, . . . , P}. For simplicity, it is also
assumed that @ p such that the graph G[Cp] has star topology (see Definition 5.1). Let
σ(s) : N → P be a switching signal, and suppose that σ(s) determines the dyna-
mic switching as C(s) = Cσ(s). Suppose that Assumption 6.2 holds1 for all s ∈ S .
Suppose further that Assumption 6.1 holds, which implies for any s1 ≥ 0, σ(s1) is
independent of the state x(s), for all s < s1. Then, the DeGroot–Friedkin model with
dynamic relative interaction matrices is
x(s + 1) = Fσ(s)(x(s)), (6.4)
where the nonlinear map Fp(x) for p ∈ P , is defined as
Fp(x) =

ei if x = ei for any i
αp(x)

γp,1
1−x1
...
γp,n
1−xn
 otherwise
, (6.5)
1Assumption 6.2 is equivalent to requiring that Assumption 5.1 holds separately for all Cp, p ∈ P .
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where αp(x) = 1/ ∑ni=1
γp,i
1−xi and γp,i is the i
th entry of the dominant left eigenvector
of Cp, γ>p = [γp,1, γp,2, . . . , γp,n]. The derivation for Eq. (6.5) is an extension of the
derivation of Eq. (5.5) using [Jia et al., 2015, Lemma 2.2], by noting that C(s) = Cσ(s).
Remark 6.1. Analysis using the usual techniques for switched systems is difficult for the
system Eq. (6.4). For arbitrary switching, one might typically seek to find a common Lya-
punov function, i.e., one which would establish convergence for any fixed value of p ∈ P .
This, however, appears to be difficult (if not impossible) for Eq. (6.4). In the constant C case
studied in [Jia et al., 2015], the convergence result relied on 1) a Lyapunov function which
was dependent on the unique equilibrium point x∗, and 2) LaSalle’s Invariance Principle.
Both 1) and 2) are invalid when analysing Eq. (6.4). In the case of 1), the system Eq. (6.4)
does not have a unique equilibrium point x∗ but rather a unique trajectory x∗(s) (as will be
made clear in the sequel). In the case of 2), LaSalle’s Invariance Principle is not applicable to
general non-autonomous systems.
The following three properties were detailed in Chapter 5, and are detailed here
again (with adjusted numbering) for the convenience of the reader.
Property 6.1. The map Fp(x) in Eq. (6.5) is continuous on ∆n for all p ∈ P .
Property 6.2. For the system x(s + 1) = Fp(x(s)) with map Fp given in Eq. (6.5), and
G[Cp] does not have star topology, there exists a sufficiently small r such that for any r′ ≤ r,
xi(s) = 1− r′ implies xi(s+ 1) < 1− r′, for all i. Thus, for the set2 A = {x ∈ ∆n : 1− r ≥
xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ {1, . . . , n}}, there holds Fp(A) ⊂ A.
Property 6.3. For the system x(s + 1) = Fp(x(s)) with map Fp given in Eq. (6.5), if
x(s1) ∈ ∆̃n for some s1 < ∞, then x(s) ∈ int(∆n) for all s > s1.
The DeGroot–Friedkin model with dynamic relative interpersonal interactions
has now been formally defined, and Objective 6.1 is investigated in the remaining
sections of this chapter.
6.3 Exponential Convergence to a Unique Limiting Trajectory
The main convergence result of this chapter is now stated, the proof of which turns
out to be fairly straightforward. This is a consequence of the analysis framework
arising from the techniques used in the proof of Theorem 5.2. In addition, it should
be noted that in the theorem statement immediately below, a relaxation of the initial
conditions is made; it is no longer required that ∑ni=1 xi(0) = 1. A social interpreta-
tion of the restrictive assumption ∑ni=1 xi(0) = 1 and the new, milder assumption, are
given in Remark 6.2 immediately following the theorem, and an interpretation of the
theorem itself is given in Remark 6.3.
2The sets ∆n, ∆̃n, and int(∆n) were defined in Section 2.1, and are now redefined for the rea-
der’s convenience: The n-simplex is ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ x, 1>n x = 1}, and ∆̃n = ∆n\{e1, . . . , en} and
int(∆n) = {x ∈ Rn : 0 < x, 1>n x = 1}.
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Theorem 6.1. Suppose Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 hold, and that @ p such that Cp ∈ C is
associated with a star topology graph, with C defined above Eq. (6.4). Then, for system
Eq. (6.4), a) there exists a unique trajectory x∗(s) ∈ int(∆n), s ≥ 0 determined solely by
γσ(s1), s1 ≤ s, and b) for all initial conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and
∃ j ∈ I : xj(0) > 0, there holds lims→∞ [x(s)− x∗(s)] = 0n exponentially fast, and c) if
x(0) = ei for some i, then x(s) = ei, ∀s.
Proof. First, regarding c), observe that if x(0) = ei for some i, then Eq. (6.5) leads to
the conclusion that x(s) = ei for all s.
With initial conditions xi(0) < 1, the map Fσ(0)(x(s)) 6= ei for any i. It is easy
to verify that with these initial conditions, the matrix W(0) is row-stochastic, irre-
ducible and aperiodic, which implies that for s = 0, the opinions y(0, t) converge to
a consensus as in the constant C case. Because C(0) is irreducible, this implies that
γσ(0),i > 0 for all i, and it follows that ασ(0)(x(0)) > 0 because ∃ j : xj(0) > 0. One
thus concludes that x(1) = Fσ(0)(x(0)) > 0, i.e., for issue s = 1, every individual’s
social power/self-weight is strictly positive, and the sum of the weights is 1. More-
over, because Cp is irreducible ∀ p, this implies that for any p, there holds γp,i > 0
for all i. It follows that for s ≥ 1, ασ(s)(x(s)) > 0, which in turn guarantees that
x(s + 1) = Fσ(s)(x(s)) > 0, i.e., x(s) ∈ int(∆n) for all s > 0. This ensures that ∀ s,
W(s) is row-stochastic, and primitive. This implies that y(s, t) converges to a consen-
sus for every issue s ∈ S (see Section 2.3.1) and thus the dominant left eigenvector
ζ(s)> of W(s), used to determine x(s + 1) = ζ(s), is always well defined.
Denote the ith entry of Fp by Fp,i. Regarding Property 6.2, for each map Fp, define
the set Ap(rp) = {x ∈ ∆n : 1− rp ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I}, where 0 < rp  1 is sufficiently
small such that xi(s) ≤ 1− rp for all i ∈ I implies that Fp,i(x(s)) = xi(s + 1) < 1− rp.
Define Ā = {x ∈ ∆n : 1 − r̄ ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I} where r̄ = minp rp. Because
Fp(Ā) ⊂ Ā, it follows that ∪Pp=1Ap ⊂ Ā, and that for the system Eq. (6.4), for all
s > 0, x(s) ∈ Ā, with Ā compact and convex.
Denoting the Jacobian for the system Eq. (6.4) at issue s as JFσ(s) = {
∂Fσ(s),i
∂xj
}, and
from Assumption 6.1 yields that γσ(s) is independent of x(s), one obtains
∂Fσ(s),i
∂xi
(x) =
γσ(s),iασ(s)(x)
(1− xi)2
−
(
γσ(s),iασ(s)(x)
)2
(1− xi)3
.
Similarly, for j 6= i, one obtains
∂Fσ(s),i
∂xj
(x) = −
γσ(s),iγσ(s),j
(
ασ(s)(x)
)2
(1− xi)(1− xj)2
.
Comparing to Eq. (5.6) and Eq. (5.7), one concludes that the Jacobian of the non-
autonomous system Eq. (6.4) with the map given in Eq. (6.5) is expressible in the
same form as the Jacobian of the original system Eq. (5.4) with the map given in
Eq. (5.5). More precisely, it can be expressed in a form which is dependent on the
trajectory of the system Eq. (6.4). Using the same transformation of δz given in
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Eq. (5.8) with the same Θ(x(s)), one obtains the exact same transformed virtual
dynamics Eq. (5.9), expressed as
δz(s + 1) = H(x(s + 1))δz(s). (6.6)
Similar to the proof of Theorem 5.2, for some arbitrarily small η > 0, one can show
that there holds ‖H‖1 < 1− η for all x(s) ∈ Ā, independent of p ∈ P , which implies
that Ā is a generalised contraction region. It follows that δx(s) → 0n exponentially
fast for all x(s) ∈ Ā. Then, because Ā is compact and convex, it follows from
Theorem A.4 and Corollary A.1 that all trajectories of x(s + 1) = Fσ(s)(x(s)) converge
exponentially fast to a single trajectory, which is denoted by x∗(s), ∀ s ≥ 0. For any
s1 ∈ S , the value x∗(s1) depends only on γσ(s), s < s1, i.e. it is independent of
x(0). Note that it was established earlier that x(s) ∈ int(∆n), ∀ s ≥ 0, which implies
x∗(s) ∈ int(∆n), ∀ s ≥ 0.
Finally, following the same analysis as in [Jia et al., 2015, pp.393], one can show
that lims→∞ ζ(s) = x∗(s) and lims→∞ W(x(s))=X∗(s)+(In−X∗(s))C(s)=W(x∗(s)).
That is, the dominant left eigenvector ζ(s)> of W(s) converges to be equal to the
unique trajectory x∗(s)>, ∀ s ≥ 0, and the influence matrix W(x(s)) converges to an
issue-varying matrix function of the unique trajectory x∗(s), with functional form
given above.
The above result implies that the system Eq. (6.4), with initial conditions satisfying
0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i and ∃ j : xj(0) > 0, converges to a trajectory x∗(s), s ≥ 0 of Eq. (6.4)
as s→ ∞. For convenience in future discussions and presentation of results, this will
be called the unique limiting trajectory of Eq. (6.4). This is a limiting trajectory in the
sense that lims→∞ [x(s)− x∗(s)] = 0n.
Remark 6.2 (Relaxation of the initial conditions). Theorem 6.1 contains a relaxation of
the initial conditions of the original DeGroot–Friedkin model, and provides a more reasonable
interpretation from a social context. One can consider xi(0) as individual i’s estimate of i’s
social power (or perceived social power) when the social network is first formed and before
discussion begins on issue s = 0. The original model requires x(0) ∈ ∆̃n to avoid an
autocratic system (an autocratic system is where x(s) = ei for some i, i.e., an individual
holds all the social power). However, this is unrealistic because one cannot expect individuals
to have estimates such that ∑ni=1 xi(0) = 1. On the other hand, it has been shown that the
system trajectory satisfies further, as already commented, ∑ xi(1) = 1 and x(1) ∈ int(∆n),
and then easily ∑ni=1 xi(k) = 1, ∀k > 1 and x(k) ∈ int(∆n). Moreover, x∗(s) ∈ int(∆n), i.e.,
x∗i (s) > 0, ∀ i and ∑
n
i=1 x
∗
i (s) = 1, ∀ s. This mild assumption holds as long as no individual
i estimates his/her social power to be autocratic (xi(0) = 1) and at least one individual j has
an estimate of his/her own social power that is strictly positive (∃ j : xj(0) > 0).
The main convergence result is concluded by showing that if the set of switching
matrices has a special property (which is sometimes but certainly not always satis-
fied), then the unique limiting trajectory x∗(s) is in fact a stationary point.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that the relative interaction matrix C(s) of the DeGroot–Friedkin
model, satisfying Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2, switches as C(s) = Cσ(s) ∈ K(γ̃), where
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K(γ̃) = {Cp ∈ Rn×n : γp = γ̃, ∀ p ∈ P = {1, 2, . . . , P}}, is the set of C all having
the same dominant left eigenvector γ̃>, with P finite3. Then, the system Eq. (6.4), with
initial conditions 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i and ∃j : xj(0) > 0, converges exponentially fast to a
unique point x∗ ∈ int(∆n).
There holds x∗i < x
∗
j ⇔ γ̃i < γ̃j, for any i, j, where γ̃i and x∗i are the ith entry of γ̃ and
x∗, respectively. There holds x∗i = x
∗
j ⇔ γ̃i = γ̃j.
Proof. The map Fσ(s) is parametrised simply by the vector γσ(s). Under the stated
condition of C(s) = Cσ(s) ∈ K(γ̃), the map Fσ(s) is time-invariant. The result in
Theorem 5.2 is then used to complete the proof.
6.3.1 Extending the Results in Section 5.3
The “contraction-like” property and the subsequent results on an upper bound on
the social power at equilibrium and the convergence rate for a class of topologies, i.e.
Theorem 5.3, Corollary 5.2 and Lemma 5.2, are now extended to the case of dynamic
relative interaction matrices. Naturally, the results are slightly different due to the
dynamic topology, e.g. the upper bound result now applies to the entries of the
unique limiting trajectory x∗(s), s ≥ 0 as opposed to the fixed point x∗.
Theorem 6.3. Consider the system Eq. (6.4) and suppose that 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and
∃k ∈ I : xk(0) > 0. Suppose further that Assumptions 6.1 and 6.2 hold. Define
r̄j =
1− 2γ̄j
1− γ̄j
, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} (6.7)
where γ̄j = maxp∈P γp,j, P = {1, . . . , P} with P < ∞, and γp,j is the jth entry of the
dominant left eigenvector γ>p of Cp. Then, for any 0 < r ≤ r̄j and p ∈ P , there holds
xj = 1− r ⇒ Fp,j(x) < 1− r (6.8)
where Fp,j(x) is the jth entry of Fp(x) defined in Eq. (6.5).
Proof. The theorem is proved by checking that, for the given definition of r̄j, the result
in Theorem 5.3 holds separately for every map Fp, p ∈ P . In other words, for all i, p,
xi(s) = 1− r ⇒ Fp,i(x(s)) < 1− r , ∀ r ≤ r̄i.
Corollary 6.1 (Upper bound on x∗i (s)). Consider the system Eq. (6.4), and suppose 0 ≤
xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and ∃j ∈ Ixj(0) > 0. Then, there holds x∗i (s) < γ̄i/(1− γ̄i), ∀ s, where
γ̄j = maxp∈P γp,j, P = {1, . . . , P} with P < ∞, and x∗i (s) is the ith entry of the unique
limiting trajectory x∗(s).
Proof. The proof is a straightforward extension of the proof of Corollary 5.2.
Lemma 6.1 (Convergence Rate for Dynamic Topology). Let P = {1, . . . , P} with P <
∞. For all p ∈ P , suppose that Cp ∈ L where L = {Cp ∈ Rn×n : γp,i < 1/3, ∀ i} and
3A well-known set is K(1n/n), the set of n× n doubly-stochastic C.
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γp,i is the ith entry of γp. Then, there exists a finite s1 such that, for all s ≥ s1, the system
Eq. (6.4) contracts to its unique limiting trajectory x∗(s) with a convergence rate obeying
‖x∗(s)− x(s + 1)‖1 ≤ (2β̄− ε)‖x∗(s)− x(s)‖1 (6.9)
where β̄ = maxp∈P maxi∈I γp,i/(1 − γp,i) < 1/2 and ε is a sufficiently small positive
constant.
Proof. The proof is an extension of the proof of Lemma 5.2, recalling from the proof
of Theorem 6.1 that the Jacobian takes on the same form.
Remark 6.3 (Self-Regulation). Exponential convergence to a unique trajectory x∗(s) can
be considered from another point of view as the system Eq. (6.4) forgetting its initial con-
ditions at an exponential rate, and is a powerful notion. It implies that sequential dis-
cussion of topics combined with reflected self-appraisal is a method of “self-regulation" for
social networks, even in the presence of dynamic topology. Consider an individual i who
is extremely arrogant, e.g. xi(0) = 0.99. However, individual i is not likeable and others
tend to not trust i’s opinions on any issue, e.g. cji(s)  1 , ∀ j, s. Then, γi(s)  1 be-
cause γ(s)> = γ(s)>C(s) implies γi(s) = ∑j 6=i γj(s)cji(s). According to Corollary 6.1,
x∗i (s) ≤ γ̄i(1− γ̄i)−1, and γ̄i(1− γ̄i)−1 is extremely small. Thus, individual i exponenti-
ally loses his/her individual social power. An interesting future extension would be to expand
on the reflected self-appraisal by modelling individual behaviour. For example, one can con-
sider xi(s + 1) = φi(ζi(s)) where φi(·) is a smooth function that may capture arrogance or
humility of an individual when self-appraising his/her true social power ζi(s).
From the above results, one can also conclude that, for large s, any individual wanting to
have an impact on the discussion of topic s + 1 should focus on ensuring it has a large impact
on discussion of the prior topic s. This concept can be applied to Chapter 7.
6.4 Periodically Varying Topology
This section investigates the interesting, special case of periodically varying C(s)
which satisfies Assumption 6.2.
Motivation for Periodic Variations: Consider the example on issue-varying topology
in Section 6.1.1 of a government cabinet that meets to discuss the issues of defence,
economic growth, social security programs and foreign policy. Since these issues are
vital to the smooth running of the country, one expects the issues to be discussed
regularly and repeatedly. Regular meetings on the same set of issues for decision ma-
king/governance/management of a country or company then points to periodically
varying C(s), i.e., social networks with periodic topology.
The system Eq. (6.4), with periodically switching C(s), can be described by a
switching signal σ(s) of the form σ(0) = P, and for s ≥ 1, σ(Pq + p) = p,4 where
P < ∞ is the period length, p ∈ P = {1, 2, . . . , P} and q ∈ Z≥0 is any nonnegative
4Any given s ∈ S can be uniquely expressed by a given fixed positive integer P, a nonnegative
integer q, and positive p ∈ P , as shown.
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integer. Note that in general, Ci 6= Cj for i, j ∈ P and i 6= j. Theorem 6.1 immediately
allows one to conclude that the system Eq. (6.4) with periodic switching converges
exponentially fast to the system’s unique limiting trajectory x∗(s). This section’s key
contribution is to obtain additional, insightful information on the limiting trajectory,
including an observation that the limiting trajectory itself is periodic.
For simplicity, analysis begins with the assumption that P = {1, 2}, i.e., there
are two different C matrices, and the switching is of period 2. In the sequel, it will
be shown that analysis for P = {1, 2, . . . , P}, with arbitrarily large but finite P, is a
simple recursive extension on the analysis for P = {1, 2}. For the P = 2, one obtains
x(s + 1) =
{
F1(x(s)) if s is odd,
F2(x(s)) if s is even.
(6.10)
The periodic system is now transformed into a time-invariant system. Define a
new state z ∈ R2n (different to the differential transform δz employed in Sections 5.2
and 6.3 for nonlinear contraction analysis) as
z(2q) =
[
z1(2q)
z2(2q)
]
=
[
x(2q)
x(2q + 1)
]
. (6.11)
The evolution of z(2q) is studied for q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Note that
z(2(q + 1)) =
[
z1(2(q + 1))
z2(2(q + 1))
]
=
[
x(2(q + 1))
x(2(q + 1) + 1)
]
. (6.12)
In view of the fact that x(2(q + 1)) = F1(x(2q + 1)) and x(2(q + 1) + 1) = F2(x(2q +
2)) for any q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, it follows that
z(2(q + 1)) =
[
F1(x(2q + 1))
F2(x(2q + 2))
]
. (6.13)
Similarly, notice that x(2q + 1) = F2(x(2q)) and x(2q + 2) = F1(x(2q + 1)) for any
q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}. From this, for q ∈ {0, 1, 2, . . .}, one obtains
z(2(q + 1)) =
F1(F2(z1(2q)))
F2
(
F1(z2(2q))
) = [G1(z1(2q))
G2(z2(2q))
]
, (6.14)
with the time-invariant composition maps G1 = F1 ◦ F2 and G2 = F2 ◦ F1. Thus, one
can express the periodic system Eq. (6.10) as the nonlinear time-invariant system
z(2q + 2) = Ḡ(z(2q)), Ḡ = [G>1 , G
>
2 ]
> (6.15)
Theorem 6.4. There exists a unique periodic sequence x∗(s) for the system Eq. (6.10), with
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map Fp given in Eq. (6.5) for p = 1, 2, obeying
x∗(s) =
{
z∗1 if s is odd,
z∗2 if s is even,
(6.16)
where z∗1 ∈ int(∆n) and z∗2 ∈ int(∆n) are the unique fixed points of, respectively, G1
and G2, defined above Eq. (6.15). For all initial conditions 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and
∃ j ∈ I : xj(0) > 0, lims→∞[x(s)− x∗(s)] = 0n exponentially fast.
Proof. As mentioned above, one can immediately apply Theorem 6.1 to show that
lims→∞ [x(s)− x∗(s)] = 0n. This proof focuses on using the time-invariant transfor-
mation to show that x∗(s) has the properties described in the theorem statement.
Part 1: In this part, the map Gi, i = 1, 2 is proved to have at least one fixed point.
First, note that it was proved in Theorem 6.1 that the system Eq. (6.4), with initial
conditions 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i and for at least one j, xj(0) > 0, will have x(s) ∈ int(∆n)
for all s > 0, which implies that x∗(s) ∈ int(∆n). For p = 1, 2, Property 6.1 established
that Fp is continuous on ∆n. The composition of continuous functions is continuous,
which implies G1 = F1 ◦ F2 : ∆n 7→ ∆n and G2 = F2 ◦ F1 : ∆n 7→ ∆n are continuous.
The proof of Theorem 6.1 also showed that for all p, Fp ∈ Ā where Ā = {x ∈ ∆n :
1− r̄ ≥ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I} and r̄ is some small strictly positive constant. For the system
in Eq. (6.10) with p = 1, 2, it follows that F1(Ā) ⊂ Ā ⇒ F2(F1(Ā)) ⊂ Ā, which
implies that G1(Ā) ⊂ Ā. Similarly, G2(Ā) ⊂ Ā. Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem
then implies that there exists at least one fixed point z∗1 ∈ Ā such that z∗1 = G1(z∗1)
(respectively at least one fixed point z∗2 ∈ Ā such that z∗2 = G2(z∗2)) because G1
(respectively G2) is a continuous function on the compact, convex set A.
Part 2: In this part, it is proved that the unique limiting trajectory of Eq. (6.10)
obeys Eq. (6.16) and that z∗1 and z
∗
2 are the unique fixed point of G1 and G2, respecti-
vely. Let z∗1 be a fixed point of G1. Observe that z
∗
1 = F2(F1(z
∗
1)). Define z
∗
2 = F1(z
∗
1).
One has that z∗1 = F2(z
∗
2). Observe that F1(z
∗
1) = F1(F2(z
∗
2)), which implies that
z∗2 = F1(F2(z
∗
2)) = G2(z
∗
2). In other words, z
∗
2 is a fixed point of G2 (but at this stage, and
similarly for z∗1 , its uniqueness has not yet been proved).
Next, it will be established that the unique limiting trajectory is the periodic
sequence in Eq. (6.16). Recall that Theorem 6.1 yields the conclusion that all trajecto-
ries of Eq. (6.10) converge exponentially fast to a unique limiting trajectory x∗(s) ∈
int(∆n). It follows, from Eq. (6.15) and the definition of z(2q), that for all s ≥ 0,
Eq. (6.16) is a trajectory of the system Eq. (6.10); the critical point here is that Eq. (6.16)
holds for all s. Combining these arguments, it is clear that Eq. (6.16) is precisely the
unique limiting trajectory.
Last, it will be shown that z∗1 and z
∗
2 are the unique fixed point of G1 and G2,
respectively. To this end, suppose that, to the contrary, at least one of z∗1 and z
∗
2 is
not unique. Without loss of generality, suppose in particular that z′1 6=z∗1 is any other
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fixed point of G1. Then, z′2=F1(z
′
1) is a fixed point of G2, and
x(s) =
{
z′1 if s is odd,
z′2 if s is even,
(6.17)
is a trajectory of Eq. (6.10) that holds for all s ≥ 0, and is different from the trajectory
Eq. (6.16) because z′1 6= z∗1 . On the other hand, Theorem 6.1 implies that all trajectories
of Eq. (6.10) converge exponentially fast to a unique limiting trajectory, which yields
a contradiction. Thus, z∗1 and z
∗
2 are the unique fixed point of G1 and G2, respecti-
vely, and the system in Eq. (6.10) converges exponentially fast to the unique limiting
trajectory Eq. (6.16), which completes the proof5.
The generalisation is now provided for periodically switching topology C(s) =
Cσ(s), where σ(s) is of the form σ(0) = P, and for s ≥ 1, σ(Pq + p) = p. Here,
2 ≤ P < ∞, p ∈ P = {1, 2, . . . , P} and q ∈ Z≥0. The periodic DeGroot–Friedkin
model is described by
x(s + 1) =
{
FP(x(s)) for s = 0
Fp(x(s = Pq + p)) for all s ≥ 1.
(6.18)
A transformation of Eq. (6.18) to a time-invariant system follows a procedure
similar to the one detailed for P = 2 (in the signal processing and control literature,
this technique is sometimes referred to as “lifting”). A new state variable z ∈ RPn is
defined as
z(Pq) =

z1(Pq)
z2(Pq)
...
zP(Pq)
 =

x(Pq)
x(Pq + 1)
...
x(Pq + P− 1)
 , (6.19)
and the evolution of y(Pq) is studied for q ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. It follows that
zp(P(q + 1)) = x(P(q + 1) + p− 1) , ∀ p ∈ P .
Following the logic in the P = 2 case, but with the precise steps omitted, one obtains
z(P(q + 1)) =

FP−1(FP−2(. . . (FP(z1(Pq)))))
FP(FP−1(. . . (F1(z2(Pq)))))
...
FP−2(FP−1(. . . (FP(zP(Pq)))))
 = Ḡ(z(Pq)), (6.20)
5During the thesis examination process, an examiner has identified an alternative proof, which we
summarise here for the interested reader. The existence of x∗(s) was established in Theorem 6.1. Since
x(2s + 2) is also a trajectory, ‖x∗(2s + 2)− x∗(2s)‖ converges to 0 exponentially fast. From this, one
has that for any s ≥ 0 and k ∈ N, ‖x∗(s + 2k)− x(2s)‖ converges to 0 exponentially fast; that is x∗(2s)
is a Cauchy sequence in Ā, which must converge to a point, denoted as z∗1 . From Eq. (6.14), and
by continuity, z∗1 must be a fixed point of F1(F2(.)). A similar approach shows that x
∗(2s + 1) must
converge to a point, z∗2 , which must be a fixed point of F2(F1(.)).
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where Ḡ(z) = [G1(z1)>, G2(z2)>, . . . , GP(zP)>]>. This leads to the following gene-
ralisation of Theorem 6.4.
Theorem 6.5. There exists a unique periodic sequence x∗(s) for the system Eq. (6.18), with
map Fp given in Eq. (6.5) for p = 1, 2, . . . , P, which for any nonnegative integer q, obeys
x∗(Pq + p− 1) = z∗p, for all p ∈ {1, 2, . . . , P} (6.21)
where z∗p ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of Gp defined in Eq. (6.20). For all initial
conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0,
lims→∞[x(s)− x∗(s)] = 0n exponentially fast.
Proof. The proof is obtained by recursively applying the same techniques used in the
proof of Theorem 6.4. The detailed mechanical calculations are omitted.
This section is concluded by noting that Theorem 6.3, Lemma 6.1 and Corol-
lary 6.1 are all applicable to the periodic system Eq. (6.18) because Eq. (6.18) is just a
special case of the general switching system Eq. (6.4).
6.5 Simulations
In this section, simulations are provided to illustrate the key conclusions of this chap-
ter. To begin, a simulation for general switching topology is given, and then the spe-
cial case of periodically-varying topology is illustrated. The set of topologies is given
as C = {C1, . . . , C5}, i.e., P = {1, 2, . . . , 5}. The switching signal σ(s) is generated
such that for any given s, there is equal probability that σ(s) = p, ∀ p ∈ P . The
precise numerical forms of Cp are stated in Section 6.7.
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of individual social power over a sequence of
issues for the system as described in the above paragraph, initialised from an ar-
bitrarily chosen initial condition vector6, x̂(0) = [0.95, 0.95, 0.95, 0, 0, 0]>. For each
individual, with γ̄i = maxp∈P γp,i, it is computed that γ̄1 = 0.474, γ̄2 = 0.237, γ̄3 =
0.244, γ̄4 = 0.244, γ̄5 = 0.244, γ̄6 = 0.239. Note that ∑i γ̄i 6= 1 in general due to the
definition of γ̄i. Corollary 6.1 yields that x∗(s) ≤ [0.9, 0.311, 0.323, 0.323, 0.323, 0.314],
and this can be seen in Fig. 6.1. Since only γ̄1 > 1/3, it is observed that after the first
10 or so issues, only x∗1(s) > 0.5. That is, in the limit, only individual 1 may have
more than half the social power at some issue. Note that x∗4(s) > 0 for all s, although
for several issues, x∗4(s) is close to 0.
Figure 6.2 shows the system with a different arbitrarily selected vector of initial
conditions x̃(0) = [0.1, 0.325, 0, 0.8, 0.45, 0.7]> 6= x̂(0). Notice that for the initial con-
dition vector x̂(0) individuals 1, 2, 3 have large perceived social power x̂i(0) = 0.95,
while individuals 4, 5, 6 have x̂i(0) = 0. In contrast, for the other initial condition vec-
tor x̃(0), the perceived social power x̃i(0) is large for i = 4, 6 and small for i = 1, 2, 3.
Through sequential discussion and reflected self-appraisal, the initial conditions are
6The initial condition vector x̂(0) also illustrates the relaxed initial condition assumption.
§6.6 Conclusions 113
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S
el
f-
W
ei
gh
t, 
x i
(s
)
Issue, s
 
 Individual 1
Individual 2
Individual 3
Individual 4
Individual 5
Individual 6
Figure 6.1: Evolution of individuals’ social powers x(s) for initial condition vector x̂(0).
Viewed in conjunction with Fig. 6.2, it is clear that each individual i’s social power trajectory
xi(s) converges to x∗i (s) by about s = 10.
exponentially forgotten and both Fig. 6.1 and 6.2 show convergence to the same uni-
que limiting trajectory x∗(s) by about s = 10. This is highlighted in Fig. 6.3, which
displays the individual social powers of selected individuals 1, 3 and 6. The solid
and dotted lines correspond to initial condition vectors x̃(0) and x̂(0), respectively.
Simulations for periodically-varying topology are now presented. The period
is selected to be P = 4, with C3 = C4. That is, the switching signal is σ(s) =
[3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, 3, 3, 1, 2, . . .]. The matrices used are C1, C2, C3 given in Section 6.7. The
same two initial condition vectors x̂(0) and x̃(0) from the previous simulation are
used. The simulation result for x̂(0) is shown in Fig. 6.4. Fig. 6.5 shows a comparison
of the social power trajectory for select individuals 1,3 and 6, with the two different
vectors of initial conditions x̃(0) and x̂(0). It can clearly be seen that the initial
conditions are forgotten exponentially fast, and the unique limiting trajectory x∗(s)
is a periodic sequence.
Remark 6.4. It is worth noting that the unique limiting trajectory depends on the sequence
of switching topologies, i.e. the switching signal σ(s). For example, given the same Cp
in the periodically-varying topology simulation, but with a different switching signal (i.e.
ordering of C(s)), the unique limiting trajectory will also be different.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has extended the DeGroot–Friedkin model through the incorporation of
issue-varying, dynamic relative interpersonal interactions. The nonlinear contraction
analysis framework of Chapter 5 has been used to study the system with dynamic
114 Dynamic Social Networks: Exponential Forgetting of Perceived Social Power
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
S
el
f-
W
ei
gh
t, 
x i
(s
)
Issue, s
 
 Individual 1
Individual 2
Individual 3
Individual 4
Individual 5
Individual 6
Figure 6.2: Evolution of individuals’ social powers x(s) for initial condition vector x̃(0).
Viewed in conjunction with Fig. 6.1, it is clear that each individual i’s social power trajectory
xi(s) converges to x∗i (s) by about s = 10.
Figure 6.3: Evolution of selected individuals’ social powers xi(s), for i = 1, 3, 6. The trajectory
xi(s), for i = 1, 3, 6, beginning from the two different initial conditions, converges to the same
trajectory by about s = 10, which is precisely the unique limiting trajectory x∗i (s).
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Figure 6.4: Evolution of individuals’ social powers x(s) for initial condition vector x̂(0), with
periodically-varying topology. Clearly, x(s) becomes a periodic sequence by about s = 10.
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Figure 6.5: Evolution of selected individuals’ social powers xi(s): a comparison of different
initial condition vectors x̂(0) and x̃(0), with periodically-varying topology. The trajectory
xi(s), for i = 1, 3, 6, beginning from the two different initial conditions, converges to the
same periodic sequence x∗i (s) by about s = 10.
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topology, leading to the establishment of a general exponential convergence result.
This has been interpreted from the context of a social network discussing a sequence
of topics, where the DeGroot opinion process is coupled with the socio-psychological
mechanism of reflected self-appraisal. It is concluded that this results in every indivi-
dual forgetting his/her initial (perceived) social power exponentially fast. In the limit
of the topic sequence, the dynamics of each individual’s social power depends only
on the dynamically-varying topology associated with the topic sequence. An upper
bound on an individual’s limiting social power trajectory and the convergence rate
for a class of topologies has also been obtained. Last, the special case of periodically
switching topologies has been investigated in further detail.
6.7 Appendix: Simulation Parameters
The C used in the simulation are arbitrarily chosen by the author to illustrate the
results of this chapter. The matrices were not obtained from real-world networks.
C1 =

0 0 0 0 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0

, C2 =

0 0 0 0 1 0
0.8 0 0 0 0 0.2
0 0.1 0 0 0 0.9
0 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0

C3 =

0 0 0 0.2 0 0.8
0.3 0 0.7 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0.5 0
0 1 0 0 0 0
0.75 0 0 0.25 0 0
0 0 0 0 1 0

, C4 =

0 0 0 0 0.85 0.15
1 0 0 0 0 0
0 0.7 0 0.3 0 0
0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0
0 0 0.9 0 0 0.1
0 1 0 0 0 0

C5 =

0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5
0.9 0 0.1 0 0 0
0.9 0 0 0 0 0.1
0.9 0.1 0 0 0 0
0.9 0 0 0.1 0 0
0.9 0 0 0 0.1 0

.
Chapter 7
Modification of Social Dominance
in Autocratic Networks
Chapter Summary
The previous two chapters focused on establishing the properties of dynamics of
the individuals’ social powers, including convergence results. This chapter returns
to the original DeGroot–Friedkin model with constant relative interaction topology,
and considers a network modification problem. In particular, the star topology is
studied, because this special type of topology leads to a single individual (the centre
node of the star) accumulating all of the social power. Different strategies, via the
insertion of new individuals and/or new interpersonal relationships, are proposed
to modify the star topology so that the centre individual no longer has the largest
social power. Necessary and sufficient conditions on the strength of the new inter-
personal relationships are obtained for each strategy. Interpretations are provided in
the context of social networks, which leads to several insightful conclusions.
7.1 Introduction
In the study of dynamic complex networks (within which social networks are a sub-
field), one may focus on the temporal evolution of certain variables of interest (e.g.
opinions in influence networks) and on establishing graphical conditions or conditi-
ons on certain parameters associated with the nodes, which guarantee the variables
converge to some (perhaps desired) limiting configuration. Examples of such works
can be found in parts of Chapters 3, 5 and 6. For the DeGroot model, a strongly
connected and aperiodic influence network is sufficient for ensuring that opinions
converge to a consensus (see Section 2.3.1). Once convergence of the variables of
interest to a limiting configuration has been established, one may then be interested
in investigating how aspects of the network topology affect or determine the limiting
configuration. For example, in the DeGroot model, a certain left eigenvector of the
influence matrix W (along with the initial conditions) determines the final consen-
sus value, while the ith entry of this particular eigenvector can be considered as
the relative “impact” of individual i in the opinion discussion (see Remark 5.1 and
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Section 2.3.1). Logically, it follows that a topic of considerable interest is in the modi-
fication of the network topology to maximise a desirable (or minimise an undesirable)
property, e.g. the relative “impact” of a specific individual.
The number of works which consider network modifications are vast, and the
approach and objective depends on the context of the network and the dynamical
process being modelled (financial, epidemic, social or power grid); only a small se-
lection is presented here. In [Kempe et al., 2003], the most influential individual in
spreading ideas on a social network was identified. The optimal edge modification
of a network to minimise the spreading of a virus was studied in [Preciado et al.,
2014; Zhai et al., 2013]. [Wang et al., 2016] studied optimal node addition while
maintaining structural controllability. Systematic modification of the network struc-
ture to improve performance with respect to an objective function, e.g. reducing the
expected number of attacks arising from a terrorist network, was studied in [Mellon
et al., 2016]. Strategies for adding edges to reduce the influence of a new individual
in the DeGroot model framework were studied in [Amelkin and Singh, 2017], while
PageRank optimisation has been investigated in [Fercoq et al., 2013; Csáji et al., 2014].
According to French Jr. and Snyder, “leadership is the potential social influence
of one part of the group over another” [French Jr and Snyder, 1959]. From the
perspective of opinion dynamics, a leader can therefore be seen as an individual or a
group of individuals that has a disproportionate amount of control over the opinion
discussion process. In the context of social influence, one can therefore refer to a
leader/leader group as the socially dominant individual/group of individuals in the
network. The fact that social influence tends to accumulate with one individual or a
subgroup of individuals in a social network is reported empirically in [Friedkin, 2011]
and theoretically in [Jia et al., 2015]. This individual or subgroup is defined explicitly
by the interpersonal relationships in the network topology. Motivated by this concept
of social dominance/leadership, and using the DeGroot–Friedkin model to describe
the social power evolution in the network, this chapter considers modifications to the
network topology to cause social dominance to shift from one individual to another.
In particular, this chapter focuses on modifications to star graphs1, an example of
which is given in Fig. 7.1. Using this example figure for discussion, it was found
in [Jia et al., 2015] that for almost all initial values of the individuals’ social powers,
all of the social power accumulates with the centre individual 1. It was proved in
Chapter 5, Corollary 5.1 that for all non-star graphs, the equilibria in which one
individual holds all of the social power are unstable. Also, for a star graph, the
equilibria where an individual other than the centre individual holds all of the social
power are unstable. In other words, the star graph is the only topology type in which
an autocratic configuration (where a single individual holds all of the social power)
occurs for generic initial conditions. This provides the key motivation to investigate
modifications on the star graph.
In particular, this chapter will consider a number of basic modifications to the star
graph, which may be generalised in the future. Each modification involves the intro-
1As will be formally defined, a graph is said to have star topology if there exists a node vi, called
the centre node, such that every edge of the graph is either to or from vi.
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Figure 7.1: Star Topology with red centre node v1, with n = 7 total individuals.
duction of new individuals (nodes) and/or interpersonal interactions (edges) into the
star graph. Existing results indicate that the centre individual will no longer hold all
of the social power. However, if the perturbations away from a star topology are small
(e.g. the new edge weights are close to 0) then the centre individual will continue to
have a disproportionate amount of social power. This chapter derives necessary and
sufficient conditions in the form of explicit inequalities involving interpersonal inte-
raction strengths that ensure the centre individual is no longer the socially dominant
individual. I.e., conditions guaranteeing that some other identifiable individual will
have greater social power at equilibrium than the centre individual are obtained. The
results for each modification are discussed in its social context, which yields in each
case intuitive interpretation. In one case, it is identified that all new nodes should
attach onto the same non-star node in the star graph, rather than attach to different
non-star nodes. In other cases, it is identified that certain non-centre nodes need
to cooperate, by having all such nodes increase certain associated edge weights, in
order to change the social dominance.
7.1.1 Chapter Organization
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 7.2 defines the problem set-up and the
topology modifications to be studied. Section 7.3 presents conditions for each modi-
fication, and discusses their social implications. Illustrative simulations are given in
Section 7.4, with conclusions in Section 7.5. Proofs are given in Appendix Section 6.7.
7.2 Problem Set-up and Proposed Modification Strategies
A special topology in the context of the DeGroot–Friedkin model is the “star to-
pology”, whose definition was given in Definition 5.1, and repeated below for the
convenience of the reader. The topology is special because, for n ≥ 3 individuals
and generic initial condition, the set of all star graphs is the only set of network to-
pologies for which the individual at the centre of the star holds all of the social power in
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the limit of the issue sequence. This chapter investigates how additional nodes and/or
edges strategically connected to a star topology can change the social power at equilibrium,
x∗, and in particular to ensure that the centre individual no longer has the greatest
social power. To that end, definitions and existing results are now provided to aid in
describing the problem and the discussing of new results. To begin, an assumption
on the network topology and the DeGroot–Friedkin model dynamics are restated.
Note that the term “node” will be used interchangeably with “individual”.
Assumption 7.1. The graph G[C], with n ≥ 3 nodes, is strongly connected and no node vi
has a self-loop. Moreover, the relative interaction matrix C is row-stochastic.
The vector of social powers x(s) = [x1(s), . . . , xn(s)]> evolves as
x(s + 1) = F(x(s)), (7.1)
where the nonlinear map F(x) is defined as
F(x) =

ei if x = ei for any i
α(x)

γ1
1−x1
...
γn
1−xn
 otherwise
, (7.2)
with α(x) = 1/ ∑ni=1
γi
1−xi , andγ
> = [γ1, . . . , γn] is the dominant left eigenvector of
C, and ei is the ith canonical unit vector (see Section 2.1). For convenience, the follo-
wing definitions are restated. The n-simplex is ∆n = {x ∈ Rn : 0 ≤ x, 1>n x = 1}, and
define ∆̃n = ∆n\{e1, . . . , en} and int(∆n) = {x ∈ Rn : 0 < x, 1>n x = 1} as the simplex
excluding the corner points and the interior of the simplex, respectively.
Next, the definition of a star topology, and two convergence results (originally
from [Jia et al., 2015] and adjusted to incorporate new results presented Theorems 5.2
and 6.1, and Corollary 5.1) are stated
Definition 7.1 (Star topology). A strongly connected graph G[C] has star topology if ∃ a
node vi, called the centre node, such that every edge of G[C] is either to or from vi.
Lemma 7.1. Suppose that n ≥ 3, and suppose further that G has star topology, which
without loss of generality has centre node v1. Let G[C] satisfy Assumption 7.1. Then, for
the system Eq. (7.1) with initial condition satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ iI and for at least one
j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0, lims→∞ x(s) = e1 asymptotically.
Theorem 7.1. For n ≥ 3, consider the DeGroot-Friedkin dynamical system Eq. (7.1) with
G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Assume further that the graph G[C] does not have star
topology. Then,
(i) For all initial conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I ,
xj(0) > 0, the self-weight vector x(s) converges to x∗ exponentially fast as s → ∞,
where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point satisfying x∗ = F(x∗).
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(ii) There holds x∗i < x
∗
j if and only if γi < γj for any i, j, where γi is the i
th entry of the
dominant left eigenvector γ>. There holds x∗i = x
∗
j if and only if γi = γj.
(iii) The unique fixed point x∗ is determined only by γ, and is independent of x(0).
(iv) The fixed points ei, for all i ∈ I , are unstable equilibria of Eq. (7.1).
The following definitions of an autocratic network and a socially dominant indi-
vidual are introduced to aid future discussions.
Definition 7.2 (Autocratic Network). A social network is said to be an autocratic configu-
ration, with node vi being the autocrat, if x(s) = ei, for some s ≥ 0.
Definition 7.3 (Social dominance/leadership). Node vi is said to be the socially domi-
nant/leader node in the network if x∗i > x
∗
j for all j 6= i. In other words, at equilibrium, the
social power of individual i is greater than the social power of any other individual j 6= i.
Remark 7.1 (Autocratic tendency). Lemma 7.1 has an important social connotation. As
introduced in previous chapters, one can consider xi(0) as individual i’s estimate of i’s
social power when the social network is first formed, before any discussions occur. For any
initial estimate where no individual i believes xi(0) = 1 and at least one individual j has
xj(0) > 0, the star topology network with centre node v1 tends to the autocratic configuration
x∗ = e1. Recall from the proof of Theorem 6.1 that lims→∞ ζ(s) = x∗, where ζ>(s) is the
dominant left eigenvector of the influence matrix W(s) in the DeGroot opinion dynamics
for issue s, y(s, t + 1) = W(s)y(s, t) (see Section 5.1.1). Moreover, for any issue s, one
has that limt→∞ y(s, t) =
(
ζ>(s)y(s, 0)
)
1n. This implies that, for initial issues, opinion
discussion will occur with everyone contributing to the final consensus value. However, the
centre individual increasingly guides the outcome of discussions until, for s = ∞, there holds
ζ(s) = x∗ = e1, which implies that only the centre individual influences the final consensus
value for issue s.
The above material motivates the problem investigated in this chaper, which can
be considered as being embedded in the following objective
Objective 7.1. For a star graph G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1, investigate modifications
to the graph G[C] via the introduction of new nodes and/or new edges. In particular, given
a modified graph, conditions on the strength of edge weights cij should be identified which
guarantee that a selected individual vk has social dominance.
Remark 7.2. In [Jia et al., 2015], the constant entries cij of C are termed “relative interper-
sonal weights”, a term which is used throughout Part II. However, one can also consider cij
as the amount of relative “trust” individual i allocates to individual j. In other words, cij
captures the strength of a unidirectional interpersonal relationship.
This chapter focuses on comparing the social power of individuals within the
network at equilibrium, i.e. when s → ∞. The equilibrium value x∗i will therefore
be referred to as the social power of individual i when there is no ambiguity (as
opposed to the evolving xi(s) when s < ∞). In light of the above discussion, and in
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particular the social interpretation of Lemma 7.1 given in Remark 7.1, it is evident
that there is interest in studying star graphs and modifications to the star topology.
In particular, modifications are considered that turn a star Ḡ[C̄] into a non-star G[C]
via the introduction of new nodes (individuals) or edges (interpersonal relationships).
From Lemma 7.1 and Theorem 7.1, it immediately follows that x∗i < 1 for the original
centre node vi, but if the perturbation from star topology (caused by the new edges)
is small, one expects that vi remains socially dominant. What will be shown is that if
the interpersonal weights associated with these new edges exceed a given threshold,
the socially dominant node changes from vi to some other identifiable node.
To aid in the discussion and presentation of results, some node types are defined.
For a given star graph Ḡ[C̄], with centre node v1, all the other nodes are called subject
nodes in the sense that they are subjects to the autocrat centre node. As already noted,
this chapter will study how the autocracy of node v1 can be disrupted; this motivates
the definition of a new type of node. An attacker node is a node vj not in the original
star, which forms edges eji, eij with a subject node vi. In doing so, the graph Ḡ[C̄] is
modified to become G[C], which is no longer a star. As it will become apparent, the
weights cji and cij can modify/reduce the social power x∗1 of the centre node v1. In
other words, vj attacks the social dominance of v1. Note that two edges, eji, eij must be
formed to ensure that G[C] remains strongly connected. In the illustrative example
in Fig. 7.2, v1 is the centre node, while nodes vi, i = 2, ..., 7 are subject nodes, and
node v8 is the attacker node, forming edges e78, e87 with node v7. Actually, there are
a number of interesting ways to attack the social dominance of v1, and listed below
are some of the most important/fundamental methods, which will be considered in
this chapter. An example of each topology variation is provided in Fig. 7.2 to 7.6.
Topology 7.1 (Single Attack). Suppose that n ≥ 4. Suppose further that Ḡ[C̄] has star
topology, with v1 being the centre node, and with n − 2 subject nodes, vi, i = 2, ..., n − 1.
A single attacker node vn attaches to subject node vn−1 by forming edges en−1,n and en,n−1.
This forms the modified graph G[C].
Topology 7.2 (Coordinated Double Attack). Suppose that n ≥ 5. Suppose further that
Ḡ[C̄] has star topology, with v1 being the centre node, and with n− 3 subject nodes, vi, i =
2, ..., n− 2. Two attacker nodes vn−1 and vn attach to subject node vn−2 by forming the set
of edges {en−2,n−1, en−1,n−2, en−2,n, en,n−2}. This forms G[C].
Topology 7.3 (Uncoordinated Double Attack). Suppose that n ≥ 5. Suppose further
that Ḡ[C̄] has star topology, with v1 being the centre node, and with n − 3 subject no-
des, vi, i = 2, ..., n − 2. One attacker node vn−1 attaches to subject node vn−3 with ed-
ges en−3,n−1, en−1,n−3. A second attacker node vn attaches to subject node vn−2 with edges
en−2,n, en,n−2. This forms G[C].
Topology 7.4 (Two Dissenting Subjects). Suppose that n ≥ 4. Suppose further that Ḡ[C̄]
has star topology, with v1 being the centre node, n− 1 subject nodes vi, i = 2, ..., n. (There
are no attacker nodes). Subject nodes vn−1 and vn form edges en,n−1, en−1,n, forming G[C].
The following topology variation is motivated by the concept of a leadership group
where two leaders exist, and seek to maintain their collective social dominance.
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Topology 7.5 (Leadership Group). Suppose that G1[C1] and G2[C2] respectively have
n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 3 nodes, with node set V1 = {1, ..., n} and V2 = {n + 1, ..., n + m} respecti-
vely. Both G1 and G2 have star topology; the centre nodes for G1 and G2 are v1 and vn+1 re-
spectively. Let G[C] be the graph formed by merging G1 and G2 by insertion of the edges e1,n+1
and en+1,1. Nodes v1, vn+1 form a leadership group with subjects v2, ..., vn, vn+2, ..., vn+m.
Remark 7.3. Unlike Chapter 6, this chapter deals with the DeGroot–Friedkin model which
has a constant C for all issues s ∈ S . The topology changes detailed above are assumed
to have taken place before any discussion begins on issue s = 0. However, the exponential
convergence conclusion obtained in Chapter 6 implies that for any given non-star network,
there is a minimum convergence rate to the unique limiting trajectory x∗(s). Then, the results
in this chapter are applicable if the topology changes at a rate that is sufficiently slow when
compared to the minimum convergence rate of the network with dynamic topology.
In the next section, the above topological variations of the star graph are inves-
tigated. It is worth emphasising at this stage that, in Variations 7.1-7.3, it is useless
for an attacker node vn to attach to the centre node v1 instead of a subject node;
the topology remains a strongly connected star, and v1 continues to be an autocrat.
Note also that when new edges are introduced, it is assumed that each individual i
adjusts weights cij to ensure that the new C is row-stochastic. Take Topology Varia-
tion 7.5 as an example. Separately, the relative interaction matrix C1 (respectively C2)
associated with G1 (respectively G2) are assumed to be row-stochastic. The relative
interaction matrix C associated with G is also implicitly assumed to be row-stochastic
with zero diagonal. That is, it is assumed that after the addition of edges e1,n+1 and
en+1,1, adjustments are made to the original weights c1,j and cn+1,k to ensure C is
row-stochastic.
Remark 7.4 (Ordering of Social Power). Theorem 7.1 states that x∗ is uniquely deter-
mined by γ, and Corollary 5.2 gives an upper bound on x∗i given γi. On the other hand,
Statement (ii) of Theorem 7.1 states that the ordering of x∗i is consistent with the ordering
of γi. This chapter is interested in the ordering of individual social power, as opposed to the
precise values of social power, and this is reflected in Definition 7.3. By modifying the topo-
logy to affect the ordering of the γi, the work in this chapter can be considered as a problem in
modifying topology to affect the eigenvector centralities of the nodes in the graph. Remark 5.1
provides more details on the importance of eigenvector centrality in network science problems.
7.3 Results and Their Social Interpretations
The analysis of each topology variation is now presented, with necessary and suf-
ficient conditions established on the strength of the new relative interpersonal inte-
ractions (newly introduced edges) to ensure that individual 1 is no longer socially
dominant. The social interpretations of these conditions are then discussed. To aid
in presentation of the results and discussions, all proofs are deferred to the appendix
of this chapter, Section 7.6.
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Figure 7.2: Topology Variation 7.1 (Single Attacker) with n = 8, attacker nodes are green.
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Figure 7.3: Topology Variation 7.2 (Coordinated Double Attacker) with n = 9, attacker nodes
are green.
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Figure 7.4: Topology Variation 7.3 (Uncoordinated Double Attacker) with n = 9.
§7.3 Results and Their Social Interpretations 125
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
β2β1
Figure 7.5: Topology Variation 7.4 (Two Dissenting Subjects) with n = 7.
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Figure 7.6: Topology Variation 7.5 (Leadership Group) with n = m = 4.
7.3.1 Topology Variation 7.1: Single Attack
First, consider Topology Variation 7.1. The relative interaction matrix C(β) is
C(β) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1− β 0 0 . . . 0 β
0 0 0 . . . 1 0

, (7.3)
where β = cn−1,n ∈ (0, 1) is the influence2 exerted by the attacker node vn on subject
node vn−1. The following theorem details how the social power of each individual
changes as a function of β. The exact form of C for other Topology Variations are
provided in Appendix Section 7.6, as part of the proofs for the relevant results.
Theorem 7.2 (Single Attack). Consider a social network with Topology Variation 7.1, with
G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Suppose that the individual social power vector x(s) evolves
according to the DeGroot–Friedkin dynamics in Eq. (7.1), with initial conditions satisfying
0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0. Then, lims→∞ x(s) = x∗,
2If β = 0 or β = 1 then G is no longer strongly connected.
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where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of the map F(x) in Eq. (7.2), and the following
statements are true:
(i) For all values of β ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 , for all i 6= 1, n− 1, n and x∗n < x∗n−1
(ii) There holds 1) x∗1 > x
∗
i , ∀ i 6= 1 if and only if β < 1 − c1,n−1 = ∑
n−2
i=2 c1,i, or 2)
x∗n−1 > x
∗
i , ∀ i 6= n − 1 if and only if β > 1− c1,n−1. There holds x∗1 = x∗n−1 >
x∗i , ∀ i 6= 1, n− 1 if and only if β1 = 1− c1,n−1
(iii) There holds x∗n > x∗1 if and only if β > 1/(1 + c1,n−1).
Corollary 7.1 (Generalised Placement of Single Attacking Node). Suppose that instead
of attaching to subject node vn−1, attacker node vn can attach to any subject node vi, i ∈
{2, ..., n − 1} by forming edges en,i, ei,n. The lower bound on β = cn,i required to have
x∗i > x
∗
1 is minimised if vn attaches to vk where k = argmaxj∈{2,...,n−1} c1,j.
Topology Variation 7.1 is in fact a special case of Topology Variation 7.2, obtai-
ned by setting cn,n−2 = 0 and by removing node vn. The discussions on the social
interpretation of the above results are deferred to after the statement of results on
Variation 7.2, with discussions applicable to Variation 7.1 with minor adjustments.
7.3.2 Topology Variation 7.2: Coordinated Double Attack
Consider now Topology Variation 7.2. Let β1 = cn−2,n−1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn−2,n =
(0, 1) be the two adjustable interpersonal weights accorded to the two attackers by
subject vn−2. Because C is assumed to be row-stochastic, it is implied that β1 + β2 +
cn−2,1 = 1⇒ β1 + β2 < 1 because cn−2,1 > 0. The following results hold.
Theorem 7.3 (Coordinated Double Attack). Consider a social network with Topology
Variation 7.2, with G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Suppose that the individual social power
vector x(s) evolves according to the DeGroot–Friedkin dynamics in Eq. (7.1), with initial
conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0. Then,
lims→∞ x(s) = x∗, where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of the map F(x) in Eq. (7.2),
and the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 for all i 6= 1, n − 2, n − 1, n, and
x∗n, x∗n−1 < x
∗
n−2.
(ii) There holds 1) x∗1 > x
∗
i , ∀, i 6= 1 if and only if β1 + β2 < 1− c1,n−2 = ∑
n−3
i=2 c1,i, or 2)
x∗n−2 > x
∗
i , ∀, i 6= n− 2 if and only if β1 + β2 > 1− c1,n−2. There holds x∗1 = x∗n−2 if
and only if β1 + β2 = 1− c1,n−2.
(iii) There holds x∗n > x∗1 (respectively x
∗
n−1 > x
∗
1) if and only if β2 > (1− β1)/(1 +
c1,n−2) (respectively β1 > (1− β2)/(1 + c1,n−2) ).
(iv) There holds x∗n−1 < x
∗
n or x∗n−1 > x
∗
n if and only if β1 < β2 or β1 > β2 respectively.
If β1 = β2, then x∗n−1 = x
∗
n.
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Corollary 7.2 (Generalised Placement of Coordinated Double Attack). Suppose that
instead of attaching to subject node vn−2, attacker nodes vn−1, vn can attach to any subject
node vi, i ∈ {2, ..., n − 2} by forming the set of edges {en−1,i, ei,n−1, en,i, ei,n}. The lower
bound on β1 + β2 = cn−1,i + cn,i required to have x∗i > x
∗
1 is minimised if vn−1 and vn
attach to vk where k = argmaxj∈{2,...,n−2} c1,j.
The above results can be interpreted in the following social context. One con-
cludes from Statement (i) that subject node vi, for i ∈ {2, .., n− 3}, will never have
greater social power at equilibrium than the centre individual v1, regardless of how
β1, β2 change, i.e. x∗i < x
∗
1 . Moreover, the attacker nodes vn−1, vn will never have
greater social power than the subject node vn−2 to which it is attached.
Remark 7.2 states that cij can be considered the trust level accorded to individual
j by individual i. The key result is Statement (ii), which indicates that the combined
trust given to attackers vn−1 and vn by subject node vn−2 must exceed the combined
trust given to subjects v2, ..., vn−3 by centre node v1, in order for subject vn−2 to be-
come socially dominant. It is most interesting to note that it is only the sum of the
trust/interaction strength β1 + β2 that is relevant, and there is no requirement on the
individual magnitudes of β1, β2.
Corollary 7.2 delivers an intuitive, powerful, and socially relevant result. It states
that the attackers vn−1, vn should seek to form an interpersonal relationship with
the subject individual vk that individual v1 trusts the most. This minimises the required
amount of trust subject vk accords attacker vn before centre v1 loses social dominance.
Statement (iii) reveals that the attackers can also obtain social power greater
than the centre individual v1 if β1 and β2 exceed some lower bounding inequali-
ties. Specifically, the inequality, which if satisfied ensures that attacker vn has social
power greater than centre v1, simply involves the variables β1, β2 and c1,n−2. More-
over, there always exists a pair β1, β2, satisfying β1 + β2 < 1 (and thus maintaining
∑nj=1 cn−2,j = 1), which ensures both attacker individuals vn−1, vn have social power
greater than the centre v1. This is detailed in the proof in Section 7.6.2 and is desira-
ble from the view point of the two attacker individuals, because it indicates that it is
always possible to adjust the interpersonal interaction strengths of just β1 and β2 so
that x∗n−1 and x
∗
n are both greater than x∗1 .
Statement (iv) indicates that the ordering of the social powers x∗n−1 and x
∗
n de-
pends simply on the ratio β1/β2. Thus, attacker vn−1 will have greater social power
than attacker vn if subject vn−2 trusts vn−1 more than vn (β1 > β2) and vice versa.
7.3.3 Topology Variation 7.3: Uncoordinated Double Attack
Consider now Topology Variation 7.3, where two attackers attach onto two different
subject nodes. Define β1 = cn−3,n−1 ∈ (0, 1) and β2 = cn−2,n ∈ (0, 1), where cn−3,n−1
and cn−2,n are the relative interpersonal weights given to attacker vn by subject vn−2
and to attacker vn−1 by subject vn−3, respectively. The following result is available.
Theorem 7.4 (Uncoordinated Double Attack). Consider a social network with Topology
Variation 7.3, with G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Suppose that the individual social power
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vector x(s) evolves according to the DeGroot–Friedkin dynamics in Eq. (7.1), with initial
conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0. Then,
lims→∞ x(s) = x∗, where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of the map F(x) in Eq. (7.2),
and the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 4}, and x∗n−1 < x∗n−3
and x∗n < x∗n−2.
(ii) There holds x∗1 > x
∗
i for all i 6= 1 if and only if β1 < 1− c1,n−3 and β2 < 1− c1,n−2.
If β1 > 1 − c1,n−3 (respectively β2 > 1 − c1,n−2), then x∗n−3 > x∗1 (respectively
x∗n−2 > x
∗
1).
(iii) For i ∈ {1, 2}, there holds x∗n−2+i > x∗1 if and only if βi > 1/(1 + c1,n−4+i).
(iv) There holds x∗n−3 > x
∗
n−2 if and only if
1−β2
1−β1 >
c1,n−2
c1,n−3
⇔ c1,n−3cn−3,1 >
c1,n−2
cn−2,1
.
To reduce repetition, discussion is provided only to those results of Theorem 7.4
with social implications which differ significantly from those discussed previously
regarding Theorem 7.3.
The most interesting conclusion drawn arises from comparing Theorem 7.4 to
Theorem 7.3 (which concerns Topology Variation 7.2). With Topology Variation 7.2, it
is required that the sum of the trust values β1 + β2 exceed a lower bound for the centre
individual v1 to lose social dominance, and there are no separate lower bounding
inequalities for β1 or β2. With Topology Variation 7.3, the centre individual v1 loses
social dominance if and only if either β1 or β2 exceed their respective lower bounding
inequalities. Importantly, these two lower bounding inequalities are independent of
each other. This shows that a coordinated attack on the social dominance of the centre node
is more effective than an uncoordinated attack, an idea which is socially intuitive.
Moreover, from Statement (iii), it is clear that both attacker nodes have larger
social power than the centre node if and only if β1 > 1/(1 + c1,n−3) and β2 > 1/(1 +
c1,n−2), which implies that β1 + β2 > 1/(1+ c1,n−3) + 1/(1+ c1,n−2). From Statement
(iii) of Theorem 7.3, with Topology Variation 7.2, both attacker nodes have larger
social power than the centre node if and only if β2 > (1 − β1)/(1 + c1,n−2) and
β1 > (1− β2)/(1 + c1,n−2), which implies that β1 + β2 > 2/(2 + c1,n−2). Since both
1 + c1,n−2 and 1 + c1,n−3 are smaller than 2 + c1,n−2, it follows that 1/(1 + c1,n−3) +
1/(1 + c1,n−2) > 2/(2 + c1,n−2), which implies that a coordinated attack on the social
dominance of the centre node is also more efficient for the attackers, at least from the point
of minimising β1 + β2 required for both attackers to have greater social power than
the centre node.
7.3.4 Topology Variation 7.4: Two Dissenting Subjects
Topology Variation 7.4 is different from the ones studied above in the sense that
there are no attacker nodes. Instead, one can consider this variation as one where
two subjects form a relationship in dissent from the leader. Letting β1 = cn−1,n ∈ (0, 1)
and β2 = cn,n−1 ∈ (0, 1), analysis yields:
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Theorem 7.5 (Two Dissenting Subjects). Consider a social network with Topology Vari-
ation 7.4, with G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Suppose that the individual social power
vector x(s) evolves according to the DeGroot–Friedkin dynamics in Eq. (7.1), with initial
conditions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0. Then,
lims→∞ x(s) = x∗, where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of the map F(x) in Eq. (7.2),
and the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), there holds x∗i < x∗1 for all i 6= 1, n− 1, n.
(ii) There holds x∗n > x∗1 if and only if β1 > (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2) with β1 ∈ (0, 1).
There exists such a β1 ∈ (0, 1) only if β2 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i.
(iii) There holds x∗n−1 > x
∗
1 if and only if β2 > (1− c1,n−1)/(c1,n + β1) with β2 ∈ (0, 1).
There exists such a β2 ∈ (0, 1) only if β1 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i.
(iv) There holds x∗n < x∗n−1 if and only if β2 > β1c1,n + c1,n−1(c1,n − 1) or equivalently
β1 < (β2 + cn−1(1− c1,n))
Note that the inequality in Statement (ii) can be rewritten as β2 > (1 − c1,n −
β1c1,n−1)/β1 which, with β2 ∈ (0, 1), is satisfiable only if β1 > (1 − c1,n)/(1 +
c1,n−1). Similarly, the inequality in Statement (iii) is equivalent to β1 > (1− c1,n−1 −
β2c1,n)/β2 which, with β1 ∈ (0, 1), is satisfiable only if β2 > (1− c1,n−1)/(1 + c1,n).
The interpretation for Statement (ii), which gives conditions on subject node vn
having greater social power than centre node v1, is now discussed. A similar con-
clusion can be drawn for Statement (iii), which concerns subject node vn−1. State-
ments (ii) and (iii) are viewed as the key results for this specific topology variation.
In order to make the centre node v1 lose social dominance, the dissent subject nodes
vn−1 and vn must adopt a cooperative approach. From their definitions, one interprets β1
as the trust given by vn−1 to vn while β2 is the trust given by vn to vn−1. A necessary
condition for individual vn to have social power greater than centre node v1 is that
β2 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i. This means that not only must vn−1 trust vn sufficiently (as given
by the inequality β1 > (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2)), but individual vn must reciprocate by
ensuring that it trusts vn−1 sufficiently (β1 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i). Unless the two dissenting
nodes build a cooperative and sufficiently strong bilateral relationship, centre node v1
will remain socially dominant.
7.3.5 Topology Variation 7.5: Leadership Group
Last, Topology Variation 7.5 is considered. Here, the perspective shifts to the centre
node of a star. Specifically, this topology variation considers the case where two
star graphs are connected through the two centre nodes. The problem of interest is
to obtain conditions on the relative interactions which guarantee that the two centre
nodes continue to have greater social power than the subject nodes. With β1 = c1,n+1 ∈
(0, 1) and β2 = cn+1,1 ∈ (0, 1), the following result is obtained.
Theorem 7.6 (Leadership Group). Consider a social network with Topology Variation 7.5,
with G[C] satisfying Assumption 7.1. Suppose that the individual social power vector
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x(s) evolves according to the DeGroot–Friedkin dynamics in Eq. (7.1), with initial condi-
tions satisfying 0 ≤ xi(0) < 1, ∀ i ∈ I and for at least one j ∈ I , xj(0) > 0. Then,
lims→∞ x(s) = x∗, where x∗ ∈ int(∆n) is the unique fixed point of the map F(x) in Eq. (7.2),
and the following statements are true:
(i) For all β1 ∈ (0, 1) and for all β2 ∈ (0, 1) there holds x∗i < x∗1 and x∗k < x∗n+1 for
i ∈ {2, ..., n} and k ∈ {n + 2, ..., n + m}.
(ii) There holds x∗1 < x
∗
n+1 or x
∗
1 > x
∗
n+1 if and only if β2 < β1 or β2 > β1 respectively. If
β1 = β2, then x∗1 = x
∗
n+1.
(iii) For k ∈ {n + 2, ..., n + m} there holds x∗k > x∗1 if and only if cn+1,k(β1/β2) > 1. For
i ∈ {2, ..., n}, there holds x∗i > x∗n+1 if and only if c1,i(β2/β1) > 1.
Statement (i) indicates that the centre individuals’ social powers always remain
higher than their respective subjects from the original separate star graphs. State-
ment (ii) shows that the ratio of β1/β2 determines whether centre node v1 or centre
node vn+1 is socially dominant. Statement (iii) reveals a surprising and interesting
result on how leaders can cooperatively maintain collective social dominance over all
subject nodes. Let i ∈ {2, ..., n} and k ∈ {n + 1, ..., n + m}, and approach from centre
individual v1’s point of view. While x∗i < x
∗
1 is guaranteed from Statement (i), in
order to ensure that v1 has greater social power than subject vk (i.e. subjects of centre
individual vn+1), individual v1 must ensure that cn+1,k(β1/β2) < 1. This inequality
always holds, regardless of the value of cn+1,k < 1, if β1 = β2. That is, if the trust level
v1 accords to vn+1 is equal to the trust level vn+1 accords to v1, then regardless of the
magnitude of this trust, v1 has greater social power than all subject nodes including
the subjects of vn+1. Surprisingly, this holds even if cn+1,k  β1, β2. Yet such a result
is intuitive by considering β1/β2 as the ratio of the trust v1 places on vn+1 (and thus
indirectly the trust v1 places on subject vk via a directed path) versus the trust vn+1
places on v1 (and thus indirectly the trust subject vk places on v1 via a directed path).
7.4 Simulations
In this section, some basic simulations are provided to illustrate selected results de-
tailed in the previous section. First, the fundamental Topology Variation 7.1 is si-
mulated. The simulation considers a network with n = 8 individuals (including
the attacker individual). The top row of C is [0, 0.15, 0.15, 0.2, 0.05, 0.15, 0.3, 0]. Fi-
gure 7.7 shows the social power at equilibrium x∗i , as a function of β = c78, for select
individuals: centre individual v1, subject individuals v2 and v7, and the attacker v8.
As stated below Remark 7.3, for minor perturbations from β = 0, v1 continues to be
socially dominant. However, as β increases, x∗1 decreases while x
∗
7 and x
∗
8 increase.
Centre v1 loses social dominance when β > 0.7 (since c17 = 0.3) as stated in The-
orem 7.2, Statement (ii). Moreover, x∗2 < x
∗
1 and x
∗
8 < x
∗
7 for all values of β as in
Statement (i), and x∗8 > x
∗
1 when β satisfies the inequality in Statement (iii).
Next, Topology Variation 7.4 is studied, in particular to show the need for coope-
ration between two dissenting individuals in order to ensure that the centre node
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Figure 7.7: Simulation of Topology Variation 7.1 with n = 8, showing select individual
i = 1, 2, 7, 8’s social powers at equilibrium, x∗i as a function of the weight β, i.e. the relative
interpersonal weight accorded to v8 by v1. As β increases, x∗1 decreases. When β > 1− c17,
v1 is no longer the socially dominant individual in the network, as predicted by Theorem 7.2.
loses social dominance. The top row of C is [0, 0.1, 0.1, 0.2, 0.05, 0.05, 0.2, 0.3]. Fi-
gure 7.8 shows the social power at equilibrium x∗i , for selected individuals i =
1, 2, 7, 8, as a function of β1 = c78 when β2 = 0.49. Since β2 < ∑n−2i=2 c1,i, one can verify
that the necessary condition (the inequality on β2) in Theorem 7.5, Statement (ii) is
not satisfied. As a consequence, dissent subject v8 never achieves social power grea-
ter than centre v1 no matter how β1 varies because there does not exist a β1 ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying the required inequality β1 > (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2). Figure 7.9 shows the
same simulation scenario but now with β2 = 0.55 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i, which satisfies the
inequality condition on β2 in Statement (ii). One can see, and in accordance with
Theorem 7.5’s Statement (ii), that x∗8 > x
∗
1 when β1 > 0.93. From individual v8’s
perspective, this emphasises the need for c87 = β2 to be sufficiently large (i.e. v8 has
to trust v7 enough) before change to β1 = c78 should be contemplated.
7.5 Conclusions
This chapter addressed a network modification problem for star topologies, which
have the property that all social power accumulates with the centre individual. A
number of strategies have been proposed for modifying a star graph via the inser-
tion of new individuals and/or new interpersonal interactions. For each strategy,
necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained on the strength of the new interper-
sonal interactions required for a change in social dominance. These conditions are
interpreted from a social context, leading to several revealing conclusions. The Coor-
dinated Double Attack strategy is more efficient and effective than the Uncoordinated
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Figure 7.8: Simulation of Topology Variation 7.4 with n = 8, showing select individual
i = 1, 2, 7, 8’s social powers at equilibrium, x∗i as a function of the weight β1, i.e. the relative
interpersonal weight accorded to v8 by v7. In this instance, β2 < ∑n−2i=2 c1,i, which does not
satisfy the inequality on β2 in Statement (ii), Theorem 7.5. No matter how β1 varies, x∗1 > x
∗
i
for all i 6= 1.
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Figure 7.9: Simulation of Topology Variation 7.4 with n = 8, showing select individual
i = 1, 2, 7, 8’s social powers at equilibrium, x∗i as a function of the weight β1, i.e. the re-
lative interpersonal weight accorded to v8 by v7. In this instance, β2 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i, i.e. the
inequality on β2 in Statement (ii), Theorem 7.5 is satisfied. Thus, when β1 is sufficiently large
(see Statement (ii), Theorem 7.5), x∗1 < x
∗
8 and centre v1 is no longer the socially dominant
individual.
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Double Attack strategy. For the Dissenting Subjects strategy, cooperation among the
two dissenting individuals is a necessary condition for the centre individual to lose
social dominance. For the Leadership group, mutual trust between the two centre
individuals (i.e. the ratio of the interpersonal weights the two centre individuals ac-
cord to each other must be close to 1) is a necessary and sufficient condition for the
two centre individuals to maintain social dominance. All of the findings highlight
a unifying concept: increasing (or decreasing) one’s own social power is often only
possible by modifying connections in other parts of the network.
7.6 Appendix: Proofs
The proofs extensively use Theorem 7.1, Statement (ii), which states that x∗i > x
∗
j ⇔
γi > γj and x∗i = x
∗
j ⇔ γi = γj.
7.6.1 Proofs for Theorem 7.2 and Corollary 7.1
The expression γ> = γ>C, where C is given in Eq. (7.3), yields
γ1 =
n−2
∑
i=2
γi + (1− β)γn−1 (7.4a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 1, n (7.4b)
γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + γn (7.4c)
γn = βγn−1. (7.4d)
Statement (i) is obtained from Eq. (7.4b), where it is concluded that γi < γ1 because
c1i < 1 for all i 6= 1, n − 1, n, and from Eq. (7.4d), which allows one to conclude
that γn < γn−1 for all β ∈ (0, 1). For Statement (ii), substituting γn from Eq. (7.4d)
into Eq. (7.4c) yields γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + βγn−1. This is rearranged to obtain γ1 =
γn−1(1− β)/c1,n−1. Recalling that 0 < c1,n−1 and 0 < β < 1, it follows that γ1 < γn−1
if and only if β > 1− c1,n−1. Similarly, one can obtain that γ1 > γn if and only if
β < 1/(1 + c1,n−1), which proves Statement (iii). Corollary 7.1 is a generalisation of
Statement (ii) obtained by observing that argminj(1− c1,j) = argmaxjc1,j. 
7.6.2 Proofs for Theorem 7.3 and Corollary 7.2
For Topology Variation 7.2, the relative interaction matrix C is given by
C(β) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 0 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
1− (β1 + β2) 0 0 . . . 0 β1 β2
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 0

. (7.5)
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From γ>C = γ>, it follows that
γ1 =
n−3
∑
i=2
γi + (1− β1 − β2)γn−2 (7.6a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 2, n− 1, n (7.6b)
γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1 + γn−1 + γn (7.6c)
γn−1 = β1γn−2 (7.6d)
γn = β2γn−2. (7.6e)
Statement (i) is obtained from Eq. (7.6a) and Eq. (7.6d) and Eq. (7.6e), using the
same arguments as in the proof for Theorem 7.2. Regarding Statement (ii), substitute
Eq. (7.6d) and Eq. (7.6e) into Eq. (7.6c) and rearrange to obtain γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1/(1−
β1 − β2). The statement is then straightforwardly obtained. For Statement (iii), in
regards to γn, substitute γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1/(1− β1 − β2) into the right hand side of
Eq. (7.6e) to obtain γn = β2c1,n−2γ1/(1− β1 − β2). One can verify that β2 > (1−
β1)/(1 + c1,n−2) implies β2c1,n−2/(1− β1 − β2) > 1, which in turn implies γn > γ1.
The inequality that ensures γn−1 > γ1 can be similarly found. Observe that 1− β1 <
1, 1− β2 < 1 and 1 < 1 + c1,n−2. There must also hold β1 + β2 < 1. This implies that
for any value c1,n−2, there always exist β1, β2 which ensures γn−1 > γ1 and γn > γ1.
From Eq. (7.6d) and Eq. (7.6e), one has that γn−1/γn = β1/β2. Statement (iv) follows
immediately. Corollary 7.2 is a generalisation of Statement (ii) by observing that
argminj(1− c1,j) = argmaxjc1,j. 
7.6.3 Proof for Theorem 7.4
The equation γ>C = γ>, with C given by
C(β1, β2) =

0 c1,2 · · · c1,n−3 c1,n−2 0 0
1 0 · · · 0 0 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
1− β1 0 · · · 0 0 β1 0
1− β2 0 · · · 0 0 0 β2
0 0 · · · 1 0 0 0
0 0 · · · 0 1 0 0

, (7.7)
yields γ1 = (1− β1)γn−3 + (1− β2)γn−2 + ∑n−4i=2 γi, along with the equalities:
γi = ciγ1, i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 4} (7.8a)
γn−3 = c1,n−3γ1 + γn−1 (7.8b)
γn−2 = c1,n−2γ1 + γn (7.8c)
γn−1 = β1γn−3 (7.8d)
γn = β2γn−2 (7.8e)
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From (7.8a), since c1,i ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n − 4}, it follows that γi < γ0
for all i ∈ {2, . . . , n− 4}. From (7.8d) and (7.8e), since β1, β2 ∈ (0, 1), it follows that
γn−1 < γn−3 and γn < γn−2. Thus, Statement (i) is true.
From (7.8b) and (7.8d), one has that γn−3γ1 =
c1,n−3
1−β1 , which implies that γ1 > γn−3 if
and only if β1 < 1− c1,n−3. Similarly, from (7.8c) and (7.8e), one has that γ1 > γn−2 if
and only if β2 < 1− c1,n−2. One then concludes that for i ∈ {1, 2}, if βi > 1− c1,n−4+i,
then x∗n−4+i > x
∗
1 . Therefore, Statement (ii) is true.
From (7.8b) and (7.8d), one obtains that γn−1γ1 =
β1c1,n−3
1−β1 . It follows that γn−1 > γ1 if
and only if β1 > 1/(1 + c1,n−3). Similarly, from (7.8c) and (7.8e), one concludes that
γn > γ1 if and only if β2 > 1/(1 + c1,n−2). Thus, Statement (iii) is true.
Since γn−3γ1 =
c1,n−3
1−β1 and
γn−2
γ1
=
c1,n−2
1−β2 , it follows that γn−3(1− β1)/c1,n−3 = γn−2(1−
β2)/c1,n−2, which implies that
γn−3
γn−2
=
c1,n−3(1−β2)
c1,n−2(1−β1) . Then, γn−3 > γn−2 if and only if
1−β2
1−β1 >
c1,n−2
c1,n−3
. Therefore, Statement (iv) is true.
7.6.4 Proof for Theorem 7.5
For Topology Variation 7.4, the relative interaction matrix C is expressed as
C(β1, β2) =

0 c12 c13 . . . c1,n−1 c1,n
1 0 0 . . . 0 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
1− β1 0 0 . . . 0 β1
1− β2 0 0 . . . β2 0
 , (7.9)
where β1 = cn−1,n and β2 = cn,n−1. The expression γ>C = γ> yields
γ1 =
n−2
∑
i=2
γi + (1− β1)γn−1 + (1− β2)γn (7.10a)
γi = c1iγ1, ∀ i 6= 1, n− 1, n (7.10b)
γn−1 = c1,n−1γ1 + β2γn (7.10c)
γn = c1,nγ1 + β1γn−1. (7.10d)
Again, Statement (i) is obtained trivially from Eq. (7.10b). Substitute Eq. (7.10c) into
Eq. (7.10d) and rearrange for γn to obtain
γn =
(
c1,n + β1c1,n−1
1− β1β2
)
γ1, (7.11)
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and it follows that γn > γ1 is implied by
c1,n + β1c1,n−1 > 1− β1β2 (7.12)
β1 >
1− c1,n
c1,n−1 + β2
(7.13)
β2 >
1− c1,n − c1,n−1β1
β1
. (7.14)
Consider Eq. (7.13). Observe that (1− c1,n)/(c1,n−1 + β2) ≥ 1 ⇔ 1− c1,n − c1,n−1 ≥
β2 ⇔ ∑n−2i=2 c1,i ≥ β2. Recalling that β1 ∈ (0, 1), one concludes that γn > γ1 is possible
only if β2 > ∑n−2i=2 c1,i. Alternatively, one can consider Eq. (7.14) and similarly derive
that γn > γ1 if β2 > (1− c1,n − β1c1,n−1)/β1 and β1 > (1− c1,n)/(1 + c1,n−1). The
inequality conditions for ensuring γn−1 > γ1 are derived in a similar manner.
7.6.5 Proof for Theorem 7.6
The relative interaction matrix for Topology Variation 7.5 is given by
C(β1, β2) =

0 c12 c13 . . . β1 0 . . . 0
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . 0
β2 0 0 . . . 0 cn+1,n+2 . . . cn+1,n
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 0 . . . 1 0 . . . 0

(7.15)
And the expression γ>C = γ> yields the following equalities
γ1 = ∑
1<i≤n
γi + β2γn+1 (7.16a)
γi = c1,iγ1, ∀ i ∈ {2, ..., n} (7.16b)
γn+1 = ∑
n+1<i≤n+m
γi + β1γ1 (7.16c)
γi = cn+1,iγn+1, ∀ i ∈ {n + 2, ..., n + m} (7.16d)
Statement (i) is obtained trivially from Eq. (7.16b) and Eq. (7.16d). In regards to
Statement (ii), first substitute Eq. (7.16b) into Eq. (7.16a) to obtain γ1 = β2γn+1 +
∑1<i≤n c1,iγ1 which is rearranged to yield γ1(1−∑1<i≤n c1,i) = β2γn+1, and which is
equivalent to β1γ1 = β2γn+1 because 1−∑1<i≤n c1,i = β1. Statement (iii) is obtained
by substituting γ1 = β2γn+1/β1 into Eq. (7.16d).
Chapter 8
Nonlinear Mapping Convergence
and Application to Social Power
Analysis
Chapter Summary
This chapter considers the original DeGroot–Friedkin model. Recently, a nonlinear
mapping convergence result was developed using Lefschetz fixed point theory; a
map can be shown to have a unique fixed point that is locally exponentially stable
if the Jacobian evaluated at any fixed point satisfies a certain property. This result is
used to analyse the DeGroot–Friedkin model, allowing an exponential convergence
result to be established using a tool different to the nonlinear contraction analysis
employed in Chapters 5 and 6.
It must be noted that both the general result and the application to the DeGroot–
Friedkin model will appear in the same conference paper at the 2018 European Con-
trol Conference (see page vii, paper [10]). The general result was developed by B. D.
O. Anderson, and will be presented in Section 8.2. The application to the DeGroot–
Friedkin model was the work of the author, and will thus be presented separately.
8.1 Introduction
Recursive equations of the form
x(k + 1) = F(x(k)), (8.1)
are fundamental to control and signal processing. Very often F is linear or affine,
but this is not always so and as a result, established linear system theory techniques
cannot be applied. However, and as is the case in this chapter, F is often suitably
smooth. Usually also, x(k) resides in a Euclidean space of known dimension, though
this is not always the case, and indeed will not always be the case in the problem
considered in this chapter.
In many situations, it is possible to examine local behaviour of the nonlinear map
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F in Eq. (8.1) around an equilibrium point, through a linearisation process. If x̄ is an
equilibrium point, i.e. a fixed point of the mapping F satisfying x̄ = F(x̄), then the
Jacobian J(x̄) = ∂F∂x |x̄ can often provide guidance as to behaviour in the vicinity of x̄.
If ‖x(k)− x̄‖ is small, for some norm ‖ · ‖, then approximately
x(k + 1)− x̄ = J(x̄)[x(k)− x̄] (8.2)
If the eigenvalues of J(x̄) do not lie on the unit circle, then the asymptotic stability or
instability of the linear equation Eq. (8.2) implies the same property for the nonlinear
equation Eq. (8.1), albeit locally.
The DeGroot–Friedkin model, introduced in [Jia et al., 2015] and studied in Chap-
ters 5–7 thus far, is what amounts to a particular version of Eq. (8.1). [Jia et al., 2015]
established by two different sets of rather specialised calculations, tailored to the
specific algebraic form of F, that under normal circumstances, the system Eq. (8.1)
(i) possesses a unique fixed point for the map F, and (ii) the equilibrium is globally
asymptotically stable. Chapter 5 used nonlinear contraction theory to obtain an ex-
ponential convergence result, again exploiting the specific algebraic form of F. In
that instance, the specific algebraic form of F was used to find the expression of J(x)
over the entire state-space, and from this expression of the Jacobian, a differential
coordinate transform was introduced to establish a contractive property.
It is natural to speculate whether the conclusion that there is a single attractive
equilibrium is indeed intrinsic to the algebraic form of F, or whether rather, it is
a consequence of some more general property, and consequently also one that will
follow for a whole class of F of which that in the DeGroot–Friedkin model is just
a special case. It turns out that this conclusion is indeed a consequence of a more
general property. The recent paper [Anderson and Ye, 2018] showed, using Lefschetz
fixed point theory, that if a system of the form Eq. (8.1) acting on a positive invariant
set (with the set satisfying some further topological conditions) has at least one fixed
point and the Jacobian at every fixed point has eigenvalues inside the unit circle, then
the map F has a unique fixed point and Eq. (8.1) is locally exponentially stable about
that point. This chapter shows that the DeGroot–Friedkin model has a map F which
is in the larger class of maps for which the result in [Anderson and Ye, 2018] holds.
By way of brief background, Lefschetz fixed point theory (of which more de-
tails are summarised subsequently) is a tool for relating the local behaviour of maps
to some global properties, taking into account the underlying topological space in
which the maps act. The local properties are associated with the linearised equations
Eq. (8.2), potentially studied at multiple equilibrium points (and with in general a
different J(x̄) associated with each equilibrium point). Such local properties were
flagged in Chapters 5 and 6 as of central concern in, respectively, a time-invariant
and a time-varying version of the DeGroot–Friedkin model.
To sum up the contribution of this chapter, an exponential convergence result is
established for the DeGroot–Friedkin model using a recently developed nonlinear
mapping convergence result. The analysis method avoids the detailed calculations
required in [Jia et al., 2015] and Chapter 5 to establish uniqueness and attractiveness
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of the equilibrium, by only requiring evaluation of the Jacobian at each fixed point of
the map (assuming at least one fixed point exists); uniqueness and local exponential
stability are guaranteed if the Jacobian at each fixed point satisfies a certain property.
8.1.1 Chapter Organization
In the remaining part of this chapter, Section 8.2 reviews a recently developed non-
linear mapping result, and Section 8.3 shows how this result may be applied to the
DeGroot–Friedkin model. Conclusions are drawn in Section 8.4.
8.2 A General Nonlinear Mapping Convergence Result
8.2.1 Background on Lefschetz Fixed Point Theory
Lefschetz fixed-point theory applies to smooth maps F : X → X where X is a com-
pact oriented manifold [Guillemin and Pollack, 2010; Hirsch, 2012] or a compact
triangulable space [Armstrong, 2013] 1. Thus X = Rn is excluded, but if X is a com-
pact subset of Rn such as a simplex, then it is allowed. This also means that if a map
F : Rn → Rn is known to have no fixed points for large values of its argument, the
theory can often be applied by considering the restriction of F to a compact subset
of Rn, such as a ball of large enough radius for which F in Eq. (8.1) needs to be
positively invariant.
Lefschetz fixed-point theory involves derivatives. Any smooth map has the pro-
perty that at any point x ∈ X, there is a linear derivative mapping, call it dFx, and
if X looks locally like Rm, then the derivative map can be represented by the m×m
Jacobian matrix in the local coordinate basis.
Interest is centred for the purposes of this chapter on those maps which have a
finite number of fixed points (including possibly zero) in X, though of course, maps
with an infinite set of fixed points exist, for example F(x) = x, i.e. the identity map.
A fixed point x is called a Lefschetz fixed point of F if the eigenvalues of dFx are unequal
to 1. A fixed point being a Lefschetz fixed point is sufficient but not necessary to
ensure that x is an isolated fixed point of F, i.e. there is an open neighbourhood
around x in which no other fixed point occurs. Because X is compact, and if it
is known that all fixed points of F are isolated, say because they are all Lefschetz
fixed points, it easily follows that the number of fixed points is necessarily finite.
For completeness, an argument by contradiction is recorded, which seems standard.
If there were an infinite number of fixed points, xi, i = 1, 2, . . . , compactness of X
implies there is a convergent subsequence xi1, xi2, . . . , with limit point x̄, and again
by compactness x̄ ∈ X. Now F is continuous so F(xij) → F(x̄) since xij → x̄ as
j→ ∞. Then xij − F(xij)→ x̄− F(x̄) as j→ ∞. Since xij − F(xij) = 0 ∀j, it is evident
1The notion of orientation of a manifold is described in the references; roughly, a manifold is oriented
if one can attach an infinitesimal set of coordinate axes to an arbitrary point on the manifold, and then
move the point with the axes attached knowing that one can never move to reverse the orientation. A
Möbius strip is not an oriented manifold.
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that x̄ is a fixed point of F. However, being a limit point it is not isolated, hence the
contradiction.
The Lefschetz property holding at a particular fixed point x also implies that at
the point x, the (linear) mapping Im − dFx is an isomorphism of the tangent space
Tx(X) at x. If it preserves orientation, then its determinant is positive, while if it
reverses orientation, its determinant is negative. The local Lefschetz number of F at a
fixed point x, written Lx(F), is defined as +1 or −1 according as the determinant of
Im − dFx is positive or negative.2
The map F is termed a Lefschetz map if and only if all its fixed points are Lefschetz
fixed points (and there are then, as noted above, a finite number of fixed points). The
Lefschetz number of F, written L(F), is defined as
L(F) = ∑
F(x)=x
Lx(F) (8.3)
There is an alternative definition of the Lefschetz number not provided here
which can be shown to be equivalent to that appearing here, based on topologi-
cal considerations, and provided in [Hirsch, 2012; Guillemin and Pollack, 2010]. It
is not restricted to maps with a finite number of fixed points. Moreover, using this
alternative definition, one sees that L(F) is a homotopy invariant3, and this particu-
lar property does not require limitation to those maps with a finite number of fixed
points. Further, the alternative approach yields a connection between the Lefschetz
number of the identity map (which has an infinite number of fixed points) and anot-
her topological invariant of the underlying space X, viz the Euler characteristic4,
[Hirsch, 2012; Guillemin and Pollack, 2010; Matsumoto, 2002].
The key result (see e.g. [Hirsch, 2012] for the case of a compact oriented manifold
and [Armstrong, 2013] for the case of a compact triangulable space) is as follows:
Theorem 8.1. The Lefschetz number of the identity map Id : X → X where X is a compact
oriented manifold or a compact triangulable space is χ(X), the Euler characteristic of X.
A key consequence of this theorem is that if a map F is homotopically equivalent
to Id, i.e. if there exists a smooth map H : X × I → X such that H(x, 0) = F(x) and
H(x, 1) = Id(x) = x then
L(F) = χ(X) (8.4)
Hence one has the following theorem:
2Reference [Guillemin and Pollack, 2010] uses dFx − Im rather than Im − dFx, which is used by
[Hirsch, 2012]. The latter form is what is required.
3Smooth maps F : X → X and G : X → X are said to be homotopic if there exists a smooth map
H : X × I → X × I with H(x, 0) = F(x), and H(x, 1) = G(x). Saying L(F) is a homotopy invariant
means L(F) = L(G) for any G which is homotopic to F.
4The Euler characteristic is an integer number associated with a topological space, including a space
that in some sense is a limit of a sequence of multidimensional polyhedra, e.g. a sphere, and a key
property is that distortion or bending of the space leaves the number invariant. Euler characteristics
are known for a great many topological spaces.
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Theorem 8.2 (Specialisation of Lefschetz–Hopf Theorem). Let X be a compact oriented
manifold or a compact triangulable space, and suppose F : X → X is a Lefschetz map, i.e.
there are a finite number of fixed points at each of which Im − dFx is an isomorphism, and is
homotopically equivalent to the identity map. Then there holds
L(F) = ∑
F(x)=x
Lx(F) = χ(X) (8.5)
where Lx(F) is +1 or −1 according as det(Im − dFx) has positive or negative sign, and
χ(X) is the Euler characteristic of X.
8.2.2 A General Convergence Result
The general result established in [Anderson and Ye, 2018] will now be presented. It
is assumed throughout this subsection that a mapping F has at least one fixed point
(this perhaps being established by a standard fixed point result, e.g. Brouwer Fixed
Point Theorem, [Guillemin and Pollack, 2010; Hirsch, 2012]). The result will establish
that certain properties of the mapping F and the associated space X guarantee that
F has a unique fixed point and the system Eq. (8.1) is locally exponentially stable
about the unique fixed point. The main result, proved using the Lefschetz theory, is
as follows.
Theorem 8.3. Consider a smooth map F : X → X where X is a compact, oriented and
convex manifold or a convex triangulable space of arbitrary dimension. Suppose that the
eigenvalues of dFx have magnitude less than 1 for all fixed points of F. Then F has a unique
fixed point, and in a local neighborhood about the fixed point, Eq. (8.1) converges to the fixed
point exponentially fast.
Proof. Observe first that the compactness and convexity properties of X guarantee it
is homotopy equivalent to the unit m-dimensional disk Dm and accordingly then ho-
motopy equivalent to a single point. This means that χ(X) = 1, see e.g. [Matsumoto,
2002, pp. 140].
Next, observe that, because X is convex, H = tId + (1− t)F which maps x to
tx + (1− t)F(x), is a mapping from X to X for every t ∈ [0, 1] and the smoothness
properties of H (which come from the smoothness of F and the specific dependence
on t) then guarantee that F and Id are homotopically equivalent. By Theorem 8.2,
there holds
L(F) = 1 (8.6)
Now for any real matrix A ∈ Rm×m for which the eigenvalues are less than one in
magnitude, it is easily seen that the matrix Im − A has eigenvalues all with positive
real part, from which it follows that the determinant of Im − A is positive, since the
determinant is equal to the product of the eigenvalues. Hence for any fixed point x
of F, one observes by identifying A with dFx that there necessarily holds Lx(F) = 1.
By Eq. (8.3) and Eq. (8.6), it follows that 1 = ∑F(x)=x 1, or that there is precisely one
fixed point.
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Convergence of Eq. (8.1) to the unique fixed point from any initial value in its re-
gion of attraction is necessarily exponentially fast. In a neighbourhood D around the
unique fixed point, the eigenvalue property of dFx guarantees exponential conver-
gence. The region of attraction for the fixed point is in most instances larger than D,
and one denotes as U ⊂ X an arbitrary compact space within the region of attraction,
and containing D. For any initial x ∈ U , the sequence x, F(x), F(F(x)), . . . converges
to the neighbourhood D in a finite number of steps, and because the set U is com-
pact, there is a number of steps, N̄ < ∞ say, such that from all initial conditions in
U , the neighbourhood is reached in no more than N̄ steps. The finiteness of N̄ then
implies that exponentially fast convergence occurs ∀ x(0) ∈ U .
Remark 8.1. The proof of the theorem using Lefschetz ideas will clearly generalise in the
following way. Suppose that F is homotopic to the identity and X is not homotopic to the
unit ball, while all fixed points are Lefschetz with the property that Im − dFx has positive
determinant. Then the number of fixed points will be χ(X), and Eq. (8.1) will have χ(X)
locally exponentially stable equilibria. If for example F mapped S2 to S2 (i.e. the unit sphere
embedded in three-dimensional Euclidean space) and never mapped a point to its antipodal
point, i.e. there was no x for which F(x) = −x, it will be homotopic to the identity map and
then there will be two fixed points, since χ(S2) = 2. To construct the homotopy, observe that,
because of the exclusion that F can map any point to an antipodal point, there is a well-defined
homotopy provided by
H(x, t) =
(1− t)x + tF(x)
‖(1− t)x + tF(x)‖2
8.3 Application to the DeGroot-Friedkin Model
The above results are now applied to the DeGroot–Friedkin model. For simplicity,
consider networks with n ≥ 3 individuals. The model itself was introduced in Chap-
ter 5 and its properties (including convergence) studied in Chapters 5 through 7.
Thus, no further details about the model itself will be presented, though the map F
in question is presented again, for convenience, and its properties discussed below.
F(x) =

ei if x = ei for any i
α(x)

γ1
1−x1
...
γn
1−xn
 otherwise
(8.7)
with α(x) = 1/ ∑ni=1
γi
1−xi where the vector γ = [γ1, γ2, . . . , γn]
> is constant, has
strictly positive entries γi ≤ 1/2 and satisfies γ>1n = 1. It can be verified that
F : ∆n → ∆n where ∆n = {xi : ∑ni xi = 1, xi ≥ 0} is the n-dimensional unit simplex
(see Section 2.1). Thus, ∆n satisfies all the requirements on compactness, orientability,
and convexity. Moreover, F is smooth everywhere on ∆n, including at the corners
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xi = 1, even given the 1/(1− xi) term in the ith entry of F; it was shown in the proof
of Corollary 5.1 that F is of class C∞ in ∆n. It was also proved in Chapter 5 (and
also in [Jia et al., 2015]) that there are no fixed points of F for which there exists a j
such that xj = 0, other than the corners of the simplex at x = ek, k = 1, . . . , n. These
corners were proved to be unstable fixed points unless γi = 1/2 (there can only be
one entry of γ equal to 1/2 because n ≥ 3 and γk > 0 for all k), see Corollary 5.1.
The case of γi = 1/2 occurs only for star graphs, which are not considered in this
chapter.
One should also take note of the important point that the above definition Eq. (8.7)
of F can be regarded as defining a map Rn → Rn, or as defining a map on an
(n− 1)-dimensional triangulable space ∆n → ∆n, with the n-dimensional vector x =
[x1, x2, . . . , xn]> providing a convenient parametrization of the space given imposition
of the constraints ∑ni=1 xi = 1, xi ≥ 0.
8.3.1 Existing Results
Before presenting the application of Theorem 8.3 to the DeGroot–Friedkin model, a
quick recapitulation of the existing results on the DeGroot–Friedkin model (including
those in the previous chapters of this thesis) are provided here to better contextualise
the result in this chapter.
In the paper [Jia et al., 2015], which first proposed the DeGroot–Friedkin model,
the following analysis was provided. First, because F is continuous and ∆n is convex
and compact, Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem is used to conclude there exists at least
one interior fixed point. Next, [Jia et al., 2015] used a series of inequality calculations,
exploiting the algebraic form of F, to show that the fixed point x̄ is unique, and
importantly, that x̄ is in the interior of ∆n. Following this, the authors showed using
a separate set of complicated calculations that the trajectories of x(k) had specific
monotone properties, again by exploiting the algebraic form of F. Last, a Lyapunov
function is proposed and the properties of the trajectories of x(k) are used to show
the Lyapunov function is nonincreasing; LaSalle’s Invariance Principle is used to
conclude asymptotic convergence to the unique interior fixed point x̄ for all initial
conditions x(0) that are not a corner of the simplex ∆n.
Chapter 5 takes a different approach, and looks at the Jacobian of F both as a map
Rn → Rn and its restriction (after choice of an appropriate coordinate basis for ∆n)
as a map ∆n → ∆n. (Note that in any fixed coordinate basis, the second Jacobian is of
dimension (n− 1)× (n− 1), with the two Jacobians necessarily related, as described
further below. It is this second Jacobian which represents the mapping dFx defined
in earlier sections.) However, rather than employing Theorem 8.3, Chapter 5 uses
nonlinear contraction analysis. A differential transformation is introduced, with the
transformation exploiting the algebraic form of F (and specifically the form of the
relevant Jacobian). More importantly, that chapter studies the Jacobian over all values
of x in the state-space (in that instance, x was in the interior of ∆n). As will be
apparent, application of Theorem 8.3 requires evaluation of the mapping dFx only at
the fixed points of F (which are not assumed to be unique). Chapter 5 concludes by
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showing that the 1-norm of the transformed Jacobian is less than one via a nontrivial
calculation, and thus exponential convergence to a unique fixed point is ensured, for
all x(0) not at the corners of the simplex ∆n.
8.3.2 Proof of a Unique Fixed Point Which Is Locally Exponentially Stable
Before the application of Theorem 8.3 to the DeGroot–Friedkin model is shown, esta-
blishing there is a single fixed point, and further that it is locally exponentially stable,
the Jacobian of F : Rn → Rn, and the related Jacobian of F : ∆n → ∆n in a coordinate
basis to be defined, are computed, and some properties of the two Jacobians are es-
tablished. For convenience, and when there is no risk of confusion, the argument k
is dropped from x(k) and x(k) from α(x(k)). Recall from Chapter 5 that
∂Fi
∂xi
=
γiα
(1− xi)2
−
γ2i α
2
(1− xi)3
= Fi
1− Fi
1− xi
. (8.8)
Similarly, one obtains, for j 6= i,
∂Fi
∂xj
= −
γiγjα
2
(1− xi)(1− xj)2
= −
FiFj
1− xj
. (8.9)
The above is in fact the Jacobian of F : Rn → Rn.
Regarding the unstable equilibria at the corners of the simplex, the proof of Corol-
lary 5.1 showed that the Jacobian ∂F∂x associated with F : R
n → Rn at the point x = ei
has a single eigenvalue at (1− γi)/γi and all other eigenvalues are 0. Since γi < 1/2,
then (1− γi)/γi > 1 and the fixed point ei is unstable. The associated eigenvector is
ei. This eigenvector has a nonzero projection onto ∆n so that the instability is also an
instability of the fixed point of F : ∆n → ∆n. No matter what (n− 1)-vector coordi-
natisation is used for ∆n, the representation of dFx will be an (n− 1)× (n− 1) matrix
with an eigenvalue greater than 1.
Recall that there are no fixed points x̄ for which there is a zero entry in x̄, except
the fixed points at the corners of the simplex. (As noted above, Brouwer’s Fixed
Point Theorem can be used to easily conclude that there is at least one such fixed
point x̄.) Since ei for all i = 1, . . . , n are unstable equilibria, they can excluded by
defining an entity5, distinct from ∆n, as ∆̂n = {xi : ∑ni xi = 1, 0 < δ ≤ xi ≤ 1− δ},
where δ > 0 is sufficiently small to ensure that any fixed point of F in ∆n, save
the unstable ei, is contained in ∆̂n. This ensures that ∆̂n is a compact, convex, and
oriented manifold, and it is easily verified to be positively invariant for Eq. (8.7) (see
e.g. Chapter 5, Property 5.2). This allows the use of results developed in Section 8.2.2.
In other words, one may now study the map in Eq. (8.7) as F : ∆̂n → ∆̂n. Now
as already noted the above computed n × n Jacobian ∂F∂x , with elements given in
5This definition of ∆̂n in this chapter is slightly different to ∆̃n defined in Section 2.1 and used in
Chapters 5 through 7. The purpose of defining ∆̂n in this chapter in the manner described is to define
a positive invariant set for the system Eq. (8.1) that is compact, convex and orientable, so Theorem 8.3
may be used.
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Eq. (8.8) and Eq. (8.9), is in fact not what is required to apply6 Theorem 8.3. This
is because ∂F∂x is the Jacobian computed in the coordinates of the Euclidean space
in which ∆̂n is embedded. What is instead required is the Jacobian on the manifold
∆̂n, which will now be obtained. A new coordinate basis is introduced, y ∈ Rn−1
where y1 = x1, y2 = x2, . . . , yn−1 = xn−1, and thus on the manifold ∆̂n there holds
xn = 1−∑n−1k=1 yk. On the manifold, and in the new coordinates, define G as the map
with G1(y) = F1(x), . . . , Gn−1(y) = Fn−1(x), which means that Fn = 1 − ∑n−1k=1 Gk.
The Jacobian on the manifold of ∆̂n is in fact dGy, which is now computed. For any
Gi(y1, . . . , yn−1) = Fi(y1, . . . , yn−1, 1−∑n−1k=1 yk), one obtains by the Chain rule that:
∂Gi
∂yj
=
n
∑
k=1
∂Fi
∂xk
∂xk
∂yj
=
∂Fi
∂xj
∂xj
∂yj
+
∂Fi
∂xn
∂xn
∂yj
, (8.10)
because ∂xk/∂yj = 0 for k 6= j, n. In fact, it follows from the definition of y, that
∂xj/∂yj = 1 and ∂xn/∂yj = −1. Thus,
∂Gi
∂yj
=
∂Fi
∂xj
− ∂Fi
∂xn
. (8.11)
In matrix form, observe that
∂G1
∂y1
· · · ∂G1∂yn−1
...
. . .
...
∂Gn−1
∂y1
· · · ∂Gn−1∂yn−1
 =

∂F1
∂x1
· · · ∂F1∂xn
...
. . .
...
∂Fn−1
∂x1
· · · ∂Fn−1∂xn
 [ In−1−1>n−1
]
. (8.12)
where In−1 and 1n−1 are the n− 1 dimensional identity matrix and column vector of
all ones, respectively, as was defined in Section 2.1. The result showing the applica-
tion of Theorem 8.3 to the DeGroot–Friedkin model is now ready to be presented.
Theorem 8.4. Suppose that γi < 1/2 for all i. Then the map F given in Eq. (8.7) has a
unique fixed point in ∆̂n, and this fixed point is locally exponentially stable.
Proof. While one will need to use dGy, for convenience the proof begins by studying
certain properties of ∂F∂x , which allow for easier delivery of specific conclusions in
relation to dGy. In summary, it will be proved that at any fixed point x̄ ∈ ∆̂n, ∂F∂x
has a single eigenvalue at zero and all other eigenvalues are real, positive, and with
magnitude less than one. It will then be shown that the eigenvalues of dGy are the
nonzero eigenvalues of ∂F∂x , which allows Theorem 8.3 to be used.
Denote an arbitrary fixed point of F as x̄. Then, clearly Fi(x̄) = x̄i for any i, and
6The Jacobian calculated in Eq. (8.8) and Eq. (8.9) can, however, be used for nonlinear contraction
analysis, as in Chapters 5 and 6, since that method studies the differential dynamics.
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it follows that
∂Fi
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
x̄
= x̄i (8.13)
∂Fi
∂xj
∣∣∣∣
x̄
= −
x̄i x̄j
1− x̄j
(8.14)
As discussed below Eq. (8.7), x̄i > 0 for all i. Since x̄ ∈ ∆̂n, one immediately conclu-
des that the diagonal entries of ∂F∂x |x̄ are strictly positive and the off-diagonal entries
strictly negative. Moreover, one can readily verify using Eq. (8.8) and Eq. (8.9) that
the column sum of ∂F∂x is equal to zero for every column
7. In other words,
[
∂F
∂x
]>
is the
Laplacian matrix associated with a strongly connected directed graph, which implies
that ∂F∂x has a single eigenvalue at zero and all other eigenvalues have positive real
part (see Appendix A.2 and Lemma A.8 for a definition of the Laplacian of a graph
and its spectral properties). Next, it will be shown that the other eigenvalues are
strictly real and less than one in magnitude.
Define A = diag(1− x̄i) as a diagonal matrix with the ith diagonal entry being
1− x̄i. Since x̄i ∈ ∆̂n, A is positive definite. The matrix B = ∂F∂x A is symmetric, with
diagonal entry bii = x̄i(1− x̄i) > 0 and off-diagonal entries bij = −x̄i x̄j < 0. Verify
that, for any i, there holds
n
∑
j=1
bij = x̄i(1− x̄i)− x̄i
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
x̄j = x̄i(1− x̄i −
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
x̄j) (8.15)
= 0, (8.16)
where the last equality was obtained by using the fact that x̄ ∈ ∆̂n ⇔ ∑nj=1 x̄j = 1⇔
1− x̄i = ∑nj=1,j 6=i x̄j. In other words, the row sum of B is equal to zero for every row.
It follows that B is the Laplacian matrix of an undirected, complete graph; B has a
single eigenvalue at zero and all other eigenvalues are positive real (see Lemma A.8
and the comment immediately below). Using Lemma A.4, one thus concludes that
∂F
∂x |x̄ = (A−1B)> has all real eigenvalues (because A−1 is positive definite and B is
positive semidefinite). Notice that trace( ∂F∂x |x̄) = ∑
n
i=1 x̄i = 1 = ∑j=1 λj(
∂F
∂x |x̄), where
λj is an eigenvalue of ∂F∂x |x̄. Since n ≥ 3 and
∂F
∂x |x̄ has only a single zero eigenvalue, it
follows that all other eigenvalues of ∂F∂x |x̄ are positive and strictly less than one (and
real).
Define the matrix
T =
[
In−1 0n−1
−1>n−1 1
]
, T−1 =
[
In−1 0n−1
1>n−1 1
]
, (8.17)
where 0n−1 is the n− 1 dimensional vector of all zeros. It was established earlier that
∂F
∂x has column sum equal to zero, i.e. 1
> ∂F
∂x = 0
>. Combining this column sum fact
7The fact that the column sum of ∂F∂x is equal to zero for every column is a consequence of the
property that F : ∆̂n ⇒ ∆̂n. This was also noted in Chapter 5, in Lemma 5.2.
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with Eq. (8.12), observe then, that[
dGy ∂F∂xn
0>n−1 0
]
= T−1
∂F
∂x
T (8.18)
where ∂F∂xn is a column vector with i
th element ∂Fi∂xn . The similarity transform in
Eq. (8.18) indicates that the matrix on the left of Eq. (8.18) has the same eigenva-
lues as ∂F∂x , and since the matrix is block triangular, it follows that dGy has the same
nonzero eigenvalues as ∂F∂x .
Since the above assumed that x̄ was an arbitrary fixed point it follows that all
eigenvalues of ∂F∂x at any fixed point in ∆̂n are real and strictly less than one, which in
turn implies that the eigenvalues of dGy, at any fixed point ȳ = [x̄1, . . . , x̄n−1]>, are
inside the unit circle. By Theorem 8.3, G has a unique fixed point ȳ in ∆̂n, and thus
F in Eq. (8.7) has a unique fixed point x̄ in ∆̂n.
Remark 8.2. The fact that the eigenvalues of dGy at a point in ∆̂n are a subset of those of ∂F∂x
is no surprise. Because ∆̂n is invariant under F, the translation of the affine space enclosing
the set to define a linear space (including the origin) must have the property that this linear
space is an invariant subspace for ∂F∂x . As such, linear algebra indicates that the eigenvalues
of ∂F∂x restricted to the invariant subspace are a subset of the full set of eigenvalues of
∂F
∂x . The
above proof chose to give a more “explicit” proof of the relation, in the process identifying the
eigenvalue of ∂F∂x that drops out in restricting to the invariant subspace.
Remark 8.3. Note that it is possible to prove ∂F∂x , for all x ∈ ∆̂n, has strictly real eigenvalues
with a single zero eigenvalue and all others positive. This property holds not only at the fixed
point of F. However, via simulations, it was observed that the eigenvalues of ∂F∂x can be
greater than one (other than at a fixed point), and this typically occurred near the boundary
of ∆̂n. This motivated the introduction of a differential coordinate transform in Chapters 5
and 6 to show the transformed Jacobian had 1-norm strictly less than one in ∆̂n; nonlinear
contraction analysis was used to conclude exponential convergence to a unique fixed point x̄.
It is not always assured that such a transform exists; the one proposed in Chapter 5 and the
subsequent proof of the norm upper bound in Theorem 5.2 were nontrivial and not intuitive.
In this chapter, the analysis has been greatly simplified by looking at the Jacobian at only
the fixed points of F (which were initially assumed to not be unique). However, this method
guarantees only local convergence, in the sense that although there can be only one fixed
point, the existence of trajectories which are not convergent to the fixed point but rather for
example converge to an orbit is not precluded. Moreover, the technique of Theorem 8.3 cannot
be easily extended to treat non-autonomous versions of Eq. (8.1), which in the DeGroot–
Friedkin model, occurs when the social network topology is dynamic. For the non-autonomous
case, Chapter 6 uses the techniques of nonlinear contraction to conclude there is a unique
limiting trajectory x̄(k) for the DeGroot–Friedkin model.
Remark 8.4. It should be stressed that a key desirable aspect of Theorem 8.3 is that in
applying it, one needs only to evaluate the Jacobian dFx at the fixed points of F. In contrast,
recall that a standard method to prove that F : X → X has a unique fixed point x̄ and that
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Eq. (8.1) converges exponentially fast to x̄ is via Banach’s Fixed Point Theorem (assuming
X compact). Specifically, one sufficient condition for F to be a contractive map would be to
prove that, for some matrix norm ‖ · ‖, there holds ‖dFx‖ < α, ∀ x ∈ X, where α < 1, with a
further assumption that X be convex [Khamsi and Kirk, 2011]. Thus, global properties rather
than local (at fixed point) properties are required to generate the conclusion. The nonlinear
contraction analysis in Chapter 5 is an extension of this via a differential transform.
The difficulty in proving a contractive property is acute for general nonlinear F. A
nonlinear F results in dFx being state-dependent. Consider two consecutive points of the
trajectory of Eq. (8.1) with neither a fixed point, which are denoted x1 = x(k) and x2 =
x(k + 1), and suppose that dFx|x1 and dFx|x2 both have eigenvalues with magnitudes less
than 1, i.e. assume that the eigenvalue restriction applies other than just at the fixed points.
Then according to [Horn and Johnson, 2012, Lemma 5.6.10], there exist norms ‖ · ‖′ and
‖ · ‖′′ such that ‖dFx|x1‖′ < 1 and ‖dFx|x2‖′′ < 1. However, it cannot be guaranteed that
there exists a single norm ‖ · ‖′′′ such that ‖dFx|x1‖′′′, ‖dFx|x2‖′′′ < 1. In this chapter,
there was no need to consider norms, nor was it necessary to study eigenvalue properties at
all points; one only needed to consider the eigenvalues of dFx at fixed points x̄ = F(x̄) to
simultaneously obtain a unique fixed point conclusion and local exponential convergence.
While Theorem 8.3 does not deliver a global convergence result, it may be useful when
paired with other analysis methods, e.g. analysis using Lyapunov functions, particularly
when other analysis methods may be unable to establish whether the fixed point is unique.
8.4 Conclusions
This chapter has used a recent nonlinear mapping convergence result to analyse the
DeGroot–Friedkin model. More specifically, the result in [Anderson and Ye, 2018]
used Lefschetz fixed point theory to show that a map applied to a positive invari-
ant set (which also satisfied some further properties on compactness, convexity, and
orientability) could be shown to have a unique, locally exponentially stable fixed
point if the Jacobian evaluated at every fixed point had certain eigenvalue proper-
ties. This result was applied to the DeGroot–Friedkin system, illustrating how the
map could be considered acting on an n-dimensional Euclidean space (for a network
with n individuals) or on an n − 1 dimensional embedded space. The analysis is
greatly simplified when compared to Chapter 5 and the original work [Jia et al.,
2015], though the conclusion is local convergence rather than global. Nonetheless,
this chapter illustrates the usefulness of the result in [Anderson and Ye, 2018] and
its ease of application; the result may be used to bolster existing techniques, such as
analysis using Lyapunov functions.
Part III
Opinion Dynamics with
Interdependent Topics
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Chapter 9
Continuous-Time Opinion
Dynamics with Interdependent
Topics
Chapter Summary
This chapter considers a model in which a network of individuals discuss opinions
on a set of logically interdependent topics simultaneously. Thus, the work is different to
the EPO model (Part I), which assumes a single topic, and DeGroot–Friedkin mo-
del (Part II), which assumes multiple topics are discussed sequentially. Also, the
model is in continuous-time, which is a departure from the previous discrete-time
models considered. Key to this model is a “logic matrix” which describes the logical
interdependence relations between the topics. Beginning with a network where no
stubborn individuals exist, a necessary and sufficient condition is obtained for gua-
ranteeing that the network reaches a consensus of opinions for each separate topic.
The discrete-time counterpart has been studied to some degree by others, but to the
author’s knowledge, this chapter is the first to study a continuous-time model for lo-
gically interdependent topic discussion. Surprisingly, different types of conclusions
come from continuous time as opposed to discrete time. In fact, a key finding is that
in continuous time, the condition for consensus couples the logic matrix with the net-
work topology, whereas consensus in the discrete-time model is ensured if separate
conditions on the logic matrix and network topology are satisfied. Last, stubborn
individuals are considered, with some sufficient conditions obtained for the opinion
to converge to a configuration of disagreement.
9.1 Introduction
This chapter considers a continuous-time model for a network of individuals who
each have a belief system on the same set of topics, i.e. the individuals discuss opi-
nions on a set of interdependent topics. Continuous-time models have been con-
sidered from the very beginnings of research on agent-based opinion dynamics;
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shortly after John French Jr. first proposed the French–Harary–DeGroot model in
[French Jr, 1956], Robert Abelson proposed a continuous-time counterpart in [Abel-
son, 1964]. Over the years, a number of models have been treated in both continuous-
and discrete-time, perhaps with some minor differences. A notable example is the
Friedkin–Johnsen model (discrete-time) [Friedkin and Johnsen, 1990] and the Taylor
model (continuous-time) [Taylor, 1968], which consider the presence of stubborn in-
dividuals in the network. Similarly, the Altafini model has been considered in both
continuous-time [Altafini, 2013; Proskurnikov et al., 2016; Hendrickx, 2014] , and in
discrete-time. [Xia et al., 2016a; Liu et al., 2017a; Hendrickx, 2014]. The distributed
DeGroot–Friedkin model has been studied in continuous-time in [Chen et al., 2017]
and in discrete-time in [Xu et al., 2015; Xia et al., 2016b]. Several reasons motivate
study of continuous-time models. First, it is of interest to observe whether, mutatis
mutandis, the conditions for ensuring certain behaviour of the opinion dynamical
system are the same for continuous- and discrete-time models. It turns out that this
is not always the case. For example, for the Abelson model, a strongly connected
network will ensure that opinions reach a consensus, whereas in the DeGroot model,
the network is required to be strongly connected and aperiodic in order for opinions
to reach a consensus. If the network is periodic, the opinions will oscillate indefini-
tely. Second, given the same network structure, differences in the limiting behaviour
may arise because in continuous-time, opinions typically evolve in a smooth manner,
while opinion values can “jump” from one time instant to another in discrete-time;
an example of differences can be seen in [Amelkin et al., 2017] vs [Liu et al., 2017b].
Third, the tools available to study continuous-time systems are generally more ma-
ture (at least in the systems and control community) when compared to discrete-time
systems, especially for nonlinear systems.
In [Parsegov et al., 2017], an extension to the Friedkin–Johnsen model was pro-
posed to study a network of individuals discussing their opinions on a set of inter-
dependent topics simultaneously. The set of interdependent topics form a “belief
system”, as termed by Converse in his now classical paper [Converse, 1964]. That
is, an individual’s position on Topic A may influence his/her position on Topic B
due to the individual’s view of constraints or relations between the two topics. In
particular, the individual’s belief system may be used to internally adjust the indi-
vidual’s opinions on the set of topics to eliminate cognitive inconsistencies in the
opinions on the different, but related topics. In [Friedkin et al., 2016b], the same
authors as in [Parsegov et al., 2017] use this model to study the belief systems of the
American population on three topics regarding the 2003 Invasion of Iraq. The topics
were A: “Iraq possesses Weapons of Mass Destruction”, B: “These Weapons of Mass
Destruction are a danger to the Middle East and the world in general”, and C: “A
preemptive invasion of Iraq is justified.” These topics are clearly interdependent,
and [Friedkin et al., 2016b] showed that a change in the opinions of the US public on
Topic A resulted in a shift in the opinions of the US public on Topic B and C due to
this interdependence; there was majority support for the invasion in 2003 (i.e. Topic
C) since most people believed Topic A to be true, but after 2005, when it was decla-
red that there were no weapons of mass destruction (Topic A), the majority shifted
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to withdraw support for the invasion (Topic C).
The model in this chapter may be considered as a continuous-time counterpart
to the work of [Parsegov et al., 2017; Friedkin et al., 2016b]. Also, the proposed mo-
del may also be considered as an extension to the Taylor model [Taylor, 1968] (see
also Section 1.2.5). Assuming that the matrix describing the logical interdependen-
ces between the topics (called the logic matrix) is homogeneous for all individuals,
networks where there are no stubborn individuals, and where there are stubborn
individuals, are both studied. First, focus is placed on networks with no stubborn
individuals, and a necessary and sufficient condition is obtained for guaranteeing
a consensus is reached. It turns out that this condition depends on both the logic
matrix and the network topology, which is a distinct, and significant departure from
the discrete-time model. For a given logic matrix, a sufficient (though certainly not
necessary) condition on the network topology is obtained for ensuring consensus; it
turns out that consensus is guaranteed if the strength of interpersonal interactions
is sufficiently weak. From these findings, a reason for the difference in conditions
for consensus between the continuous- and discrete-time models is conjectured. The
oscillations of an individual’s opinions because of, separately, the cognitive process
for securing a consistent belief system and the interpersonal interactions for secu-
ring a consensus, can be much larger in the continuous-time model. As a result, the
combined oscillations due to the cognitive process and the interpersonal interactions
may create instability. For a class of logic matrices with sufficiently weak couplings,
a class of networks with sufficiently weak interactions is identified which guarantee
consensus. Following this, networks with stubborn individuals are studied, and se-
veral sufficient conditions involving the stubbornness of individuals are derived for
ensuring that the opinions converge to a steady state of persistent disagreement.
9.1.1 Chapter Organization
The organisation of the chapter is as follows. Section 9.2 develops, explains, and
justifies the opinion dynamics model, including the important logic matrix describing
the interdependence between the topics. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 present convergence
results for networks with no stubborn individuals and with stubborn individuals,
respectively. Illustrative simulations are provided in Section 9.5, with concluding
remarks given in Section 9.6.
9.2 Development of the Continuous-Time Model
In this section, a general opinion dynamics model is first presented where stubborn
individuals may exist in the network. The model with no stubborn individuals,
which is a specialisation, is also detailed. In the second part of this section, the
matrix describing the logical interdependences between the topics (i.e. the matrix
which forms the belief system) is explored in detail using an illustrative example.
As a result, several constraints are identified on the matrix, arising from the natural
properties present due to the socio-psychological context of the model.
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9.2.1 Opinion Dynamics Model and Problem Statement
The general opinion updating model for each individual is provided, and a formal
problem statement is presented. Let xi(t) = [x1i (t), . . . , x
d
i (t)]
> ∈ Rd be the vector
of opinion values1 held by individual i, at time t, on d different topics. Where there
is no confusion, the time argument t will be dropped. The opinions of individual i
evolve according to the following differential equation
ẋi(t) = ∑
j∈Ni
aijC
(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)
+ (C− Id)xi(t) + bi(xi(0)− xi(t)), (9.1)
where aij is the (i, j)th entry of the adjacency matrix A of the directed graph G.
Continuous-time models require a slightly different approach to describing the graph
topology, including use of the Laplacian matrix L of G. The additional connectivity
term “directed spanning tree2” used to describe G, and the spectral properties of L
are given in Appendix A.2, which also introduces the graph theory required in this
chapter. The matrix C ∈ Rd×d is the same for each individual i ∈ I and represents
the logical interdependence/coupling between different topics. The scalar bi ≥ 0 is a
measure of individual i’s stubbornness, or attachment to initial opinion values xi(0).
The properties of the constant matrix C, and its interpretation, will be explored
in detail in the next subsection. The update rule Eq. (9.1) with the special case
C = Id is in fact the Taylor model, and has been well studied in a wide range of
literature e.g. [Proskurnikov and Tempo, 2017; Taylor, 1968; Cao et al., 2012] (in
effect d independently evolving consensus problems). If bi = 0 ∀ i, i.e. there are no
stubborn individuals, then Eq. (9.1) reduces to
ẋi(t) = ∑
j∈Ni
aijC
(
xj(t)− xi(t)
)
+ (C− Id)xi(t). (9.2)
The compact form of the dynamical system describing a network of n individuals’
opinions evolving according to Eq. (9.1) can be expressed as
ẋ = (In ⊗ (C− Id))x− (L⊗ C)x + (B⊗ Id)(x(0)− x), (9.3)
where x = [x>1 , . . . , x
>
n ]
> ∈ Rnd is the stacked vector of all individual opinion vectors
xi and L is the Laplacian matrix3 associated with the graph G. The diagonal matrix
B = diag(bi) encodes individuals’ stubbornness. One can rearrange to obtain
ẋ = −
[
Ind + (L− In)⊗ C + B⊗ Id
]
x + (B⊗ Id)x(0). (9.4)
1See Section 2.3.3 for a discussion of how an opinion may be represented as a real number.
2Some literature use other terms, e.g. rooted out-branching [Mesbahi and Egerstedt, 2010b] or
directed rooted tree.
3By way of a brief summary, the Laplacian L has a single eigenvalue at 0, and all other eigenvalues
have positive real part if and only if G has a directed spanning tree. With an eigenvalue of L denoted as
λi(L), i ∈ I , the eigenvalues can be ordered as λ1(L) = 0, and Re(λj(L)) > 0, j = 2, . . . , n. Associated
with λ1(L) = 0 is the right eigenvector 1n and left eigenvector γ> ≥ 0 satisfying γ>1n = 1.
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When the network has no stubborn individuals, i.e. when all individuals’ evolve
according to Eq. (9.2), the network has the following dynamics:
ẋ = −
(
Ind + (L− In)⊗ C
)
x. (9.5)
The problem considered in this chapter can be captured in the following objective.
Objective 9.1. Let a social network be represented by a directed graph G = (V , E ,A).
Supposing that all individuals’ opinions evolve according to Eq. (9.1), one seeks to determine
(i) the topological constraints on the graph G, (ii) the conditions on the matrix C, and (iii)
the conditions on B, which guarantee that as t → ∞, opinions converge to a limit, i.e.
limt→∞ xi(t) exists ∀ i ∈ I .
A special case of the objective is consensus of opinions. It is said that a consensus
of opinions has been reached if
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− xj(t)‖2 = 0 , ∀ i, j ∈ I , (9.6)
and it will be shown that consensus can occur when there are no stubborn individuals
in the network, or if there exist stubborn individuals and the special case of xi(0) =
xj(0), ∀ i, j occurs. Note that in the case of multiple topics, a consensus is said to be
reached if the opinions of all individuals within each topic reach a consensus; the
final consensus value for different topics in general will be different.
It will become apparent in the sequel that the problem is addressed by studying
the marriage and influence of three different aspects of the opinion dynamical system
outlined in Objective 9.1, viz. the network topology, logical interdependence, and
individual stubbornness, described in Eq. (9.4) by L, C, and B respectively4.
Remark 9.1. In [Taylor, 1968], motivation and justification is given for a generalisation
of Eq. (9.1) where individual i remains attached to several other static opinions, in addi-
tion to i’s initial opinion xi(0). Suppose that individual i considers m different constant
inputs ui,1, . . . , ui,m, such as the initial opinions of his/her neighbours, or constant infor-
mation sources, e.g. politicians or the media. Then, the last term in Eq. (9.1) becomes
∑mk=1 bi,k(ui,k − xi(t)) = b̄i(ūi − xi(t)) where b̄i = ∑mk=1 bi,k and ūi = 1∑mk=1 bi,k ∑
m
k=1 bi,kui,k
is the aggregate influence of all external sources. This chapter focuses on convergence and
stability analysis, results which hold for both Eq. (9.1) and the generalised model discussed in
this remark. Future research will focus on how the inputs ui,1, . . . , ui,m affect the final opinion
distribution, limt→∞ x(t).
4Some existing literature on consensus and containment control study agents with dynamics żi =
Fzi + Gui, with control input ui = K ∑j∈Ni aij(xj − xi). A typical result requires the control gain
K = G>P where P = P> > 0 is the solution to some algebraic Riccati equation, see e.g. [Qin et al.,
2015]. Lemma A.4 indicates that GG>P has nonnegative, real eigenvalues. In this paper, C− Id and C in
Eq. (9.1) replace F and GG>P, respectively. The matrix C is allowed to have complex eigenvalues, which
greatly increases the number of different couplings/interdependencies between topics describable by
C. Moreover, F is also a function of C. All this means conditions for stability are different to existing
results.
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9.2.2 Interdependent Topics and the Logic Matrix
In [Parsegov et al., 2017; Friedkin et al., 2016b], the authors call C the matrix of the
multi-issues dependence structure (MiDS). In this chapter, the matrix C will be called
the logic matrix because it encodes the logical coupling between issues. An example
is now provided to motivate C and demonstrate its purpose in a person’s cognitive
process for handling logically interdependent topics. In doing so, an assumption on
C is proposed which arises from studying the effect of C on an individual’s opinion
formation. The motivation and justification for this assumption was not detailed in
[Parsegov et al., 2017].
Consider two topics being simultaneously discussed; Topic 1: North Korea has
nuclear weapons capable of reaching the USA. Topic 2: The USA will use its arsenal
to preemptively eliminate North Korea’s nuclear strike ability. Let individual i’s
opinion vector be xi = [x1i , x
2
i ]
>. For topic 1, if x1i is positive (respectively negative)
then individual i believes (respectively does not believe) that North Korea has nuclear
weapons capable of reaching the USA. For topic 2, if x2i is positive (respectively
negative) then individual i believes (respectively does not believe) that the USA will
preemptively strike North Korea. One possible logic matrix is given by
C =
[
1 0
0.7 0.3
]
, (9.7)
which indicates that the individual’s opinion on whether the USA will strike North
Korea depends heavily on the individual’s opinion on whether North Korea has
nuclear weapons capable of reaching the USA. Note that while the above C is row-
stochastic, in general it is not required that C be row-stochastic (though other con-
straints will apply).
To gain further insight into constraints on C, and by way of example, suppose that
an individual i has no neighbours and is maximally open to influence, i.e. Ni = {∅}
and bi = 0. Then Eq. (9.1) becomes
ẋi = Cxi − xi. (9.8)
Here, the matrix C is the logic matrix, and (C − Id)xi is the difference between in-
dividual i’s current opinion xi and his/her opinions after taking into consideration
the logical interdependencies of the discussed topics, Cxi. In other words, Eq. (9.8)
represents the cognitive process used by individual i to simultaneously adjust his/her
opinions to ensure he/she has a consistent set of attitudes and beliefs [Gawronski
and Strack, 2012; Converse, 1964].
Now, suppose that individual i has initial opinions xi(0) = [1,−0.5]>, i.e. i learns
that North Korea does have nuclear weapons and but initially believes with some
certainty that the USA will not strike North Korea. Then Eq. (9.8) with C given in
Eq. (9.7) indicates that limt→∞ xi(t) = [1, 1]. In other words, individual i has an initial
opinion against USA preemptively striking North Korea, but i’s belief that North
Korea has nuclear weapons threatening the US creates an inconsistency. Individual
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i’s cognitive process Eq. (9.8) is used to adjust his/her opinions until a consistent
belief system is held, i.e. i believes the USA will preemptively strike North Korea
because North Korea has nuclear weapons.
The fact that Eq. (9.8) represents a cognitive process implies some constraints
must be placed on the matrix C; human cognitive processes are not arbitrary. It is
clear that if Eq. (9.8) is asymptotically stable then limt→∞ xi(t) = 0d, i.e. all opinion
values converge to zero. This is a non-generic cognitive process, which will be as-
sumed to not occur in this thesis. It is also not expected that the belief system is
oscillatory, i.e. xi(t) does not enter a limit cycle. Moreover, it is reasonably required
that the belief system not be unstable, i.e. limt→∞ ‖x(t)‖∞ = ∞. In order for Eq. (9.8)
to satisfy these properties, the following assumption may be placed on the matrix C.
Assumption 9.1 (The matrix C). The matrix C ∈ Rd×d is such that λ1(C) = 1 is a simple
eigenvalue with an associated right (respectively left) eigenvector ζ (respectively ξ>), such
that the eigenvectors satisfy ξ>ζ = 1. Moreover, for the other d− 1 eigenvalues λk(C), there
holds Re(λk(C)) < 1, ∀ k 6= 1.
It is noted here that ζ is a nullvector of C − Id, and if individual i has no neig-
hbours and is not stubborn, i.e. has dynamics Eq. (9.8), then the final set of opinions
xi(∞) is in the span of ζ. It will become apparent that ζ also plays a role in determi-
ning the final set of opinions for the network of individuals. For convenience, the set
of topics is indexed by J = {1, . . . , d}.
Remark 9.2. One may naturally ask whether, with bi > 0, the cognitive process varies from
Eq. (9.8) to become
ẋi(t) = (C− Id)xi(t) + biC(xi(0)− xi(t)), (9.9)
or the second summand has no logic matrix C, i.e.
ẋi(t) = (C− Id)xi(t) + bi(xi(0)− xi(t)). (9.10)
The latter is the proposed model, and is consistent with Eq. (9.1). Suppose that Assump-
tion 9.1 holds. For large bi, it is clear that Eq. (9.9) may become unstable (since under
Assumption 9.1, C may have an eigenvalue with negative real part) but Eq. (9.10) remains
stable. The author argues that in general, larger values of stubbornness in an individual
should not create an unstable belief system, and therefore Eq. (9.10) represents a stubborn
individual’s cognitive process. Moreover, Appendix Section 9.7 shows that the Euler approx-
imation of Eq. (9.1) (a specialisation of which yields Eq. (9.10) rather than Eq. (9.9)) give the
model in [Parsegov et al., 2017].
9.3 Consensus for Individuals with No Stubbornness
This section will consider networks with no stubborn individuals. First, a necessary
and sufficient condition is obtained for consensus of opinions. Following that, several
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sufficient conditions (each different in some aspect) are obtained which consider
either a class of logic matrices, or a class of network topologies.
9.3.1 Stability and Convergence to Consensus
The convergence result on the fundamental algorithm Eq. (9.2), where all individuals
are maximally open to influence, i.e. not stubborn: bi = 0, ∀ i ∈ I , is first presented.
The key result is summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 9.1. Let C, which satisfies Assumption 9.1, and G = (V , E ,A) be given. Then
for all initial conditions x(0), the social network, with each individuals’ opinions evolving
according to Eq. (9.2), reaches a consensus on all topics exponentially fast5 if and only if
Re ((1− λi(L))λk(C)) < 1, ∀ i = 2, ..., n and k ∈ J , (9.11)
where λi(L) the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix L, with λ1(L) = 0. Moreover, the
solution satisfies
lim
t→∞
xi(t) = (γ⊗ ξ)> x(0)ζ, ∀i ∈ I , (9.12)
where γ> ∈ R1×n is the normalised left eigenvector of L associated with the 0 eigenvalue
satisfying γ>1n = 1, and ξ> and ζ are eigenvectors of C defined in Assumption 9.1.
Proof. First, observe that Eq. (9.11) holds only if λi(L), i = 2, ..., n are nonzero, which
in turn holds if and only if the graph G has a directed spanning tree (see Lemma A.8).
That is, satisfying Eq. (9.11) implies that G has a directed spanning tree6. We first
establish the sufficiency of Eq. (9.11).
With all individuals maximally open to influence, i.e. bi = 0∀i ∈ I , the opinions
x(t) of the social network evolve according to Eq. (9.5). Denote M = −Ind + (In −
L)⊗ C. Clearly the ith eigenvalue of M is equal to −1 + λi(A) where λi(A) is the
ith eigenvalue of A = (In −L)⊗ C. The associated eigenvector is vi, where vi is the
eigenvector of A associated with λi(A). One has that λi(A) = µk ϕl , where µk and ϕl
are eigenvalues of In − L and C respectively, k ∈ I , l ∈ J (see Lemma A.5). Then,
one can verify that vi = uk ⊗wl is an eigenvector of A associated with λi(A), where
uk and wl are eigenvectors of In − L and C associated with µk and ϕl , respectively.
According to Assumption 9.1, C has a single eigenvalue at 1, which is denoted as
ϕ1. If G has a directed spanning tree, then L has a single eigenvalue at zero, which
implies In − L has a single eigenvalue at 1. Denote this eigenvalue as µ1. Then
clearly, λ1 = µ1ϕ1 = 1 is an eigenvalue of A with right eigenvector v1 = 1n ⊗ ζ.
5Convergence is of course exponential, since Eq. (9.5) is an LTI system.
6The requirement of a directed spanning tree is not surprising, and appears frequently in consensus
problems for multi-agent systems [Ren and Cao, 2011]. If G does not have a directed spanning tree then
there is at least one individual i, or a group of individuals forming a closed and strongly connected
subgraph (see Appendix A.2), who does not consider any other opinions. It follows that for generic ini-
tial conditions, individual i’s opinions (or the closed group of individuals’ opinions) evolve separately,
and will not reach a consensus with the opinions of any other individual k in the social network.
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For λi = µ1ϕl , l = 2, . . . , d, clearly λi = ϕl has real part strictly less than 1, because
Assumption 9.1 has that Re(ϕl) < 1. For λi = µk ϕl where k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, l ∈ J , if
Eq. (9.11) is satisfied then λi has real part strictly less than 1. This in turn implies
that Re(λi) < 1 for all i 6= 1, which implies that all eigenvalues of M have strictly
negative real part, except for a single eigenvalue at the origin, with associated right
eigenvector v1 = 1n ⊗ ζ. From linear systems theory, one has that x(t) = eMtx(0) =
PeJtP−1x(0), where P is such that J = P−1MP, and J is the Jordan canonical form of
M, ordered such that
J =
[
0 0>(nd−1)
0(nd−1) ∆
]
. (9.13)
The nd− 1 nonzero diagonal entries of ∆ are the stable eigenvalues of M. One then
obtains limt→∞ x(t) = p1q>1 x(0) where p1 and q
>
1 are right and left eigenvectors
of M associated with the single zero eigenvalue, satisfying p>1 q1 = 1. The above
analysis yielded p1 = 1n ⊗ ζ. One can easily verify that q>1 = (γ ⊗ ξ)> and thus
limt→∞ x = (γ ⊗ ξ)>x(0)(1n ⊗ ζ). In other words, limt→∞ xi(t) = xj(t) = αζ as in
Eq. (9.12), with α = (γ⊗ ξ)>x(0). Eq. (9.6) is satisfied. The sufficiency of Eq. (9.11)
has thus been established.
It remains for the necessity of Condition 9.11 to be established. Suppose that
Eq. (9.11) is not satisfied. Then there is some λi = µk ϕl , k ∈ {2, . . . , n}, l ∈ J such
that the eigenvalue of M, −1 + λi, is in the closed right half-plane. The system is
either unstable, or −1 + λi is on the imaginary axis (possibly at the origin). In the
latter case either a) there are now at least 2 eigenvalues of M at the origin, or b)
M has a pair of purely imaginary eigenvalues. Regarding a), the system is either
unstable (there is a Jordan block in J associated with the eigenvalue 0, of size at least
2× 2), or there are at least two 1× 1 Jordan blocks associated with a zero eigenvalue.
In the second possibility, consider for convenience the case where there are precisely
2 zero eigenvalues. Then, x converges exponentially fast to a subspace spanned by
{v1, vi} where vi is an eigenvector of M associated with eigenvalue λi = µk ϕl = 0,
k 6= 1. Because k 6= 1, vi = uk ⊗wl cannot take the form 1n ⊗wl , for some wl ∈ Rd,
which implies that consensus is not reached for generic initial conditions. Regarding
b), denote one of the imaginary eigenvalues as λi = µk ϕl , and recall that k 6= 1. Then,
the system oscillates but not in consensus because, similar to the above arguments,
vi associated with the imaginary λi cannot take the form 1n ⊗ wl . The proof is
complete.
Remark 9.3. Theorem 9.1 provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the stability of the
opinion dynamics system. Clearly, whether consensus is achieved depends on the combination
of the network topology, as encoded by L, and the logical interdependence as encoded by C.
Given a C satisfying Assumption 9.1 , two different graphs G1 and G2 may have different
stability properties. For networks with no stubborn individuals, this is in direct contrast
to the discrete-time result in [Parsegov et al., 2017], which establishes that consensus is
reached if and only if C is regular, and either limk→∞ Ck = 0n×n or W is fully regular7.
7A matrix A is regular if limk→∞ Ak exists, and a row-stochastic matrix B ∈ Rn×n is fully regular if
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Here, W is the influence matrix, i.e. the discrete-time counterpart to L. Thus, in discrete-
time, consensus is guaranteed if both C and W separately satisfy the required conditions,
whereas in the continuous-time model Eq. (9.4), the conditions intertwine C and L, making
prediction of conditions for consensus significantly more difficult. Naïve analysis of L and
I − C separately could lead to a conclusion that a consensus is reached, when in fact the
system is unstable; this is illustrated in the simulations in Section 9.5.
The author conjectures that the difference between the continuous- and discrete-time mo-
dels is due to the different assumptions on the logic matrix and network topology. In discrete-
time, W is row-stochastic (i.e. ‖W‖∞ = 1) and C is regular (which implies ‖C‖′ ≤ 1 for
some matrix norm ‖ · ‖′). In continuous-time, there are no restrictions on the size of the
entries in A (and consequently no restrictions on the size of the entries in L), and C only
needs to satisfy Assumption 9.1. This means separately, the cognitive process Eq. (9.8) and
the consensus process (which involves L) can have much larger oscillations (i.e. the complex
eigenvalues have large moduli) in continuous-time. When the two processes occur separately,
there is no risk of instability, but when individuals discuss interdependent topics simultane-
ously, the two processes may combine to cause instability. Remark 9.5 below explores this in
more detail.
It may be difficult to verify the conditions in Theorem 9.1 for complex networks
because the sprecise values of eigenvalues of both L, C are needed. Two results
are now presented on sufficient conditions which guarantee consensus using limited
information about the network and the logic structure. The detailed motivation for this is
discussed in Remark 9.5 below.
Corollary 9.1. Let G = (V , E ,A) be given and suppose that G has a directed spanning tree.
Then for any given C satisfying Assumption 9.1, there exists a graph with the same node
and edge set as G but with different edge weights, G = {V , E ,A}, such that consensus of
opinions is achieved using Eq. (9.2).
Proof. Let L be the Laplacian associated with the graph G. One can easily verify that
Re ((1− λi(L))λk(C)) = dk − yidk ± ziek, (9.14)
where, without loss of generality, λi(L) = yi ± zi  and λk(C) = dk ± ek  are com-
plex conjugate eigenvalues of L and C respectively. Here, zi, ek > 0, and yi > 0 for
all i ≥ 2 since G has a directed spanning tree (see Lemma A.8). Because Assump-
tion 9.1 holds, dk ≤ 1, for all k. For i = 2, . . . , n and k = 1, . . . , d, it follows that
Re ((1− λi(L))λk(C)) < 1 ⇔ dk − yidk + ziek < 1. Define A = αA, where α > 0
is a constant which adjusts every edge weight. Let L be the Laplacian associated
with G = (V , E , Ā). Observe that Re
(
(1− λi(L))λk(C)
)
= Re ((1− αλi(L))λk(C)).
It follows that consensus of opinions is achieved on the graph G if and only if
dk − α(yidk − ziek) < 1. Since dk ≤ 1 under Assumption 9.1, there always exists a
sufficiently small α for which dk − α(yidk − ziek) < 1 holds, because yi > 0 ∀ i ≥ 2.
The proof is complete.
limk→∞ Bk = 1nv> for some v ∈ Rn [Bullo et al., 2009].
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The above corollary states that for any given C, there always exists a graph G
for which consensus of opinions can be achieved. The proof gives a simple way to
scale the edge weights, as captured by A, by the same constant α. It is however, not
the only way to scale the edge weights. Below, a more complex scaling method is
presented, which requires only limited knowledge of the network topology and the
logic structure C. The reader is encouraged to revisit the Geršgorin disc theorem,
viz. Theorem A.3, as it will be used here and later in several other instances in this
chapter.
Corollary 9.2. Let C, which satisfies Assumption 9.1, and G = (V , E ,A) be given. Suppose
that G has a directed spanning tree. Then consensus of opinions is achieved if8, for all k ∈ J
l̄ < min
{
|1− |λk| cos(θk)|(1 + cos(θk))
|λk| sin2(θk)
, 0.5
}
, (9.15)
where |λk| = |λk(C)| and tan(θk) = ek/dk with λk(C) = dk ± ek . Here, l̄ = maxi∈I lii,
and lii = ∑j∈Ni aij is the i
th diagonal entry of L.
Proof. The system Eq. (9.5) reaches a consensus if and only if Statement 9.11 in The-
orem 9.1 is satisfied. This is equivalent to ensuring that
dk − yidk + ziek < 1 (9.16)
where λi(L) = yi ± zi  and λk(C) = dk ± ek  are any eigenvalue of L and C, respecti-
vely, except for λ1(L) = 0 and λ1(C) = 1. According to Assumption 9.1, dk < 1.
The definition of L implies that it has nonnegative diagonal entries and nonpo-
sitive off-diagonal entries, and moreover each row sums to 0 (see Appendix A.2).
Moreover, L has precisely one eigenvalue at 0 since G contains a directed spanning
tree (see Lemma A.8). Combining these observations with Theorem A.3, one con-
cludes that every nonzero eigenvalue of L is contained in the disc centred at l̄, with
radius l̄. Denote this disc as Dl̄ . The fact that l̄ < 0.5 implies yi < 1 (from Theo-
rem A.3). Thus, dk − yidk < 1 because dk < 1 . If λk(C) is real, i.e. ek = 0, then
Eq. (9.16) is satisfied. If all eigenvalues of C are real, then l̄ < 0.5 ensures stability.
Consider now ek > 0 for some k. Observe that Eq. (9.16) is implied by zi2ek2 <
(1− dk + yidk)2, which is in turn implied by
z̄2i ek
2 < (1− dk + yidk)2, (9.17)
where z̄i ≥ zi is such that βi = yi + z̄i  is on the boundary of Dl̄ . Because βi is on
the boundary of Dl̄ , it satisfies (yi − l̄)2 + z̄2i = l̄2, which yields z̄2i = −yi2 + 2yi l̄.
Substituting into Eq. (9.17) yields
(−yi2 + 2yi l̄)ek2 < (1− dk + yidk)2. (9.18)
8As will be evident in the corollary proof, the right of Eq. (9.15) is well defined, since the left term
approaches (1 + |λk|)/2|λk| > 1/2 as θk → π. This indicates that Eq. (9.15) holds for real eigenvalues
of C, i.e. θk = {0, π}.
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Expanding and rearranging for l̄ yields l̄ < 12yi
(1−dk)2
ek2
+ dk(1−dk)ek2
+ yi2
(dk
2+ek2)
ek2
, or
l̄ <
fk(yi)
|λk|2 sin2(θk)
, (9.19)
where
fk(yi) =
[
(1− ac)2 + yi2c2 + 2yiac(1− ac)
2yi
]
, (9.20)
with a = cos(θk) and c = |λk|. Recall that yi > 0. Calculations show that ȳi =
|1− ac|/c > 0 is a unique minimum of fk(yi) for yi ∈ (0, ∞). Since the right hand
side of Eq. (9.20) is always strictly positive, it follows that Eq. (9.19) is implied by
l̄ < fk(ȳi)/|λk|2 sin2(θk), which after some rearranging yields
l̄ <
|1− |λk| cos(θk)|(1 + cos(θk))
|λk| sin2(θk)
. (9.21)
The proof is completed by noting that Eq. (9.21) must hold for all k to guarantee that
Eq. (9.15) holds. Note that |1− |λk| cos(θk)| 6= 0 because |λk| cos(θk) = dk < 1.
Consider the scenario where C(η) varies smoothly as a function of some parame-
ter η ∈ [a, b], and for some κ ∈ (a, b), λp(C(κ)) has negative real part. Suppose furt-
her that λp(C(η)) is real for η ≤ κ, and is complex for η > κ. Then, limη→κ θp = π.
Notice that, separately, limθp→π 1 + cos(θk) = 0 and limθp→π sin
2(θk) = 0. As will
now be shown, Eq. (9.15) continues to hold, i.e. is evaluable, as θp approaches π.
Define g(θp) = |λp| sin2(θp) and h(θp) = (1 − |λp| cos(θp))(1 + cos(θp)). Denote
lim θp → π− as the limit of θp approaching π from the left. Since h(θp), g(θp) are
continuous in θp, calculations using L’Hôpital’s rule yield
lim
θp→π−
h(θp)
g(θp)
= lim
θp→π−
h′(θp)
g′(θp)
=
1 + |λp|
2|λp|
. (9.22)
That is, the limit exists. This is consistent with Eq. (9.15) because (1 + |λp|)/2|λp| >
1/2 for |λp| > 0.
Remark 9.4. Corollary 9.2 is a stronger result than Corollary 9.1. Corollary 9.1 requires the
scaling of every aij by the same constant α > 0. Corollary 9.2 shows that aij only need to be
adjusted for individual i if lii = ∑nj∈Ni aij exceeds the right hand side of Eq. (9.15). Moreover,
for individual i, aij do not need to be scaled by the same constant for different j.
Remark 9.5. Checking the sufficiency condition in Corollary 9.2 requires only limited in-
formation concerning L and C. Furthermore, consider the first term on the right hand side
of Eq. (9.15). One can rewrite this as (1−dk)(1+cos(θk))ek sin(θk) . Sets of topics whose C have large
ek and θk close to π/2 are associated with a cognitive process, described in Eq. (9.8), where
the opinions for an isolated individual would oscillate heavily and rapidly before settling to a
consistent belief system. Given such a C, Corollaries 9.1 and 9.2 show it is always possible to
reach a consensus if there is a sufficiently slow exchange of opinions (weights aij are small).
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The cost of guaranteeing consensus is a slower speed of convergence. On the other
hand, rapid discussions (arising from large aij values) can create large oscillations in the
opinions. When topics are uncoupled, i.e. C = Id, there is no risk of instability with large aij,
provided the graph has a directed spanning tree. However, when the topics are coupled, large
oscillations in both the cognitive process and in the consensus process may lead to a collapse
in the discussions. This is the marriage of two aspects of the opinion dynamical system, viz.
network topology and logical interdependence, as alluded to in Sections 9.1 and 9.2. This is
of particular interest because C relates to a cognitive process and therefore cannot be easily
changed for a given set of issues. It also provides commentary on the relative time scale
(or intensity) of the cognitive process, i.e. Eq. (9.8), and the interpersonal interactions arising
from the network, when establishing conditions required for consensus. Corollary 9.2 provides
a straightforward method to determine the class of L which ensures consensus of opinions for
a given C.
9.3.2 Consensus for a Class of Logic Matrices
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, in many opinion dynamics problems, it is desirable to
scale the opinions to be in some predefined interval, with [−1, 1] being popular. With
x and xi defined as in Section 9.2.1, define R = {x : xki ∈ [−1, 1], ∀i ∈ I , ∀k ∈ J }.
It will now be shown that, under the assumption given below, x(0) ∈ R ⇒ x(t) ∈
R, ∀t ≥ 0 and Eq. (9.6) is satisfied.
Assumption 9.2. (a) The ith diagonal entry of the Laplacian matrix L, associated with
G = (V , E ,A), satisfies lii ≤ 1, ∀i ∈ I . (b) The kth diagonal of the logic matrix C satisfies
ckk > 0, ∀k ∈ J , and ‖C‖∞ = 1.
It is clear that Assumption 9.2 places constraints, including, separately, the size
of the allowable oscillations, on both the logic matrix C and the network topology
L. This was alluded to in Remark 9.3, which showed that conditions for consensus
were tied to both C and L, and not just one or the other. Note also that ckk > 0 is a
reasonable assumption as it simply implies that the kth topic is positively dependent
on itself. No restrictions are placed on the signs of the off-diagonal entries of C, i.e.
how two different topics are coupled. First, it will be shown thatR is an invariant set
for the system Eq. (9.5), and then it will be shown that consensus is always reached
under Assumptions 9.1 and 9.2.
Lemma 9.1. Suppose that Assumption 9.2 holds for C and G = (V , E ,A). Suppose further
that each individual’s opinion changes according to Eq. (9.2). Then, if x(0) ∈ R, the opinion
vector x(t) ∈ R for all t ≥ 0, where R was defined above Assumption 9.2.
Proof. The proof is presented in Appendix Section 9.7.
To conclude Section 9.3, it will be shown that all networks that contain a directed
spanning tree and satisfy Assumptions 9.1 and 9.2 will reach a consensus of opinions.
Theorem 9.2. Suppose that Assumptions 9.1 and 9.2 hold for a given C and G = (V , E ,A).
Then, with each individual’s opinions evolving according to Eq. (9.2), for all initial conditions,
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the social network will reach a consensus value on all topics with an exponential convergence
rate if and only if G has a directed spanning tree. The consensus value is given in Eq. (9.12)
Proof. The necessity of the directed spanning tree was explained in the proof of The-
orem 9.1. Before sufficiency is established, some properties will first be established
regarding the eigenvalues of the matrix M = −Ind + (In −L)⊗ C. Consider a given
l ∈ {1, . . . , nd}. The lth diagonal entry of M is mll = −1 + (1−∑j∈Ni aij)ckk for some
i ∈ I and k ∈ J . The off-diagonal entries of the lth row, ml j, are given by (1− lii)ckp
for all q ∈ I , p ∈ J , p 6= k, and aiqckp for all q ∈ I , p ∈ J . From Assumption 9.2, one
has 0 < ckk ≤ 1 and ∑j∈Ni aij = lii ≤ 1 ∀ i ∈ I ⇒ 0 ≤ 1−∑j∈Ni aij ≤ 1. It follows that
mll ≤ 0 for all l ∈ {1, . . . , nd}. Turning to Geršgorin disc theory (see Theorem A.3),
define Rl(M) = ∑ndj=1,j 6=l |ml j|, i.e. the sum of the absolute values of the off-diagonal
entries of the lth row of M. One can then verify that
Rl(M) = |1− lii|
d
∑
p=1,p 6=k
|ckp|+ ∑
j∈Ni
aij ĉk = (1− lii)
d
∑
p=1,p 6=k
|ckp|+ lii ĉk, (9.23)
where ĉk = ∑dp=1 |ckp| is the sum of the absolute values of the entries in the kth row
of C. Note that 0 ≤ 1− lii ≤ 1. Thus,
mll + Rl(M) = −1 + (1− lii)ckk + (1− lii)
d
∑
p=1,p 6=k
|ckp|+ lii ĉk
= −1 + (1− lii)
( d
∑
p=1,p 6=k
|ckp|+ ckk
)
+ lii ĉk (9.24)
From Assumption 9.2, there holds ‖C‖∞ = 1 and ckk > 0, which implies that
∑dp=1,p 6=k |ckp|+ ckk = ĉk ≤ 1. It follows that
mll + Rl(M) = −1 + ĉk ≤ 0. (9.25)
This implies that mll ≤ −Rl(M), and that this holds for all l ∈ {1, . . . , nd}. Thus, the
Geršgorin discs of M are all in the left half-plane. Specifically, the discs are either in
the open left half-plane (mll < −Rl(M)) or touch the imaginary axis at the origin but
do not enclose it (mll = −Rl(M), including the possibility that mll = 0). This implies
that the eigenvalues of M either have strictly negative real part, or are equal to zero.
It will now be established that if G has a directed spanning tree, and Assump-
tion 9.2 holds, then consensus is achieved. As in the proof of Theorem 9.1, define
A = (In − L) ⊗ C, with eigenvalue and eigenvector pair λi(A) and vi. Define µk,
uk and ϕl , wl as an eigenvalue and eigenvector pair of (In −L) and C, respectively,
k ∈ I and l ∈ J . As in the proof of Theorem 9.1, one concludes that if G contains a
directed spanning tree, then λ1(M) = −1 + λ1(A) = 0 is an eigenvalue of M, with
associated right eigenvector v1 = 1n ⊗ ζ. Above, it was established that the eigen-
values of M either have strictly negative real part, or are equal to zero. Note also
that µ1 = 1 ⇒ λi(A) = µ1ϕl 6= 1, ∀ l ∈ {2, . . . , d} because Re(ϕl) < 1 according to
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Assumption 9.1. This implies that proving λi(A) = µk ϕl 6= 1 ∀ k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and
l ∈ J is equivalent to satisfying Condition 9.11 in Theorem 9.1.
Because L has a single zero eigenvalue and all other eigenvalues have positive
real part, it follows from Assumption 9.2 that Re(µk) < 1 for k 6= 1. This implies that
λi(A) = µk ϕ1 6= 1, for all k 6= 1, since ϕ1 = 1 according to Assumption 9.1. Consider
now k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and l ∈ {2, . . . , d}. Because lii ≤ 1, it follows from Theorem A.3
that |µk| ≤ 1. Because cll > 0, ∀ l ∈ J , ‖C‖∞ = 1, and ϕ1 = 1 is simple eigenvalue,
then for l 6= 1, the lth Geršgorin disc of C is situated at cll with radius 1− cll . It
follows that |ϕl | < 1 for l = {2, . . . , d}. Thus |λi| = |µk ϕl | ≤ |µk||ϕl | < 1 for all
k ∈ {2, . . . , n} and l ∈ {2, . . . , d}. In other words, Condition 9.11 of Theorem 9.1 is
satisfied. The final consensus value is computed as in the proof of Theorem 9.1.
9.4 Persistent Disagreement for Stubborn Individuals
The chapter now turns to the study of networks with stubborn individuals, i.e. ∃ i ∈
I : bi > 0. The compact form of the network dynamics is given in Eq. (9.4), and the
convergence of the opinions to a finite limit as t→ ∞, i.e. Objective 9.1, is ensured if
Re
[
λi
(
(In −L)⊗ C− B⊗ Id
)]
< 1, (9.26)
where λi(·) is an eigenvalue of (In − L)⊗ C − B⊗ Id. In other words, this section
will seek conditions which ensure the exponential stability of the unforced system
ẋ = −
[
Ind +
(
(L− In)⊗ C
)
+ B⊗ Id
]
x (9.27)
to the origin x = 0nd. If this exponential stability condition is satisfied, one then
concludes that the final opinions will converge to
lim
t→∞
x(t) = [Ind + (L− In)⊗ C + B⊗ Id]−1 (B⊗ Id)x(0. (9.28)
Note that if xi(0) = xj(0), ∀i, j ∈ I , i.e. all individuals are initially at consensus,
then clearly ẋ = (In ⊗ (C− Id))x and limt→∞ xi(t) = ξ>xi(0)ζ for all i ∈ I , where ξ>
and ζ were given in Assumption 9.1. When the initial conditions are not equal, the
opinions converge to a steady state of persistent disagreement if the system Eq. (9.4)
is stable. In what follows, several different conditions are given on the stubborn
individuals which ensures that the system Eq. (9.4) is stable, for social networks
whose C matrix satisfies Assumption 9.1. Then, under Assumption 9.2, a general
condition is obtained on the stubbornness of the individuals for ensuring stability.
For this section, the Laplacian matrix L associated with G is assumed to be ex-
pressed as
L =
[
L11 0r×(n−r)
L21 L22
]
(9.29)
where with r ≤ n, L11 ∈ Rr×r is the Laplacian associated with a closed (no incoming
edges) and strongly connected subgraph. Note that for any graph G which has a
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directed spanning tree there exists a reordering of the nodes so that its associated
Laplacian is given in the form in Eq. (9.29) (see Appendix A.2).
9.4.1 Stability for Social Networks Under Assumption 9.1
In this subsection, three results are presented on the stability of the opinion dy-
namical system. As a summary, stability conditions cover three scenarios: (i) the
individuals are all slightly stubborn, (ii) the individuals are all extremely stubborn,
and (iii) the individuals are stubborn to approximately the same degree.
9.4.1.1 Individuals Are Slightly Stubborn
Theorem 9.3. Suppose that the matrix C satisfies Assumption 9.1, and that the system
Eq. (9.5) (i.e. without stubborn individuals) reaches a consensus. Suppose further that the
graph G has nodes ordered so that its Laplacian L is expressed in the form given in Eq. (9.29).
The opinion dynamics system Eq. (9.4) with stubborn individuals converges to Eq. (9.28)
exponentially fast if ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : bj > 0, and bi ≥ 0 are sufficiently small, for all i ∈ I .
Proof. In the proof of Theorem 9.1, it was established that if consensus is reached
for the system Eq. (9.5), then M = −Ind +
(
(In − L) ⊗ C
)
has a single eigenvalue
at zero, which was denoted as λ1(M) = 0. It was shown in the same proof that
λ1(M) = 0 has an associated left eigenvector u1 = 1n ⊗ ζ and right eigenvector
v>1 = γ
>⊗ ξ> where ξ> and ζ are given in Assumption 9.1, and γ> is the normalised
left eigenvector of the 0 eigenvalue of L (see Lemma A.8).
The exponential stability property of the system Eq. (9.27) will now be establis-
hed. Define b = [b1, . . . , bn]> and B(b) = diag(bi). Next, by defining
Z(b) = −Ind +
(
(In −L)⊗ C
)
− B(b)⊗ Id, (9.30)
observe that the system Eq. (9.27) is equivalent to ẋ = Z(b)x. Observe that, with
bi ≥ 0 and ei being the ith canonical unit vector (see Section 2.1), there holds
∂
∂bi
[Z(b)] = −eie>i ⊗ Id ≤ 0. (9.31)
Recall that λ1(Z(0n)) = 0 has associated left and right eigenvectors u1 = γ> ⊗ ξ>
and v1 = 1n ⊗ ζ. Note that γ> ≥ 0, with γi > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , r} (see Lemma A.8). It
then follows from Lemma A.7 that
∂
∂bi
[λ1(Z(0n))] = −(γ> ⊗ ξ>)(eie>i ⊗ Id)(1n ⊗ ζ) = −γi ≤ 0. (9.32)
Thus, for sufficiently small bi ≥ 0, i ∈ I , the gradient ∂∂bi [λ1(Z(0n))] is nonpositive.
Moreover, it was assumed that ∃ j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : bj > 0, and because γj > 0 for j ∈
{1, . . . , r} (see above), it follows that ∂∂bj [λ1(Z(0n))] = −γj < 0. I.e., the eigenvalue
λ1(Z(0)) = 0 moves into the open left half-plane as bj increases from 0. Thus, for
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sufficiently small bj and bi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\j, λ1(Z(b)) is a stable eigenvalue. The
other nd− 1 eigenvalues are continuous functions of b and thus will remain in the
open left-half plane for small bi (the eigenvalues are already in the open left half-
plane by virtue of the fact that the nonstubborn system ẋ = Z(0n)x is assumed to be
convergent). Thus, Z(b) is nonsingular, and by recalling the definition of Z(b) given
in Eq. (9.30), the proof is completed.
9.4.1.2 All Individuals Are Extremely Stubborn
Lemma 9.2. Suppose that the matrix C satisfies Assumption 9.1, and that G contains a
directed spanning tree. The opinion dynamics system Eq. (9.4) with stubborn individuals
converges to Eq. (9.28) exponentially fast if for all i ∈ I , bi > 0 is sufficiently large.
Proof. The proof is an application of Geršgorin’s Disk Theorem. Examination of
Eq. (9.27) shows that bi > 0 does not change the radius of the associated (i− 1)d +
1, (i− 1)d, . . . , (i− 1)d+ d Geršgorin disks, but does shift the centre of the disc further
along the negative real axis towards −∞. If every bi is sufficiently large, then every
Geršgorin disk will be strictly inside the open left half-plane, indicating that the
system Eq. (9.27) is exponentially stable about the origin x = 0nd. This, along with
the arguments preceding Eq. (9.28), completes the proof.
Remark 9.6. Lemma 9.2 does not require the system with no stubborn individuals to reach a
consensus. In other words, high stubbornness in all individuals ensures the opinion dynamics
process is convergent even when the topic couplings are complex. However, this may be at
the expense of reaching a consensus. Future work may study an adaptive bi(t), which might
capture individuals who increase their stubbornness when they sense the opinion evolution
process is becoming unstable (an undesirable social situation).
9.4.1.3 Individuals Have Almost the Same Stubbornness
Lemma 9.3. Suppose that the matrix C satisfies Assumption 9.1. Suppose further that the
system Eq. (9.5) (i.e. without stubborn individuals) is convergent. Then, for any α > 0,
the opinion dynamics system Eq. (9.4) with stubborn individuals converges to Eq. (9.28)
exponentially fast if bi = α + εi, ∀ i ∈ I and εi ∈ R is sufficiently small.
Proof. Suppose first that εi = 0, ∀ i. If bi = α, ∀ i, then Eq. (9.27) yields
ẋ =
[
− (1 + α)Ind − (L− In)⊗ C
]
x (9.33)
which implies that the eigenvalues of Z = −(1 + α)Ind − (L− In)⊗ C are the eigen-
values of −Ind− (L− In)⊗C (which are all in the open left half-plane except for one
at the origin) shifted along the real axis by −α < 0. In other words, the eigenvalues
of Z have real part strictly less than zero, which ensures the exponential stability of
Eq. (9.33) and ensures that the final opinions converge to Eq. (9.28).
Next, consider εi 6= 0 for some i. From the fact that the eigenvalues of Z are
continuous functions of εi, one concludes that for sufficiently small εi, all eigenvalues
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of Z̄ = −(1+ α)Ind− (L− In)⊗C−∑ni=1 εieie>i ⊗ Id will remain in the open left-half
plane. In other words, for minor perturbations induced by εi, Z̄ remains stable.
9.4.2 Stability for Social Networks Under Assumption 9.2
A more general result is now established for networks with stubborn individuals
whose logic matrix C and graph G satisfy Assumptions 9.1 and 9.2.
Theorem 9.4. Suppose that the logic coupling matrix C and social network G satisfy As-
sumptions 9.1 and 9.2. Suppose further that G has a directed spanning tree with nodes ordered
so that its Laplacian L is expressed in the form given in Eq. (9.29). If each individual’s opi-
nions evolve according to Eq. (9.1), and bi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I and ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : bj > 0, then,
the opinion dynamics system Eq. (9.4) converges to Eq. (9.28) exponentially fast.
Proof. Observe that Eq. (9.27) can be written as ẋ = M̄x where M̄ = M − B⊗ Id, and
M = −Ind + (In − L) ⊗ C was defined in the proof of Theorem 9.1. In that same
proof, it was shown that the Geršgorin discs of M were in the closed left half-plane,
and the discs could at most touch the origin, but not enclose it. This implied that
M has eigenvalues that either have strictly negative real part, or are at the origin. If
bi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ I then −B⊗ Id is a diagonal matrix with nonpositive diagonal entries. It
follows that, for i ∈ I , the (i− 1)d + 1, . . . , (i− 1)d + d Geršgorin discs of M̄ are the
(i− 1)d + 1, . . . , (i− 1)d + d Geršgorin discs of M, with the same radius, but shifted
along the real axis to the left by bi ≥ 0. In other words, the Geršgorin discs of M̄ are
in the closed left half-plane, and can at most touch the origin, but not enclose it. By
proving that M̄ is invertible (as shall be done now), one immediately proves that all
eigenvalues of M̄ have negative real part, i.e. are all stable.
To establish a contradiction, suppose that M̄ = −Ind + (In − L)⊗ C − B⊗ Id is
not invertible. Then there exists a nonzero vector x ∈ Rnd such that M̄x = 0nd. This
implies that ((B + In)⊗ Id) x = ((In −L)⊗ C) x, or
x =
(
((B + In)−1(In −L))⊗ C
)
x, (9.34)
with B + In invertible because bi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ I . Obviously, Eq. (9.34) holds if and
only if the matrix N = ((B + In)−1(In −L))⊗ C has an eigenvalue at 1. Notice that
the diagonal entries of (B + In)−1 are (bi + 1)−1 ≤ 1 for all i ∈ I . It follows that,
for i ∈ I , the (i − 1)d + 1, . . . , (i − 1)d + d rows of (B + In)−1(In − L) are equal to
the same rows of In − L scaled by (bi + 1)−1 ≤ 1. In the proof of Theorem 9.2, it
was established that the eigenvalues of In −L are in the closed unit circle. It follows
Geršgorin disk theory that the eigenvalues of (B + In)−1(In − L) are in the closed
unit circle (see Theorem A.3).
The fact that N does not have an eigenvalue at 1 is now proved by contradiction.
Denote the eigenvalues of N, (B + In)−1(In − L), and C as ψi, µ̄k, and ϕl with as-
sociated eigenvectors vi, uk, and wl , respectively. One has that ψi = µ̄k ϕl , for k ∈ I
and l ∈ J (see Lemma A.5). Note that, from Assumption 9.1, ϕ1 = 1 is a simple
eigenvalue of C. Using the same arguments as in the last paragraph of the proof of
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Theorem 9.2, one can establish that under Assumption 9.2, ψi = µ̄k ϕl 6= 1 for k ∈ I
and j ∈ {2, . . . , d}. Thus, N has an eigenvalue at 1 if and only if ψi = µ̄k ϕ1 = 1
for some k ∈ I . This implies that ∃k : µ̄k = 1, i.e. for some nonzero r ∈ Rn, there
holds (B + In)−1(In −L)r = r or equivalently (B + L)r = 0n. In other words, B + L
must be singular if N has an eigenvalue at 1. With L expressed as in Eq. (9.29), one
can use [Qu, 2009, Corollary 4.33] to verify that L11 + diag[b1, . . . , br] is nonsingular
because ∃j ∈ {1, . . . , r} : bj > 0. It remains to verify that L22 + diag[br+1, . . . , bn] is
nonsingular. For convenience, denote diag[br+1, . . . , bn] = B22. Consider
L̄ =
[
0 0>n−1
L211n−r − B221n−r L22 + B22
]
. (9.35)
One can verify that L̄ is a Laplacian matrix associated with a graph Ḡ that has a
directed spanning tree9. According to Lemma A.8, L̄ has a single zero eigenvalue.
The block triangular form of L̄ then implies that L22 + B22 is nonsingular. Thus, B +
L is nonsingular. It follows that N does not have an eigenvalue at 1, and thus M̄ does
not have an eigenvalue at 0; M̄ is Hurwitz. Eq. (9.28) gives the final opinions.
Remark 9.7. In [Parsegov et al., 2017], individual i is said to be oblivious if bi = 0 and
@j ∈ I such that bj > 0 and there is directed path from vj to vi. That is, an oblivious
individual is not stubborn, and is not influenced by a stubborn individual’s opinion via a
directed path. The sufficient condition involving bi in Theorem 9.4 is equivalent to ensuring
that there are no oblivious individuals in the network, because there is at least one non-
oblivious individual in the closed and strongly connected subgraph GL with associated L11.
9.5 Simulations
Simulations are now presented to illustrate some of the key results of this chapter.
The network G has the Laplacian
L =

1 0 −1 0 0 0 0 0
−1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 −0.8 1 −0.2 0 0 0 0
0 0 −1 1 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 −0.4 1 0 −0.6 0
0 0 −0.2 0 −0.8 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 −1 1 0
−0.3 −0.7 0 0 0 0 0 1

. (9.36)
9In fact, the graph Ḡ is the graph GF detailed below Lemma A.8 with an additional node, denoted v0,
and edges going from v0 to vj, j ∈ {r + 1, . . . , n} as captured by the column vector L211n−r − B221n−r.
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The coupling matrix is given by
C =
 1 0 0−0.1 0.2 0.7
0.1 −0.8 0.1
 . (9.37)
This may correspond to the following set of truth statements. Topic 1: North Korea
has nuclear weapons capable of reaching the USA. Topic 2: As its ally, China will de-
fend North Korea against an attack. Topic 3: The USA will use its nuclear arsenal to
eliminate North Korea’s nuclear strike ability. For each topic, a positive (respectively
negative) opinion would represent an individual’s certainty that the statement of the
topic is true (respectively certainty that the statement of the topic is false). Verify that
G contains a directed spanning tree, and is of the form in Eq. (9.29), with r = 4. The
initial conditions are generated with each xki (0) selected from a uniform distribution
in the interval [−1, 1]. Initially, it is assumed that bi = 0, ∀ i ∈ I (no stubbornness).
One can verify that L and C satisfy Assumptions 9.1 and 9.2. As predicted by
Theorems 9.1 and 9.2, one observes in Fig. 9.1 that the opinions for all 3 topics reach
a consensus. In contrast, for the same graph G with the same associated L and x(0),
Fig. 9.2 shows the case where the topics are uncoupled with C = Id, i.e. regular
consensus. With C as in Eq. (9.37), Topic 2 is coupled to Topics 1 and 3 by a negative
and positive weight respectively. The coupling effect is clear: the consensus value
of Topic 2 in Fig. 9.1 is further from the consensus value of Topic 1 and closer to
the consensus value of Topic 3 when compared to Fig. 9.2. In the social context,
this simulation reflects a group of individuals who believe China is less willing to
help a North Korea who is actively developing nuclear warheads (Topic 2’s negative
coupling to Topic 1), but also believe China would come to the aid of North Korea if
the USA were to attack (Topic 2’s positive coupling to Topic 3).
In Fig. 9.3, the same C, as in Eq. (9.37), and x(0) are used but each edge weight
is multiplied by 3, i.e. L̄ = 3L, where L is given in Eq. (9.36). Condition 9.11 of The-
orem 9.1 is not satisfied, and thus the opinions diverge at an exponential rate. This
illustrates a different effect of having logical interdependences, which contrasts with
the above paragraph: consensus is guaranteed for L̄ with uncoupled C = Id: since
both L and Id −C are Hurwitz, na’́ive analysis of the system would have lead one to
believe that the combined dynamics, i.e. Eq. (9.5), are convergent. Last, stubbornness
is introduced, with b = [0, 0.1, 0, 0.05, 0, 0.4, 0, 0.3]>, and the same x(0) as above. The
L and C are given in Eq. (9.36) and Eq. (9.37). As predicted by Theorem 9.4, opini-
ons converge to a steady-state configuration of persistent disagreement. Notice that
stubbornness greatly changes the final opinion distribution for each topic (compare
with Fig. 9.1), even though only half the individuals are stubborn.
9.6 Conclusions
This chapter studied a continuous-time opinion dynamics model that considers an
influence network where individuals discuss multiple logically interdependent to-
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Figure 9.1: Consensus is reached on all 3 topics when the conditions of Theorem 9.1 are
satisfied.
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Figure 9.2: When the topics are uncoupled, C = Id, consensus is reached but the final
consensus values are different due to the lack of logic coupling.
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Figure 9.3: When Condition 9.11 of Theorem 9.1 is not satisfied, the opinion system is unsta-
ble.
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Figure 9.4: In the presence of four stubborn individuals, a state of persistent disagreement is
achieved when the conditions in Theorem 9.4 are met.
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pics simultaneously. After presentation of the model, the logic matrix describing the
belief system for the interdependent topics was explored in detail. Beginning with
networks that have no stubborn individuals, a necessary and sufficient condition was
obtained for consensus to be reached. The condition depends on both the network
topology and the logic matrix, which was a significant departure from the discrete-
time model. It was conjectured that this difference is because in continuous-time,
there are fewer restrictions on the logic matrix and network topology when each is
viewed separately. Further exploration led to sufficient conditions for consensus, and
the conclusion that one method of achieving a consensus was to ensure that the in-
terpersonal interactions (encoded by the network) were weaker when compared to
the coupling in the logical interdependences between topics. Then, a class of logic
matrices and a class of topologies were identified where consensus is guaranteed as
long as the network has a directed spanning tree. Turning then to individuals with
stubbornness, several sufficient conditions for stability were identified, requiring the
level of stubbornness to either be (i) small for all individuals, (ii) large for all in-
dividuals, or (iii) approximately equal for all individuals. Last, for a class of logic
matrices and a class of network topologies, a general condition on the stubbornness
of the individuals is obtained for ensuring stability of the opinion dynamical system.
From the investigations conducted in this chapter, it is evident that the intro-
duction of interdependent topics result not only in significant differences in the li-
miting opinion values (assuming the opinions converge to a limit), but the coupling
between topics has a major influence on the stability of the system itself.
9.7 Appendix: Some Proofs
9.7.1 Proof of Lemma 9.1
As above Eq. (9.1), define the kth opinion of individual i as xki (t). To prove the lemma
statement, one only needs to prove that, for all k ∈ J and i ∈ I , there holds
ẋki (t) ≤ 0, if xki (t) = 1 (9.38)
ẋki (t) ≥ 0, if xki (t) = −1 (9.39)
for x(t) ∈ R. Denote the kth row of C as c>k . Dropping the t argument for clarity, one
obtains from Eq. (9.2):
ẋki = ∑
j∈Ni
aijc>k (xj − xi) + c>k xi − xki = ∑
j∈Ni
aij
d
∑
l=1
ckl(xlj − xli) +
d
∑
l=1
cklxli − xki (9.40)
= ∑
j∈Ni
aij
d
∑
l=1
cklxlj + (1− lii)
d
∑
l=1
cklxli − xki , (9.41)
174 Continuous-Time Opinion Dynamics with Interdependent Topics
for any k ∈ J and i ∈ I , with the last equality obtained by noting that ∑j∈Ni aij = lii.
With xki = 1 and x(t) ∈ R, it follows from Eq. (9.41) that Eq. (9.38) holds if
(1− lii)ckk − 1 + (1− lii)
d
∑
l=1,l 6=k
cklxli + ∑
j∈Ni
aij
d
∑
l=1
cklxlj ≤ 0. (9.42)
Observe that Eq. (9.42) is implied by
(1− lii)ckk − 1 + |1− lii|
d
∑
l=1,l 6=k
|ckl |+ lii
d
∑
l=1
|ckl | ≤ 0 (9.43)
because |xlj| ≤ 1, ∀ j ∈ I , l ∈ J (including xli) and ∑j∈Ni aij = lii. Since lii ≤ 1 and
ckk + ∑dl=1,l 6=k |ckl | = ∑dl=1 |ckl | ≤ 1 under Assumption 9.2, Eq. (9.43) evaluates to be
(1− lii)
(
ckk +
d
∑
l=1,l 6=k
|ckl |
)
+ lii
d
∑
l=1
|ckl | − 1 ≤ 0. (9.44)
It follows that for all t ≥ 0, for any k ∈ J and i ∈ I , the inequality in Eq. (9.44)
holds. Because Eq. (9.44) holds, then Eq. (9.42) holds, and thus Eq. (9.38) holds. One
can readily obtain a similar proof for Eq. (9.39). The proof is complete. 
9.7.2 Relation to Discrete-Time Model
It will now be shown via an Euler approximation that the discrete-time counterpart
to Eq. (9.1) is the multi-dimensional Friedkin-Johnsen algorithm studied in [Parsegov
et al., 2017]. The discrete-time opinion model in [Parsegov et al., 2017] is given by
xi(k + 1) = λi
n
∑
j=1
wijCxj(k) + (1− λi)xi(0), (9.45)
where λi ∈ [0, 1] is an individual’s susceptibility to influence, wij are the influ-
ence weights, and it is assumed that ∑nj=1 wij = 1. Note that wii is not necessarily
equal to zero10. One may compare the above with the Friedkin–Johnsen model in
Section 2.3.2. Because wii = 1−∑nj 6=i wij, Eq. (9.45) is equal to
xi(k + 1)− xi(k) = λi(1−
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
wij)Cxi(k) + λi
n
∑
j=1,j 6=i
wijCxj(k) + (1−λi)xi(0)−xi(k).
10In discrete-time, self-loops are often allowed (wii > 0) whereas most continuous-time algorithms
assume no self-loops (aii = 0, ∀ i).
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Subtracting and adding λixi(k) from the right hand side, and rearranging, yields
xi(k + 1)−xi(k) = λi
n
∑
j 6=i
wijC(xj(k)−xi(k))+λi(C− Id)xi(k) + (1− λi) [xi(0)−xi(k)] .
Recall that the Euler approximation method states that for ẏ = f (y) there holds,
approximately, y((k + 1)∆) = y(k∆) + ∆ f (y(k∆)) ⇒ (y((k + 1)∆) − y(k∆))/∆ =
f (y(k∆)), where ∆ is the sampling time. One observes that the above equation is
simply the following difference equation
xi((k + 1)∆)− xi(k∆)
∆
= λi
n
∑
j 6=i
wijC(xj(k∆)− xi(k∆)) + λi(C− Id)xi(k∆)
+ (1− λi) [xi(0)− xi(k∆)] (9.46)
with ∆ = 1. As ∆ becomes arbitrarily small in equation Eq. (9.46), Eq. (9.1) is reco-
vered, where aij is the instantaneous influence weighting and bi is the instantaneous
stubbornness weighting. Note that Eq. (9.1) is not a precise equivalent of Eq. (9.45)
because of the treatment of λi. Comparing the right hand sides of Eq. (9.46) and
Eq. (9.1), it is clear that λi and wij have been combined and replaced with aij in the
first summand. In the second summand, there is no λi. In Eq. (9.1), and in contrast to
Eq. (9.46), 1− λi ∈ [0, 1] in the third summand of Eq. (9.46) was replaced with bi ≥ 0
in Eq. (9.1). Note that no assumptions are placed on aij other than aij ≥ 0, ∀ i, j. This
is different to the assumption that 0 ≤ wij ≤ 1 and ∑nj=1 wij = 1.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions and Future Work
By way of conclusion, the main contributions of this thesis are now summarised and
discussed. Possible future research directions are also outlined in Section 10.2.
10.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions
This thesis has presented and studied three different models for social networks
in three distinct parts; the EPO (Expressed–Private–Opinion) model, the DeGroot–
Friedkin model, and a model for simultaneous discussion of interdependent topics.
A number of different, complex social phenomena that arise through interpersonal
interactions, and the conditions on network topology and parameters of each indivi-
dual that give rise to said phenomena, have been identified.
A fundamental aspect of the thesis has been the careful consideration of the socio-
psychological concepts that ground, and give meaning to, the models. Analysis has
not just been presented on arbitrary dynamical systems. The problems investigated
were chosen for their relevance when considering the context and motivations of the
model, and interpretation of the results led to the drawing of insightful conclusions
in the social context. To capture the numerous challenges of social network rese-
arch, a variety of problems have been considered, ranging from model development,
examination of established socio-psychological concepts using the model, to conver-
gence on dynamic network topologies and network modification. A summary and
discussion of the main results and contributions now follow.
10.1.1 How Differences in Private and Expressed Opinions Arise
Part I introduced the novel EPO (Expressed–Private–Opinion) model. The model
was motivated by a range of social science literature studying the phenomena that
(i) individuals can have different private and expressed opinions, and (ii) in many
social situations, there is a pressure to conform to the group norm or standard. In
particular, the model assumed that each individual had a private and an expressed
opinion, and the expressed opinion was assumed to be the individual’s private opi-
nion altered due to a pressure to conform to either the global or local public opinion.
After establishing a general stability result for a strongly connected social net-
work, study shifted to interpreting and analysing the final opinion distribution, lea-
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ding to the drawing of several interesting conclusions. It was shown that for general
networks, the private and expressed opinions converge to a state of strong diversity,
where persistent disagreement exists, and there are no clusters of individuals with
the same opinion. Moreover, a pressure to conform led to preference falsification, and
so in general, the individuals were more willing to agree when expressing opinions. Each
individual in the network had different private and expressed opinions because of the
combination of (i) a pressure to conform, (ii) stubborn attachment to his/her initial
opinion, and (iii) the strong connectedness of the influence network. A method for
estimating the disagreement in the private opinions was presented. Last, the propagating
effect of resilience to conformity was established by proving that each individual’s
resilience affected every other individual’s expressed opinion.
Following this, the EPO model was used to re-examine the seminal experimental
works of Solomon Asch, and the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance. Asch’s ex-
periments identified three broad types of individual reactions when an individual’s
belief in a fact was challenged by a unanimous majority. The EPO model was able
to explain and capture all three types of reactions, which to the author’s knowledge
is a first for agent-based models (the Friedkin–Johnsen model was able to capture
two, but could not distinguish between one of those two and the third). Interestingly,
the EPO model was also able to explain why an increasing majority size did not ne-
cessarily translate to an increasing distortion of the individual’s belief. Separately,
stubborn extremists (zealots) were shown to be able to create pluralistic ignorance;
the general population’s private and expressed opinions converged to wildly diffe-
rent values. By studying both scale-free and small-world networks, and using both
the local and global public opinion variant of the EPO model, it was identified that
direct influence from zealots was the primary driver of pluralistic ignorance; indirect
influence from the zealots was less impactful. Providing the global public opinion to,
and increasing connectivity among, the general population are effective ways of dro-
wning out (and thus minimising) the zealots’ ability to create pluralistic ignorance.
10.1.2 Evolution of Individual Social Power
Part II studied the DeGroot–Friedkin model, which described the evolution of in-
dividuals’ social powers (or self-confidences) in a network discussing a sequence of
issues (also referred to as “topics”). Nonlinear contraction analysis was used to first
study a network with constant relative interaction topology, and then a network with
issue-varying relative interaction topology. It was established that the process of
DeGroot opinion discussion combined with reflected self-appraisal of social power
resulted in a “self-regulating” network. This is in the sense that no matter what value
an individual’s initial social power takes (which can be considered as the individual’s
estimate of his/her own power, or perceived power, before any discussion begins),
that initial value is forgotten exponentially fast. For constant topologies, each indivi-
dual’s social power converges to a constant value, while for issue-varying/dynamic
topologies, each individual’s social power converges to a unique limiting trajectory.
The constant value depends only on the constant topology structure, while for the
§10.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions 179
unique limiting trajectory, the individual’s social power for any issue depends only
on the sequence of dynamic topologies of the prior issues.
Further investigation of the model yielded additional conclusions: (i) the stability
and instability of all equilibria where a single individual held all of the social power
were characterised, (ii) an explicit upper bound on an individual’s social power in the
limit of the topic sequence, dependent only on his/her centrality in the network, and
(iii) the convergence rate for a general class of network topologies was established.
In the model context, the star graph is a special class of topologies; star graphs
are the only strongly connected graph in which general initial conditions on the
individuals’ social powers lead to a single individual (at the centre of the star) accu-
mulating all of the social power in the limit of the topic sequence. This motivated
Chapter 7, which studied several modifications of the star graph; for each modifi-
cation, necessary and sufficient conditions on the strength of certain interpersonal
interactions were established so that the centre individual no longer had the largest
social power (one strategy considered two stars joined together, and the conditions
for the two centre individuals to maintain social dominance). The unifying con-
clusion found through all the modifications was that for any individual wanting to
change the social dominance of the network, particularly for autocratic networks, the
individual may not be able to achieve the desired change by only modify relations-
hips with his/her neighbours; often, modification of relationships in other parts of
the network are necessary to create the desired change in social dominance.
To conclude Part II, a recent nonlinear mapping convergence result was applied
to the DeGroot–Friedkin model with constant topology. In doing so, the advantages
and disadvantages of the mapping result were identified; an advantage was that the
analysis (and specifically the computation of the Jacobian) need only be conducted
at all fixed points of the map, while the disadvantage was that this established only
local exponential stability (though it does simultaneously prove that the map has a
unique fixed point). Nonetheless, the nonlinear mapping result may prove useful as
a complement to other analysis tools.
10.1.3 Opinion Dynamics with Interdependent Topics
Part III considered a continuous-time model where individuals discussed multiple
logically interdependent topics. Introduction of the model included detailed expla-
nation of how the logical interdependences between the topics could be captured
by a “logic matrix”. The properties of the logic matrix, arising from consideration
of its function in an individual’s cognitive process in establishing a consistent belief
system on a set of topics, were explicitly established and justified.
Beginning with the assumption that the network contained no stubborn individu-
als, a necessary and sufficient condition was established for the opinions to reach a
consensus. The condition involves both the logical interdependence and the network
topology, clearly showing the added effects of the logical couplings. By further study
and the establishing of a sufficient condition, a powerful conclusion can be drawn:
for topic sets that have complex logical interdependences, consensus can be ensured
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if the strength of the interpersonal influences is sufficiently weak. One interpretation
is that interpersonal influences cannot “overpower” or have a greater impact than an
individual’s own cognitive process in establishing a consistent belief system. From a
time scale perspective, this indicates that the time scale associated with the consen-
sus process (interpersonal interactions) must be slower than the time scale associated
with an individual’s process of securing logical consistency in his/her belief system
(the logic matrix).
The assumption that there are no stubborn individuals is relaxed, and several
sufficient conditions for the stability of the opinion dynamical system is provided; the
presence of stubborn individuals leads to a strong diversity of opinions, i.e. persistent
disagreement. For networks where (i) the strength of the interpersonal influence is
upper bounded, and (ii) the logic matrix has infinity norm equal to 1 (i.e. the logical
coupling strength is upper bounded), consensus is shown to be guaranteed so long
as the network contains a directed spanning tree. For the same class of networks
satisfying the above two constraints, stability is shown to hold for a general condition
on the stubbornness of the individuals in the network.
10.2 Future Work
In this section some future research problems are outlined. Throughout the chapters,
a number of remarks have detailed potential research problems; no attempt is made
to list them all, and only those of most interest (including some not detailed previ-
ously) are given below. The first three subsections, 10.2.1, 10.2.2, and 10.2.3 discuss
near term future works on topics in Part I, II, and III, respectively. Subsection 10.2.4
discusses two long term problems of interest, both concerning the EPO model.
10.2.1 The EPO Model
A number of natural avenues for future research exist. The first is to provide a
comprehensive theoretical treatment of the model by establishing stability properties
of the model for (i) susceptibility and resilience values on the closed interval from
0 to 1 (whereas currently only values on the open interval are considered), and (ii)
directed networks which are not strongly connected, e.g. networks which contain
a directed spanning tree. This is of interest in order to verify the continuity of the
model (which one expects to hold) as the parameters approach their upper and lower
limits, with the primary difficulty arising because the result requires consideration of
all three aspects (susceptibility, resilience, connectivity of the graph). Asynchronous,
or gossip-based versions of this model are also of interest.
Second, the model may be made more complex, to reflect more complex human
behaviour. A number of possibilities exist. One is to assume that the private and
expressed opinion dynamics evolve at different time-scales. For example, an indivi-
dual may only express an opinion, say at every 5 time steps, while his/her private
opinion evolves at every time step. The resilience of an individual, captured by φi,
was assumed to be constant in this thesis. There is evidence [Waters and Hans,
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2009; Asch, 1951; Schachter, 1951] that φi may, among other possibilities, be state-
and time-dependent, e.g. φi = φi(yi, ŷ1, . . . , ŷn, t). The pressure may be proportio-
nal to the difference between an individual’s private opinion and the public opinion,
|yi − ŷavg| [Gorden, 1952; Schachter, 1951]. Pressure may also increase over time if
an individual fails to conform to the public opinion [Waters and Hans, 2009]. Last, it
is well known that large differences between an individual’s private and expressed
opinion generate discontent. If the difference is too large, an individual who initially
conformed may become openly rebellious [Kuran, 1997]. This suggests φi might be a
switching function activated by a state-dependent threshold.
The investigation on pluralistic ignorance can also be furthered in two aspects.
The first is to study the potential behaviour when there are two sets of zealots at
either end of the opinion spectrum. One might investigate the network or distri-
butions of susceptibility and resilience parameters among the individuals that most
commonly result in polarisation. This could indicate whether it is better to counteract
false propaganda (the first set of zealots) with more false propaganda on the oppo-
site of the opinion spectrum (the second set of zealots) or with the truth (e.g. more
knowledge of the global public opinion). Moreover, theoretical research may esta-
blish the level of pluralistic ignorance given some limited knowledge of the network
and the individuals’ parameters. More generally, this research direction falls into the
rapidly expanding area of network controllability, or structural controllability [Liu and
Morse, 2017; Lin, 1974; Cowan et al., 2012]. Beyond the basic question of where to
place zealots (controllable nodes) in order to drive the network to a given position,
one may also investigate the types of strategies which would maximise the effect
of zealots while minimising energy expenditure (measured by some metric such as
number of zealots). For the all questions regarding controllability, the converse pro-
blems associated with increasing robustness of the network to malicious control may
also be analysed; such questions have already arisen in the study of cyber-physical
systems and are of equal interest in opinion dynamics.
It would be of great interest to conduct experimental research on the EPO model
using human subjects, to validate the model, as done for e.g., the Friedkin–Johnsen
model [Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011; Friedkin and Bullo, 2017]. This is a significant
challenge that will require collaboration with social scientists: validation may serve
as the ideal way to draw further interest from the sociology community to further
develop the model in both the theoretical and experimental directions. The expe-
rimental methods detailed in [Friedkin and Johnsen, 2011] may provide a suitable
starting point. One particular issue is the need to carefully design how an indivi-
dual’s private opinion is recorded: attempts to collect the private opinion may itself
distort the private opinion value. A second issue is that two parameters, viz. resi-
lience and stubbornness, must be determined for each individual.
10.2.2 The DeGroot–Friedkin Model
Future work on the DeGroot–Friedkin model includes a number of different paths.
Remark 6.3 on page 108 proposed an interesting extension where individual behavi-
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our, such as arrogance or humility, may be modelled into the self-appraisal process
by way of a function applied to the true influence each individual has in the dis-
cussion of a given topic. A natural challenge is to identify the properties of the
function which determine the limiting behaviour. In a second direction, the nonli-
near contraction analysis technique might be applicable for study of the distributed
DeGroot–Friedkin model, where opinion evolution and self-appraisal occur on the
same time-scale; a recent result established exponential convergence for constant to-
pology [Jia et al., 2017a], but it is unclear whether that work can be extended to
dynamic topology.
Another problem of interest is to consider a state-dependent evolution of the
relative interaction matrix, i.e. for topic s, one might have C(x(0), . . . , x(s − 1)), to
capture the fact that individuals may form/change interpersonal relationships based
on social powers in the previous topic(s). One possibility is that for a given topic,
individuals may seek to form a connection with the individual who had the greatest
social power in the previous topic(s). In this case, initial (or perceived) social power
may have a more profound effect on the limiting social power configuration. One key
challenge will be to develop an update model for C that reflects how people develop
or change interpersonal relationships, with support from social science literature.
For the work of Chapter 7, the next step is to generalise the strategies to consi-
der an arbitrary number of attackers, dissenting subjects, etc. Beyond that, one may
consider more arbitrary networks, or modification of topology to maximise (or mini-
mise) the social power of a group of individuals. It is worth noting that the conditions
obtained in Chapter 7 require only local information (strength of interpersonal relati-
onships) about certain nodes. It would be of interest to see if, for arbitrary topologies,
it is also possible to obtain conditions that require only local information, but result
in global changes to the network properties (e.g. change of the socially dominant
individual(s)).
10.2.3 Multiple Logically Interdependent Topics
In terms of the model introduced in Part III, several directions of research are avai-
lable. First, for homogeneous logic matrices, a more general condition for stability
should be established for networks which contain stubborn individuals; currently, a
general condition is available only when restricted to a class of networks and a class
of logic matrices.
Second, it is of great interest to consider heterogeneous logic matrices among the
individuals. A recently accepted conference paper from the author [Ye et al., 2018],
whose ideas were not incorporated in earlier parts of the thesis, studied networks
where individuals had heterogeneous logic matrices, but in discrete-time. It was
found that competing logical interdependences, where the logic matrix had the same
pattern of zeros and nonzero entries but some off-diagonal entries had opposite
(competing) signs for different individuals, resulted in persistent disagreement of
opinions at equilibrium even when there were no stubborn individuals. Whether this
phenomenon also exists in the continuous-time case is certainly of interest. As de-
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tailed in Section 1.2.2, how strong diversity of opinions arises in strongly connected
social networks is of great interest to social scientists, and while a number of diffe-
rent explanations have been provided (stubbornness, social distancing, or a desire to
be unique), there have not been any works linking strong diversity to heterogeneous,
and competing logic structures in belief system dynamics.
Third, it was mentioned in Remark 9.6 that there is interest in extending the
model to consider an adaptive stubbornness bi(t), which might be state-dependent.
This may reflect an individual who closes himself/herself off from influence when
the combined interpersonal influence and cognitive processing of logical interdepen-
dences threaten to create an unstable opinion system. However, one would need
to take great care in proposing how bi(t) might evolve, since it must necessarily be
supported by social science literature.
10.2.4 Longer-Term Research Problems: Investigation of New Social Phe-
nomena
There are two related problems of particular interest, both of which arise from the
EPO model, and there is certainly a possibility of having both in the same framework.
The first is to consider a second-order1 model with private and expressed opini-
ons. This arises from the concept of “the spiral of silence” [Noelle-Neumann, 1993;
Taylor, 1982], which identified that an individual’s propensity to voice an opinion is
linked not only to the current public opinion (i.e. the group average) but also the
individual’s view of how the public opinion is shifting. In other words, people have an
inherent inclination to act based on predictions, which leads to the natural extension of
a second-order model. Study of such a model may lead to the identifying of whet-
her the predictive nature of people can exacerbate certain social phenomena, such as
pluralistic ignorance.
The second is to consider an event-based model for capturing when an individual
decides to express an opinion (currently each individual expresses his/her opinion
at every time step). It is not hard for the reader to imagine being in a situation where
the reader only voices an opinion when (i) others’ opinions appear to be moving too
far away from the reader’s current opinion, or (ii) others’ opinions are similar and
so the reader is emboldened to voice support, and the reader stays silent in all other
instances. It would certainly be of interest to see whether very different opinion tra-
jectories arise from the two possibilities. Again, the author stresses a key difference
with existing event-based multi-agent systems literature. In the multi-agent systems
framework, the trigger function determining when an event occurs is typically de-
signed by the engineer to drive the system to a global objective, e.g. consensus, with
considerations for, e.g. energy saving by minimising the number of events. In the
context of influence networks, the “trigger function” would be proposed to accura-
1In multi-agent systems research, study of single-integrator agents (Abelson and Taylor models)
naturally led to research on agents with double-integrator, linear, and then nonlinear dynamics, in
an attempt to capture more realistic dynamics of autonomous agents. The motivation here is entirely
different, and is driven by social concepts.
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tely capture an individual’s process in deciding whether or not to voice an opinion
(perhaps using either of the above two examples). There is no “global objective”,
insofar as reaching a desired network state, though each individual may have his/-
her own objective. Furthermore, the individual may be interested in minimising the
number events, because expressing opinions too frequently may annoy others in the
group, or reduce the ability of the individual to influence others when voicing an
opinion in the future.
Appendix A
Appendix
This appendix contains some standard results that are used in various parts of the
thesis.
A.1 Linear Algebra
Theorem A.1 ([Berman and Plemmons, 1979]). Consider a nonnegative n× n matrix A.
The following facts hold
1. The matrix A has an eigenvalue λ1(A) = ρ(A).
2. Associated with λ1(A) are a left and right eigenvector u> ≥ 0 and v ≥ 0, respectively.
Theorem A.2 (Perron–Frobenius Theorem,[Berman and Plemmons, 1979]). Consider
a nonnegative n× n matrix A, and suppose that A is irreducible.
1. If A > 0, then, ρ(A) is a simple eigenvalue, greater than the magnitude of any other
eigenvalue.
2. If A ≥ 0, then, λ1(A) = ρ(A) is a simple eigenvalue with an associated with left and
right eigenvector u> > 0 and v > 0. Any eigenvalue of modulus ρ(A) is also simple.
Moreover, the number h of eigenvalues of A of modulus ρ(A) is equal to the periodicity
of the graph G[A].
Lemma A.1. Let A ∈ Rn×n be a given square row-substochastic matrix. Suppose A has at
least one row with row sum strictly less than one, i.e. ∃ i : ∑nj=1 aij < 1. Suppose further
that A is irreducible. Then, ρ(A) < 1.
Proof. This lemma is an immediate consequence of [Varga, 2009, Lemma 2.8].
Lemma A.2 ([Bernstein, 2009, pg. 108–109]). Suppose that an invertible matrix Z ∈
Rn×n is partitioned as
Z =
[
A B
C D
]
(A.1)
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Suppose further that A, D are invertible. Then D−CA−1B and A− BD−1C are invertible,
and the inverse of Z is given as
Z−1 =
[
(A− BD−1C)−1 −A−1B(D− CA−1B)−1
−D−1C(A− BD−1C)−1 (D− CA−1B)−1
]
(A.2)
Lemma A.3 ([Bernstein, 2009, Fact 10.11.20]). Consider a matrix function A(s) ∈ Rn×n,
where s ∈ D ⊆ R. Suppose that A(s) is continuously differentiable, and invertible, for all
s ∈ D. Then
dA−1(s)
ds
= −A−1(s)
(
dA(s)
ds
)
A−1(s). (A.3)
Lemma A.4 ([Horn and Johnson, 2012, Corollary 7.6.2 ]). Let A, B ∈ Rn×n be sym-
metric. If A is positive definite, then AB is diagonalizable and has real eigenvalues. If, in
addition, B is positive definite or positive semidefinite, then the eigenvalues of AB are all
strictly positive or nonnegative, respectively.
Lemma A.5 ([Bernstein, 2009, Proposition 7.1.10]). Let λi, i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and µj, j ∈
{1, . . . , d} be an eigenvalue of A ∈ Rn×n and B ∈ Rd×d respectively. Then the nd eigen-
values of A⊗ B are given by τk = λiµj for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and µj, j ∈ {1, . . . , d}. Suppose
further that ui and vj are eigenvectors of A and B associated with λi and µj, respectively.
Then, wk = ui ⊗ jj is an eigenvector of A⊗ B.
Lemma A.6 ([Horn and Johnson, 2012]). Suppose that A ∈ Rn×n has a simple, real
eigenvalue λ. Let u and v be, respectively, a left and right eigenvector of A associated with
the eigenvalue λ, that is, Av = λv and λu> = u>A. Then, u, v are real, and can be
normalised to satisfy u>v = 1.
Theorem A.3 ([Horn and Johnson, 2012, Theorem 6.1.1]). Let A = {aij} ∈ Rn×n, and
let Ri(A) = ∑nj=1,j 6=i |aij| for i = 1, . . . , n denote the absolute row sums of the off-diagonal
elements of A. Consider the n Geršgorin discs
{z ∈ C : |z− aii| ≤ Ri(A)}, i = 1, . . . , n (A.4)
The eigenvalues of A are in the union of the Geršgorin discs
H(A) =
n⋃
i=1
{z ∈ C : |z− aii| ≤ Ri(A)} (A.5)
Furthermore, if the union of k of the n discs that comprise H(A) forms a set Hk(A) that
is disjoint from the remaining n− k discs, then Hk(A) contains exactly k eigenvalues of A,
counted according to their algebraic multiplicities.
Lemma A.7. Suppose that a matrix Z(b) is a function of b ∈ R, and that for b̄, Z(b̄) has
a simple eigenvalue λ(b̄) with associated left and right eigenvectors u> and v, respectively,
normalised to satisfy u>v = 1. Then,
d λ(b)
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
= u>
d Z(b)
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
v. (A.6)
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Proof. Observe that there holds d Z(b)vd b |b̄ =
d λ(Z(b))v
d b |b̄ which is equivalent to
d Z(b)
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
v + Z(b)
d v
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
=
d λ(Z(b))
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
v + λ(Z(b))
d v
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
.
Premultiplying both sides of the above equation by u> yields
u>
d Z(b)
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
v + u>Z(b)
d v
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
= u>
d λ(Z(b))
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
v + λ(Z(b))u>
d v
d b
∣∣∣
b̄
. (A.7)
By recalling that u>Z(b) = λ(Z(b))u>, it follows that the second term on the left
hand side cancels the second term on the right hand side of the above. Additionally,
u> d λ(Z(b))d b |b̄v =
d λ(Z(b))
d b |b̄ because u>v = 1. This yields Eq. (A.6).
A.1.1 Consensus Level and Coefficient of Ergodicity
This section will recall a common performance function and a coefficient of ergodicity
for a stochastic matrix, for details see [Seneta, 2006, pg. 82]. For a vector x ∈ Rn,
define the performance function V(x) : Rn 7→ R as
V(x) = max
i∈{1,...,n}
xi − min
j∈{1,...,n}
xj, (A.8)
In the context of this thesis, V(y) may be used to measure the “level of consensus”
in the vector of opinions y(t) of a network with n individuals. Notice in particular
that consensus, as defined in Definition 2.3, is reached if and only if V(y) = 0. Next
consider the following coefficient of ergodicity, τ(A) for a square stochastic matrix
A ∈ Rn×n, defined as
τ (A) =
1
2
max
i,j∈{1,...,n}
n
∑
s=1
|ais − ajs| = 1− min
i,j∈{1,...,n}
n
∑
s=1
min{ais, ajs}. (A.9)
It is known that this coefficient of ergodicity satisfies 0 ≤ τ(A) ≤ 1, and τ(A) = 0
if and only if all the rows of A are identical (i.e. A = 1nz> for some z ∈ Rn).
Importantly, there holds
τ(A) < 1 (A.10)
if A > 0. Last, note that there holds (see e.g. [Seneta, 2006].)
V(Ax) ≤ τ(A)V(x). (A.11)
A.2 Graph Theory
In this section, some additional results are given on graph theory, primarily for use
in Chapter 9, where there the model considered is continuous-time as opposed to
the other chapters, which all consider discrete-time models. Generally speaking,
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the graph topology considered by continuous-time models requires the use of the
Laplacian matrix associated with a graph G.
Consider a graph G = (V , E ,A). Each individual is a node in the finite, nonempty
set of nodes V = {vi : i ∈ I = {1, . . . , n}}. The set of ordered edges is E ⊆ V ×V . An
ordered edge is denoted as eij = (vi, vj) ∈ E . An edge eij is said to be outgoing with
respect to vi and incoming with respect to vj. The presence of an edge eij connotes
that individual j learns of, and takes into account, the opinion value of individual
i when updating its own opinion. The (incoming) neighbour set of vi is defined
as Ni = {vj ∈ V : eji ∈ E}. The weighted adjacency matrix A ∈ Rn×n of G has
nonnegative elements aij. The elements of A are such that aij > 0 ⇔ eji ∈ E while
aij = 0 if eji /∈ E and it is assumed that aii = 0, ∀i. The n × n Laplacian matrix,
L = {lij}, of the associated graph G is defined
lij =
{
∑nk=1,k 6=i aik for j = i
−aij for j 6= i
A directed spanning tree is a directed graph formed by directed edges of the graph
that connects all the nodes, and where every vertex apart from the root has exactly
one parent. A graph is said to contain a directed spanning tree if a subset of the
edges forms a directed spanning tree1. A graph is strongly connected if and only if,
for every node vi, there exists a directed path to every other node vj. The following
is a standard result that will be used throughout this paper.
Lemma A.8 ([Mesbahi and Egerstedt, 2010b]). Let G = (V , E ,A) be given. The Lapla-
cian L associated with G has a single eigenvalue at 0 if and only if G has a directed spanning
tree. Associated with the single eigenvalue at 0 are the right eigenvector 1n and left eigen-
vector γ ≥ 0, with normalisation γ>1n = 1. All other eigenvalues have strictly positive real
part.
Note that if the graph G is undirected, i.e. A = A> and L = L>, then a conse-
quence of Lemma A.8 is that the eigenvalues of L are real, nonnegative, and can be
ordered as 0 = λ1(L) < λ2(L) ≤ . . . ≤ λn(L).
If the graph contains a directed spanning tree, then there exists an r ≤ n such
that the reordered nodes v1, . . . , vr induce a maximally closed and strongly connected
subgraph GL. By closed, it is meant that no edges are incoming to GL. Denote by GF
the subgraph induced by the set of nodes vr+1, . . . , vn. With the nodes reordered, the
Laplacian matrix L associated with G is expressed as
L =
[
L11 0r×(n−r)
L21 L22
]
(A.12)
where L11 ∈ Rr×r is irreducible. In some literature, this is referred to as the Frobe-
nius normal form of the Laplacian matrix [Li et al., 2010]. If r = n then G is strongly
1Some literature use other terms, e.g. rooted out-branching [Mesbahi and Egerstedt, 2010b] or
directed rooted tree.
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connected, and L22 ∈ R0×0. If r < n then the matrix L22 ∈ R(n−r)×(n−r) is non-
singular, and its eigenvalues have strictly positive real part [Xia and Cao, 2017]. In
addition, there is a right eigenvector associated with λ1(L) = 0, with nonnegative
entries, given by γ> = [γ1, . . . , γn] with γi > 0, i ∈ {1, . . . , r}. In this thesis, it is
assumed that γ is normalised such that ∑ni=1 γi = 1 holds.
A.3 Nonlinear Contraction Analysis
In this section of the appendix, some results on nonlinear contraction analysis of
discrete-time systems are presented. These results will be used in Chapters 5 and
6. Nonlinear contraction analysis was first exposed to the control community as a
method to study dynamical systems in the now classic [Lohmiller and Slotine, 1998,
Section 5], though these results have existed in the wider mathematical community
for several decades prior.
Consider a deterministic discrete-time system of the form
x(k + 1) = fσ(k)(x(k), k), (A.13)
with n × 1 state vector x, switching signal σ(k), and n × 1 vector-valued function
fσ(k)(x(k), k). It is assumed that f is smooth, by which it is meant that any required
derivative or partial derivative exists, and is continuous. The associated virtual2
dynamics is
δx(k + 1) =
∂ fσ(k)
∂x(k)
δx(k).
See Fig. A.1 for an illustration of the virtual dynamics. In a region of interest of
the state-space D ⊆ Rn, define the transformation δz(k) = Θσ(k)(x(k), k)δx(k) where
Θσ(k)(x(k), k) ∈ Rn×n is uniformly nonsingular. More specifically, uniform nonsin-
gularity means that there exist a real number κ > 0 and a matrix norm ‖ · ‖′ such
that κ < ‖Θσ(k)(x(k), k)‖′ < κ−1 holds for all x ∈ D and k ≥ 0. If the uniformly
nonsingular condition holds, then exponential convergence of δz to 0n implies, and
is implied by, exponential convergence of δx to 0n. The transformed virtual dynamics
can be computed as
δz(k + 1) = F(k)δz(k), (A.14)
where F(k) = Θσ(k+1)(x(k + 1), k + 1)
∂ fσ(k)
∂x(k) Θσ(k)(x(k), k)
−1 is the transformed Jaco-
bian.
Definition A.1 (Generalised Contraction Region). Given the discrete-time system in
Eq. (A.13), a region of the state space D ⊆ Rn is called a generalised contraction region with
respect to the metric ‖δx‖Θ(k),1 = ‖Θσ(k)(x(k), k)δx‖1 if in that region, ‖F(k)‖1 < 1− η
holds for all k, where η > 0 is an arbitrarily small constant.
2The term “virtual” is taken from Lohmiller and Slotine [1998]; δx is a virtual, i.e. infinitesimal,
displacement.
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Figure A.1: Two trajectories of x(k + 1) = fσ(k)(x(k), k) are separated by a virtual displa-
cement δx(k). The virtual dynamics are illustrated, and nonlinear contraction analysis is
focused on study of how the virtual displacement evolves over k. One desirable property is
for the virtual displacement δx(k) to converge to zero; this implies certain properties of the
system A.13. See Chapters 5 and 6 for the interpretations of these properties in the context
of the evolution of social power in social networks.
Note that the 1-norm metric is being considered in the variable space δz which
in turn leads to a weighted 1-norm in the variable space δx. Here, the weighting
matrix is Θσ(k)(x(k), k) and the weighted 1-norm is well defined over D because Θ is
uniformly nonsingular.
Theorem A.4. Given the system Eq. (A.13), consider a tube of constant radius with respect
to the metric ‖x‖Θ(k),1, centred at a given trajectory of Eq. (A.13). Any trajectory, which
starts in this tube and is contained at all times in a generalised contraction region, remains
in that tube and converges exponentially fast to the given trajectory as k→ ∞.
Furthermore, global exponential convergence to the given trajectory is guaranteed if the
whole state space is a generalised contraction region with respect to the metric ‖x‖Θ(k),1.
The now classic paper [Lohmiller and Slotine, 1998] focused on contraction in
the Euclidean metric ‖x‖Θ(k),2 = ‖Θσ(k)(x(k), k)x(k)‖2. However, it is obvious from
Eq. (A.14) that other norms can be considered. This thesis, and specifically Chapters 5
and 6, requires use of the 1-norm metric because the 2-norm metric does not deliver
a convergence result (see the relevant chapters for comments and remarks on this
issue). A sketch of the proof is provided here, modified for the 1-norm metric, and
the reader is referred to [Lohmiller and Slotine, 1998] for precise details.
Proof. In a generalised contraction region, there holds
‖δz(k + 1)‖1 = ‖F(k)δz(k)‖1
‖δz(k + 1)‖1 < (1− η)‖δz(k)‖1
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since ‖F(k)‖1 < 1− η holds ∀ k inside the generalised contraction region3. This im-
plies that limk→∞ δz(k) = 0n exponentially fast, which in turn implies that there holds
limk→∞ δx(k) = 0n exponentially fast due to uniform nonsingularity of Θσ(k)(x(k), k).
The definition of δx then implies that any two infinitesimally close trajectories of the sy-
stem in Eq. (A.13) converge to each other exponentially fast.
The distance between two points, P1 and P2, with respect to the metric4 ‖ · ‖Θ(k),1 is
defined as the shortest path length between P1 and P2, i.e., the smallest path integral∫ P2
P1
‖δz‖1 =
∫ P2
P1
‖δx‖Θ(k),1. A tube centred about a trajectory x1(k) and with radius
R is then defined as the set of all points whose distances to x1(k) with respect to
‖ · ‖Θ(k),1 are strictly less than R.
Let x2(k) 6= x1(k) be any trajectory that starts inside this tube, separated from
x1(k) by a finite distance with respect to the metric ‖ · ‖Θ(k),1. Suppose that the
tube is contained at all times in a generalised contraction region. The fact that there
holds limk→∞ ‖δx(k)‖Θ(k),1 = 0 then implies that limk→∞
∫ x2(k)
x1(k)
‖δx(k)‖Θ(k),1 = 0 ex-
ponentially fast. That is, given the trajectories x2(k) and x1(k), separated by a finite
distance with respect to the metric ‖ · ‖Θ(k),1, x2(k) converges to x1(k) exponentially
fast. Global convergence is obtained by setting R = ∞.
Corollary A.1. If the contraction region is convex, then all trajectories converge exponenti-
ally fast to a unique trajectory.
Proof. This immediately follows from the fact that any finite distance between two
trajectories shrinks exponentially in the convex region.
3One needs η > 0 to eliminate the possibility that limk→∞ ‖F(k)‖1 = 1, which would not result in
exponential convergence.
4It is easy to verify that the requirements of a metric are satisfied.
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